“Both Bivens and § 1983 allow a plaintiff to seek money damages from government officials who have violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See § 1983; Bivens, supra, at 397. ” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (U.S. 1999) 36 U.S. Code § 70511 - Liability for acts of officers and agents
46 U.S. Code § 30101 - Extension of jurisdiction to cases of damage or injury on land

FLASHBACK

In 1604, an English court made the now-famous observation that "the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose." Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K. B.). In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone noted that
"the law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man's house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity: agreeing herein with the sentiments of antient Rome. . . . For this reason no doors can in general be broken open to execute any civil process; though, in criminal causes, the public safety supersedes the private." 4 Commentaries 223 (1765-1769).WILSON V. LAYNE U.S. Supreme Court·526 U.S. 603 (1999)

Tax fraud mm In common law, there is no debtor's prison; but in commerce or admiralty there are. You can serve jail time to pay your debt.

If we were in common law, the creditor would have the right to force the debtor to work off that debt.

In commerce, you can't pay your debts, but you do get to discharge your debts, (not eliminate them, but) put them off into the future.

The creditor determines the money. Your signature (as a creditor) creates all the money.

Any name in all capital letters is a vessel. Vessels, (corporations) are dead (fake); they can't create money.
Your promissory note paid for the house. They don't tell you that, but if you as a creditor knew how to interact with the IRS, you could discharge that debt.

What if I also told you that.......

The Bible has many overlays - one is commercial. The sign of the cross is a ledger - assets on the left, liabilities on the right. Christianity is double entry bookkeeping. Yeshua pre-paid your debt. Many call the Bible the "sacred volume of law".

7 years for a bankruptcy; 70 years for a commercial bankruptcy; 10 days, 3 days for a commercial process, etc. The Elites follow the Bible to a "T". They're the sons of Cain.

The Garden of Eden is a commercial-free zone.
In the Bible, one can charge usury only to foreigners. Wooden yoke is slavery at home; iron yoke is slavery in a foreign land.

Sin is debt.

If you come from anger, greed, etc., you're a spiritual debtor. The deadliest sin is pride. Humility is the basic trait of a creditor. Creditors don't take anything personal; they love. You, the authorized representative and trustee of the corporation are there to bring remedy. Don't be an enemy (paper terrorist) of the State by misusing these powerful documents.

Everything in commerce comes from offers and acceptances.




HERE'S SOME INFORMATION MOST OF YOU AREN'T AWARE OF:

In 1868, there was a corporation founded and in that particular company, the founders of that company called it the "United States Corporation" and they stipulated that anybody who would be a member of that corporation or worked for that corporation, would be called, not an employee but a "citizen". So today, if you are asked, ‘are you a citizen of the United States’, what you think you're being asked is, 'are you lawfully in this country to do business?' but that's not lawfully, what's being asked. They didn't ask you if you are an American, lawfully, they asked you a specific question... are you, of your own volition, out of your own mouth testifying that you are a citizen of the United States because in that way, citizen of the United States means you are an employee of a foreign corporation, operating under international maritime law. So today, the President of United States is the President of a privately owned company. The company is called "United States" and the word "President", is always the word used in corporate law - banks have Presidents, all companies have Presidents. President Trump is not the President of America. President Bush is the president of a privately owned company, privately owned out of England. We need to understand words and terms and they have been used to trick and enslave you...



Violations of oath of office 5 U.S.C. 3331 - Oath of office - US Government Publishing Office
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE-2011-title5/USCODE-2011-title5-partIII-subpartB-chap33-subchapII-sec3331 Public Employee affidavit; loyalty and striking against the ... of the office or employment does not or will not violate section 7311 of this title.

Jan 3, 2012 ... United States Code, 2006 Edition, Supplement 5, Title 5 - GOVERNMENT ... SUBCHAPTER II - OATH OF OFFICE (sections 3331 - 3333).

Capital Treason Under Title 18 USC 2381 Criminal Negligence Debtors slavery is modern day Slavery
Peonage was outlawed by an Act of Congress

The federal Constitution makes a careful distinction between natural born Citizens and citizens of the United States** (compare 2:1:5 with Section 1 of the so-called 14th Amendment). One is an unconditional Sovereign by natural birth, who is endowed by the Creator with certain unalienable rights; the other has been granted the revocable privileges of U.S.** citizenship, endowed by the Congress of the United States**. One is a Citizen, the other is a subject. One is a Sovereign, the other is a subordinate. One is a Citizen of our constitutional Republic; the other is a citizen of a legislative democracy (the federal zone). Notice the superior/subordinate relationship between these two statuses.

PRIVATE PROPERTY IS TAX EXEMPT.
Most people don't know that there's a SECRET LIEN on all property bought with FRN's. One guy actually paid off that lien with gold coins, and had his property reclassified as PRIVATE, and didn't have to pay property tax after that. I mean, doh, what do you think is the COLLATERAL for the federal (national) debt? Property of all US PERSONS!

"Property which is taxed is always identified by one of three commercial classifications: residential, industrial or agricultural. Private property cannot be taxed!
Contact your Tax Assessor and ask for a written explanation of the numbered codes appearing on your property tax statement. Once you have deciphered the statement, you will find your property classified by one of the above commercial designations.
Write a letter to your Tax Assessor, explaining that you have discovered an error in your tax statement. Do not mention the tax itself, as the error in question relates only to the classification. Explain that your property has mistakenly been classified as ____________ (agricultural, industrial, residential), and to please correct the classification to read "private." Ask the Assessor to notify you by mail once the matter has been handled. Be polite and sign the letter, using words like "Sincerely", "Best wishes", etc. There is no reason be belligerent at this point.
If the Assessor honors your wishes, you will never see a property tax statement again. If, as is more likely, the Assessor writes back, refusing to adjust his records, you may now open up discussion as to why not. Ask whether you have the right to own private property. He will say yes, of course. Ask why he refuses to classify it as private property. He will either explain to you that he cannot tax property unless it is classified pursuant to constitutional limitations (residential, industrial, agricultural), or he will reveal to you that you do not really own the property (in which case he has admitted to fraud, nullifying the transfer of property in the first place, since you were not aware of what you were doing at the time).
In either case, once the Assessor brings up taxation, you can now make the argument that your real property has been re-classified, without your permission, for the sole purpose of taxation. This is the firm basis for a lawsuit."

JURISDICTIONAL DIVIDE

The jurisdictional division between state and federal tribunals is an essential component of American federalism. Federal courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over certain subject matter, notably those issues of national significance like patent and admiralty law. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 1338. Exclusive jurisdiction over such issues is indicative of a salient federal interest in particular subject matter and allows for the development of a uniform body of federal law governing complex issues with interstate implications. Conversely, the limited jurisdiction of federal courts encourages resort to local tribunals when adjudicating issues germane to those courts. This also inhibits excessive federal judicial intervention. Moreover, federal and state tribunals have subject-matter jurisdiction, concurrently, over a great many issues. This is reflective of the integrated judicial system present in the United States.

Finally, it is important to recognize the far reaching jurisprudential impact of the concept of subject-matter jurisdiction. While discourse in the United States surrounding subject-matter jurisdiction is often related to the relationship between domestic courts, subject-matter jurisdiction plays an operative role in the international sphere as well. Issues frequently arise, for example, involving the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals, like the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. In these debates subject-matter jurisdiction takes on international political significance as parties must decide the degree to which a supranational tribunal can affect persons traditionally subject to domestic law.


MORE 1983 ACTIONS

“Holding that § 1983 creates cause of action against state officials for violating federal statutes”
DAVIS v. SCHERER, 468 U.S. 183 (1984)

“Holding that because § 1983 by its plain text “broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law,” plaintiffs could bring suit for violation of Social Security Act”
Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2014)

“Holding “the § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law.””
Brown v. City of Barre, 878 F.Supp.2d 469 (D. Vt. 2012)

“Holding Section 1983 applies to violations of federal constitutional rights, as well as certain limited federal statutory rights”
Jamison v. Hawk, 3:12-cv-150-RJC (W.D.N.C. May. 30, 2012)

“Holding that § 1983 creates a cause of action against state officials for violations of federal statutes”
Stroud v. McIntosh, CASE NO. 2:11-cv-006-MEF [WO] (M.D. Ala. Dec. 29, 2011)

“Holding that § 1983 encompasses claims against state actors for violations of both federal statutory and constitutional rights”
HARRIS v. MEDICAL STAFF OF MARION CORR. INSTITUTION, 1:11-cv-242 — RJC. (W.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 2011)

“Holding that § 1983 encompasses a claim based on federal statutory violations and applying the holding to a claim for welfare benefits under the Social Security Act”
WASHINGTON v. DeBEAUGRINE, 658 F. Supp.2d 1332 (N.D. Fla. 2009)

“Holding that § 1983 creates a cause of action for violations of all federal statutes”
BLOOM v. JERSEY CITY MUNICIPAL UTILITIES AUTHORITY, MASTER FILE: 06-CV-3526 (WJM). (D.N.J. Feb. 8, 2008)

“Holding that section 1983 could be used to vindicate non-constitutional statutory rights”
HEPTING v. ATT CORP, 439 F. Supp.2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006)

“Holding that parties may enforce under § 1983 rights created by Social Security Act”
FLORIDA PHARMACY ASS'N v. COOK, (N.D.Fla. 1998), 17 F. Supp.2d 1293 (N.D. Fla. 1998)

“Holding that phrase "and laws" actually "means what it says," and allows party to bring § 1983 action based on violation of the Social Security Act”
MORROW v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, ARK., (E.D.Ark. 1996), 941 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Ark. 1996)

“Holding that plaintiffs may bring an action under § 1983 for violation of their right to receive AFDC benefits under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act”
CARELLI v. HOWSER, (S.D.Ohio 1990), 733 F. Supp. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1990)

“Holding that § 1983 applies to violations of any federal statute, not just equal rights legislation”
VEST v. SCHAFER, 757 P.2d 588 (Alaska 1988)

“Holding that federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over section 1983 actions, which may also be pursued in state court”
COX v. STATE, 5 So.3d 659 (Fla. 2009)

“Holding that § 1983 authorizes suits to redress violations by state officials of rights created by federal statutes as well as the federal Constitution”
McLAUGHLIN v. CITY OF LOWELL, 94-5069 (Mass. Cmmw. 1998)
“Finding private cause of action under § 1983 to enforce rights conferred by Social Security Act”
ALBISTON v. MAINE COM'R OF HUMAN SERVICES, 7 F.3d 258 (1st Cir. 1993)

“Finding that the phrase “Constitution and laws” as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 created a cause of action for “violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law””
Venmill Indus., Inc. v. Elm, Inc., 100 F.Supp.3d 59 (D. Mass. 2015)

“Finding "that the § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law"”
Ollis v. Franklin, 1:12-cv-347-RJC (W.D.N.C. Nov. 20, 2012)

“Finding "that the § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutsional law."”
Deal v. Mim, 3:12-cv-363-RJC (W.D.N.C. Aug. 29, 2012)

“Concluding only that "the § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses federal statutory as well as constitutional law"”
GREEN v. McKASKLE, 788 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1986)

“Rejecting contention that § 1983 applies only to civil rights statutes and constitutional rights”
WEBB v. COUNTY OF TRINITY, 734 F. Supp.2d 1018 (E.D. Cal. 2010)

“Recognizing the availability of suits to enforce individual rights under the Social Security Act”
N.B. v. Hamos, No. 11 C 06866 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2013)

“Recognizing that § 1983 actions may be brought to enforce rights created by federal statutes in addition to constitutional rights”
JOSEPH S. v. HOGAN, 561 F. Supp.2d 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
“Refusing to construe "and laws" as limited to civil rights or equal protection laws”
REED v. FARLEY, 512 U.S. 339 (1994)

“Assuming State is a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983”
UNITED STATES v. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)

Attorney Licensing Is a Fraud
(1957) and is located for all to read at the following pages in volume 353 U.S. pgs.238, 239 of the United States Reports. Here is a quote from that case:

Receivership[s] of the US Bankruptcy

Now, to explain what I started in Point 9: The FIRST receiver was the Secretary of the Treasury;

the SECOND was the Secretary of Commerce (See P.L. 97, 67th Congress, session 1, chapter 135).

This also follows the “primary bond” tracking of the certificate of berth of newly formed vessels, or Birth Certificates, that now represent the existence of a corporate person under Title 26 USC 7701 and 18 USC Section 8; which is likely the reason the position of receiver shifted for the THIRD TIME to the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, in 1981, pursuant to P.L. 97-31, subsection (a)(1), codified Title 46 USC Section 1247(a).


Sec. 34. RIGHT TO HUNT, FISH, AND HARVEST WILDLIFE. (a) The people have the right to hunt, fish, and harvest wildlife, including by the use of traditional methods, subject to laws or regulations to conserve and manage wildlife and preserve the future of hunting and fishing.
(b) Hunting and fishing are preferred methods of managing and controlling wildlife.
(c) This section does not affect any provision of law relating to trespass, property rights, or eminent domain.
(d) This section does not affect the power of the legislature to authorize a municipality to regulate the discharge of a weapon in a populated area in the interest of public safety.

U.S. Constitution : Article IV Section 4 - Republican form of government guaranteed.
NOT a Democracy. Therefore, a Democracy is UNCONSTITUTIONAL....



Vehicle/Traffic
"An action by Department of Motor Vehicles, whether directly or through a court sitting administratively as the hearing officer, must be clearly defined in the statute before it has subject matter jurisdiction, without such jurisdiction of the licensee, all acts of the agency, by its employees, agents, hearing officers, are null and void." Doolan v. Carr, 125 US 618; City v Pearson, 181 Cal. 640.

"Agency, or party sitting for the agency, (which would be the magistrate of a municipal court) has no authority to enforce as to any licensee unless he is acting for compensation. Such an act is highly penal in nature, and should not be construed to include anything which is not embraced within its terms. (Where) there is no charge within a complaint that the accused was employed for compensation to do the act complained of, or that the act constituted part of a contract." Schomig v. Kaiser, 189 Cal 596.

"When acting to enforce a statute and its subsequent amendments to the present date, the judge of the municipal court is acting as an administrative officer and not in a judicial capacity; courts in administering or enforcing statutes do not act judicially, but merely ministerially". Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 583.

"A judge ceases to sit as a judicial officer because the governing principle of administrative law provides that courts are prohibited from substituting their evidence, testimony, record, arguments, and rationale for that of the agency. Additionally, courts are prohibited from substituting their judgment for that of the agency. Courts in administrative issues are prohibited from even listening to or hearing arguments, presentation, or rational." ASIS v. US, 568 F2d 284.

"Ministerial officers are incompetent to receive grants of judicial power from the legislature, their acts in attempting to exercise such powers are necessarily nullities." Burns v. Sup., Ct., SF, 140 Cal. 1.

The elementary doctrine that the constitutionality of a legislative act is open to attack only by persons whose rights are affected thereby, applies to statute relating to administrative agencies, the validity of which may not be called into question in the absence of a showing of substantial harm, actual or impending, to a legally protected interest directly resulting from the enforcement of the statute."
Board of Trade v. Olson, 262 US 1; 29 ALR 2d 105.

RIGHT OF DEFENSE AGAINST
UNLAWFUL ARREST
LAWFUL CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE

"Citizens may resist unlawful arrest to the point of taking an arresting officer's life if necessary." Plummer v. State, 136 Ind. 306. This premise was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case: John Bad Elk v. U.S., 177 U.S. 529. The Court stated:

"Where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction, when the officer had the right to make the arrest, from what it does if the officer had no right. What may be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed."

"An arrest made with a defective warrant, or one issued without affidavit, or one that fails to allege a crime is within jurisdiction, and one who is being arrested, may resist arrest and break away. if the arresting officer is killed by one who is so resisting, the killing will be no more than an involuntary manslaughter." Housh v. People, 75 111. 491; reaffirmed and quoted in State v. Leach, 7 Conn. 452; State v. Gleason, 32 Kan. 245; Ballard v. State, 43 Ohio 349; State v Rousseau, 241 P. 2d 447; State v. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 3621.
"When a person, being without fault, is in a place where he has a right to be, is violently assaulted, he may, without retreating, repel by force, and if, in the reasonable exercise of his right of self defense, his assailant is killed, he is justified." Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80; Miller v. State, 74 Ind. 1.

"These principles apply as well to an officer attempting to make an arrest, who abuses his authority and transcends the bounds thereof by the use of unnecessary force and violence, as they do to a private individual who unlawfully uses such force and violence." Jones v. State, 26 Tex. App. I; Beaverts v. State, 4 Tex. App. 1 75; Skidmore v. State, 43 Tex. 93, 903.
"An illegal arrest is an assault and battery. The person so attempted to be restrained of his liberty has the same right to use force in defending himself as he would in repelling any other assault and battery." (State v. Robinson, 145 ME. 77, 72 ATL. 260).

"Each person has the right to resist an unlawful arrest. In such a case, the person attempting the arrest stands in the position of a wrongdoer and may be resisted by the use of force, as in self- defense." (State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E. 2d 100).

"One may come to the aid of another being unlawfully arrested, just as he may where one is being assaulted, molested, raped or kidnapped. Thus it is not an offense to liberate one from the unlawful custody of an officer, even though he may have submitted to such custody, without resistance." (Adams v. State, 121 Ga. 16, 48 S.E. 910).

"Story affirmed the right of self-defense by persons held illegally. In his own writings, he had admitted that 'a situation could arise in which the checks-and-balances principle ceased to work and the various branches of government concurred in a gross usurpation.' There would be no usual remedy by changing the law or passing an amendment to the Constitution, should the oppressed party be a minority. Story concluded, 'If there be any remedy at all ... it is a remedy never provided for by human institutions.' That was the `ultimate right of all human beings in extreme cases to resist oppression, and to apply force against ruinous injustice.'" (From Mutiny on the Amistad by Howard Jones, Oxford University Press, 1987, an account of the reading of the decision in the case by Justice Joseph Story of the Supreme Court.

As for grounds for arrest: "The carrying of arms in a quiet, peaceable, and orderly manner, concealed on or about the person, is not a breach of the peace. Nor does such an act of itself, lead to a breach of the peace." (Wharton's Criminal and Civil Procedure, 12th Ed., Vol.2: Judy v. Lashley, 5 W. Va. 628, 41 S.E. 197)





Judges and lawyers , attorneys Public can't recognize Public - if they did, all attorneys & judges would have to be executed.

Judges are only establishing whether you are a creditor or a debtor, determined not by your words but by your actions. If you're a creditor, he's going to find in your favor.

Stump v. Sparkman, id., 435 U.S. 349
Some Defendants urge that any act "of a judicial nature" entitles the Judge to absolute judicial immunity. But in a jurisdictional vacuum (that is, absence of all jurisdiction) the second prong necessary to absolute judicial immunity is missing.
A judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely administrative, non-judicial capacity.

until cops aka code enforcement of the treaty of 1213 for the Vatican attorneys irs agents until cops they honor thy oath title 5 3331-3 333, stop kidnapping and destroy woman and men for their personal religions of religious convection of their on disbelief,lawful bloodline Americans for your personal greed fact,, the ones who truly honor thy oath thank you, the ones who know thy bible and the treaty of 1213 as I flied in the star of the sea and London England sewer and water , on thy devil pope soul and Vatican I ask thy as-well,,,, we don't need a driver license to lawfully travel , I have suggested a travels card paid by house resolution 192 There is no such thing as an Attorney License to practice law. The UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT held a long time ago that The practice of Law CANNOT be licensed by any state/State. This was so stated in a case named Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) and is located for all to read at the following pages in volume 353 U.S. pgs.238, 239 of the United States Reports. Here is a quote from that case:

Do You Know About The Act of 1871 Teach this in your School
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6P318bELif8

"A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection [353 U.S. 232, 239] Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 . Cf. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 ; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 . And see Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13. A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 ; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 319-320. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 . Obviously an applicant could not be excluded merely because he was a Republican or a Negro or a member of a particular church. Even in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 ."
[Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), emphasis added]

Another case which bore this out was PDF Sims v. Ahrens, 271 S.W. 720 (1925). In this case the opinion of the court was that

"The practice of Law is an occupation of common right."

http://famguardian.org/…/LegalEt…/AttorneyLicensingFraud.htm

There is no such thing as an Attorney License to practice law. The UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT held a long time ago that The practice of Law CANNOT be licensed by any state/State. This was so stated in a case named Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) and is located for all to read at the following pages in volume 353 U.S. pgs.238, 239 of the United States Reports. Here is a quote from that case:

"A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection [353 U.S. 232, 239] Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 . Cf. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 ; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 . And see Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13. A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 ; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 319-320. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 . Obviously an applicant could not be excluded merely because he was a Republican or a Negro or a member of a particular church. Even in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 ."
[Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), emphasis added]

Another case which bore this out was PDF Sims v. Ahrens, 271 S.W. 720 (1925). In this case the opinion of the court was that

"The practice of Law is an occupation of common right."

There is no such thing as an Attorney License to practice law. The UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT held a long time ago that The practice of Law CANNOT be licensed by any state/State. This was so stated in a case named Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) and is located for all to read at the following pages in volume 353 U.S. pgs.238, 239 of the United States Reports. Here is a quote from that case:

"A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection [353 U.S. 232, 239] Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 . Cf. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 ; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 . And see Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13. A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 ; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 319-320. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 . Obviously an applicant could not be excluded merely because he was a Republican or a Negro or a member of a particular church. Even in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 ."
[Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), emphasis added]

Another case which bore this out was PDF Sims v. Ahrens, 271 S.W. 720 (1925). In this case the opinion of the court was that

"The practice of Law is an occupation of common right."

http://famguardian.org/…/LegalEt…/AttorneyLicensingFraud.htm
Every Monday Read the information below could educate you 1/1/17 The Disclaimers talk show by Dave and edward johnston
http://new.oregontrackers.com/home.html
Also on youtube oregon trackers Live Stream https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Bq4H_m_pJA
5pm oregon ,6, Mountain 7pm,central 8pm eastcoast Call in 712 775 7035 228627
Constitution lawful Bloodline American Republic V Legal Democracy
please read about the law .. Edward Johnston filings, published
in the media https://olis.leg.state.or.us/…/CommitteeMeetingDocume…/72439 Also filed
filed https://s3.amazonaws.com/khu…/1-AllEdsDocs-Merged%26Long.pdf

A must watch with your children
Red Skelton's Pledge of Allegiance
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nDnXcw6euIE

Exhibit #05.051: Former IRS Commissioner Steven Miller says the income tax is "voluntary" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MG2mcjAuLo4

9 TRILLION Dollars Missing from Federal Reserve!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GYNVNhB-m0o

[1] This is a BOLD LIE,the 16th Amendment it was never ratified per Article V of the U.S. Constitution (Congressional Record House, June 13, 1967, pg 15641-15646 and Dyett v Turner (1968) are VERY CLEAR about this)

http://fromthetrenchesworldreport.com/police-unions-…/181469

Police Unions Head To DC To Ask New President, Attorney General To Stop Making Cops Respect The Constitution
by Joe from MassPrivateI

Tech Dirt - by Tim Cushing Here it comes -- the exact sort of response Trump was looking for when he issued his "Standing Up for Our Law Enforcement Community" edict during his first couple of days in office. One of the fundamental rights of every American is to live in a safe community. A […]

US GOV Elected and public servants aka employees laughing about stealing land also raping and robbing, kidnapping holding woman man and children for ransom as filed destroying family's for personal gain and British foriegn 1871 government contracted elected and public servants service of employment . https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MFGlIvY6oTw&t=629s ,,,,,,,,,Gov't employee brags about stealing land. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7jeLi14p-KU

Lawyer’s Secret Oath
Page 1 of 16 Lawyer's Secret Oath?
http://freedom-school.com/aware/the-lawyers-secret-oath.pdf

“It is a clearly established principle of law that an attorney must represent a corporation, it being incorporeal and a creature of the law. An attorney representing an artificial entity must appear with the corporate charter and law in his hand. A person acting as an attorney for a foreign principal must be registered to act on the principal’s behalf.” See, Foreign Agents Registration Act” (22 USC § 612 et seq.); Victor Rabinowitz et. at. v. Robert F. Kennedy,376 US 605. “Failure to file the "Foreign Agents Registrations Statement" goes directly to the jurisdiction and lack of standing to be before the court, and is a felony pursuant to 18 USC §§ 219, 951. The conflict of law, interest and allegiance is obvious. A Lawyer can not make a claim to your rights , Only you can . Federal District Court Judge James Alger Fee's mind blowing assertion in
United States v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Pa. 1947)
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania - 76 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Pa. 1947) February 26, 1947 , Congress cannot by legislation enlarge the federal jurisdiction, and it cannot be enlarged under the treaty making power.” Mayor, Alderman and Inhabitants of City of New Orleans v. U.S., 35 U.S. 662, 10 Pet. 662, 9 L.Ed. 573 (1836). And; 18 U.S. Code § 661 - Within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction

Current through Pub. L. 114-38. (See Public Laws for the current Congress.)

Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any personal property of another shall be punished as follows:

If the property taken is of a value exceeding $1,000, or is taken from the person of another, by a fine under this title, or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both; in all other cases, by a fine under this title or by imprisonment not more than one year, or both.

18 U.S. Code § 1341 - Frauds and swindles

Current through Pub. L. 114-38. (See Public Laws for the current Congress.)

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such "COUNTERFEIT"or spurious article............. et seq.

It is the duty of every lawful Bloodline American to oppose all enemies of this Nation, foreign and DOMESTIC. (Note added: Every Lawful and recognized American Citizen including all Elected, Appointed, hired public servant(s), Children's Protection Services, Police, Sheriff's, Martials, CIA, FBI, Capital Police, Secret Service, City Council, County Commissioners, Board of Commissioners,et al, Religious Organizations, Associations, Schools, Colleges, Universities, Schools of Law, Corporations, LLC's, Doctors, Nurses, Health Care Providers, Unions, et al, to preform they of Oath of Office, in compliance to the 1776 Constitution for the United States of America, to all matters herein related thereof.) Please help pass this information to other professionals in your area – and honor thy 1776 Constitutional oath of office in your area of expertise it is after all as Lawful Americans' right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness that 'GOD' promised mine and your bloodline of this United States of America for all mankind thereof.Please read read title 18 all of it''The Original Thirteenth Article of Amendment
To The Constitution For The United States
"If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive, or retain any title of nobility or honour, or shall without the consent of Congress, accept and retain any present, pension, office, or emolument of any kind whatever, from any emperor, king, prince, or foreign power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under them, or either of them." [Journal of the Senate]

Citizens(Federal) and Persons vs. People

IT IS ALL ABOUT BONDS why police attempt , murder , kidnap and hold Americans for ransom ..

Justice Department warns local courts about illegal enforcement of fees and fines http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/justice_department_warns_local_courts_about_illegal_enforcement_of_fees_and

What they’re doing in these courts is all about Bonds. When you go into the courtroom after you’re arrested, they use two different sets of Bonds. What they do when your arrested they fill out a “Bid Bond”. The United States District Court uses 273, 274 & 275. SF = “Standard Form”. Standard Form 273, Standard Form 274 & Standard Form 275. This is the United States District Court.

There is another set of Bonds and they are all put out by GSA = General Services Administration. I’m just talking off the top of my head because I have all of this stuff memorized. GSA Form SF24 is the “Bid Bond”, everyone should have a copy of the Bid Bond. The “Performance Bond” is SF25. The “Payment Bond” is SF25A and put out by the GSA.

O.K. So, what are they doing with these Bonds? What’s going on in the courtroom is that they are suing you for a debt collection. If you look at these Bonds, everyone of these Bonds: the “Bid Bond”, the “Performance Bond” & the “Payment Bond”, all have a “PENAL SUM” attached to it. The reason for the “Penal Sum” is if you don’t pay the Debt, you go into “Default Judgment”.

That is what is going on in the courtroom. That is why all of these guys are sitting in prison wondering what’s going on! If you go in and argue jurisdiction or refuse to answer questions that the judge or the court addresses to you, they will find you in contempt of court and they will put you in jail. What they do is arrest you, then they hold you, basically until the suit has been completed. Once they get “Default Judgment” on you because of your failure to pay the Debt, they put you in prison. Theattorneys are there to create a smoke screen.

What attorneys have been trained to do is to lead you into “Dishonor” or “Default Judgment”. Then the court puts you into prison then they sell your “Default Judgment”.

Who do they sell it to?

Believe it or not, the U.S. District Court buys all of these State Court Judgments. I don’t know why noone has found this out before. There are about 300 “re-insurance” companies that buy these bonds. They are all ‘insurance” companies. These are the people that are buying these Bonds when you went into “Default Judgment” and they cannot buy these Bonds unless they are Certified by the Secretary of the Treasury.

What are they doing with these Bonds? They have regulations governing these Bonds – there are 2,000 regulations governing these Bonds.

Commercial Paper; Negotiable Instruments - anything you put your signature on is a Negotiable Instrument under the Uniform Commercial Code which is the Lex Mercantorium. Its Mercantile Civil Law.

The reason they use Lex Merchantorium in the court room is because everyone of you are Merchant’s at Law and Merchants at Law is anyone who holds themselves out to be an expert.Because you use commercial paper on a daily basis, you are considered to be an ‘expert’. This is also why they are not telling you what is really going on in the courtroom. You are presumed to know this stuff because you hold yourself out to be an expert by using commercial paper every day.

Every time you put your signature on a piece of paper, you are creating a Negotiable Instrument. Some are Non-Negotiable and some are Negotiable. Every time you endorse something, you are acting as an accommodation party or an accommodation maker under UCC 3-419.

An accommodation party is anyone who loans their signature to another party. Read UCC 3-419, it tells you what an accommodation maker is and what an accommodation party is. When you loan your signature to them, they can then re-write your signature on any document they want and that’s exactly what they are doing.

What the Federal Courts are doing is they are buying up these state court default judgments, called ‘criminal cases’ to cover up what they are doing. Actually, they are civil cases.

If you read “Clerk’s Praxis”, you find that what they call ‘criminal’ is all civil, they just call it criminal to cover up what their doing. If you don’t pay the debt you go to prison, bottom line.

I know I’ve been there. EVERYBODY IS FEEDING OFF OF THE PRISON SYSTEM: ALL OF THE MAJOR CORPORATIONS ARE FEEDING OFF OF THE PRISON SYSTEM.

How many of you have heard of REIT = Real Estate Investment Trust or PZN which means Prison Trust? Prisoners are real estate? They own all the real estate because they hold the Bonds on them. You haven’t redeemed your Bond, so they didn’t close your account.

Here’s what goes on: A contractor comes in or any corporation could come in and tender a Bid Bond to the US District Court and they buy up these court judgments and anytime you issue a Bid Bond there has to be a reinsure. So they get a Reinsurance Company to come in and act as Surety for the Bid Bond, then they bring in a Performance Bond. All of these Bonds; Bid, Payment & Performance are all Surety Bonds and anytime you issue a Bid Bond it has to have a Surety guaranteeing or reinsuring the Bid Bond via issuing a Performance Bond.

Then they get an underwriter and that would be either an Investment Broker or an Investment Banker. They come in and underwrite the Performance Bond which is reinsuring the Bid Bond.

What does the underwriter do with the Performance Bond? The underwriter takes the 3 Bonds and pools them and creates what is known as Mortgaged Backed Securities. When you pool these MBS, they are called BONDS and are sold to a company called TBA, which is the Bond Market Association - this is an actual Corporation.

These converted Bonds, now MBS’ are investment securities and being sold the international level. CCA is one of the tickers on the NY Stock Exchange. Others include; CWX, CWD & CWG. When it goes to Frankfurt = CWG, when it goes to Berlin = CWD and so on.

Remember, everything is commercial. 7211 7 CFR says that all crimes are commercial. If you read that carefully it says kidnapping, robbery, extortion, murder, etc. are all commercial crimes. Thus, you are funding the whole enchilada simply because you got into Default Judgment when you went into court and failed to redeem the Bond.

This is why people don’t win in court; cause they don’t redeem the Bond. You are the Principal upon which all money circulates, but you don’t want to start arguing with the court about that.

They are drafting you for performance. So, anytime the court asks you to do something they are drafting you for performance and if you don’t perform, you get into dishonor by non acceptance.They are making a formal presentment under 3-501 of the UCC so they can charge you and they USE the word “charge”. They use the same commercial words on your Indictment, Information and Complaint. They use the word “charge”, i.e., “the following charges”, “…he has two counts of charges”, etc.

Be as gentle as a dove and wise as a serpent. You can’t act like an insurgent or belligerent. If you do, they will treat you like one; they’ll beat you up.

What you want to do is settle the account…go to full settlement and closure; you’re running the account, you’re the Fiduciary Trustee over the account – tell them what to do. You’re the Principal and owner of the account, tell them what to do – tell them you want full settlement and closure of the account. You have to do this from the get-go.

In order to win in court you have to redeem the Bond.

Here is where to begin: Start with what we call a conditional acceptance.

With the conditional acceptance you can say: “I’m more than happy to give you my name, if you can show that charging papers have been put into the court record. I have not seen any papers that show any charges exist.”

That’s a “Negative Averment”. What you are doing is rebutting the presumption that they have charges against you. They work off presumptions. They don’t have to have anything. You must rebut their presumptions.

I went down there and asked them for the Bid Bond. I said I want the Bid Bond back. I asked for full settlement and closure of the account. It’s your money that they create and the same thing is going on in the Banks and with these Bonds - they monetize these Bonds.

Then ask for legal counsel. The reason why you have to have an attorney, and I cannot emphasize this too strongly, is because the attorney while in a courtroom is they are working on the public side and you are working on the private side. The court cannot talk to you except through your attorney. You need a mouth piece; a microphone. That is what attorneys are - a mouthpiece. Everyone on the Public side is insolvent and bankrupt. You are not.

This is situation is called a Fiction-of-Law. They will not allow you to defeat this “Fiction-Of-Law”. Why? In Admiralty Maritime Law everything is colorable. It has the appearance of being real but is not real.

They will appoint legal counsel for you. You then instruct the attorney that you are doing a “LETTER OF ROGATORY” or letter of advice. This is also called an “Acceptance for Honor” and you want an accounting of what the total amount of the Bill is post settlement and closure of this account.

Then you give your CUSIP and AUTOTIS number and your case number.

Here’s the wording you use: “I accept your charge(s) for Value and Consideration in return for Post Settlement and Closure of Case # , account# 123-45-6789 [put down your 9 digit social security number] and put down CUSIP# [your ssn] & AUTOTRIS# [your ssn w/o dashes]. Please us my exemption for full settlement and closure of this account as this account is prepaid and exempt from levy. (Date it and endorse it as the Authorized Representative.)

(AUTOTRIS means Automated Tracking Identification System. This is the same as your social security number without the dashes. When I said that they didn’t even want to talk to me…when you sayCUSIP & AUTOTRIS they know exactly what you’re talking about. CUSIP is The COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM SECURITIES IDENTIFICATION PROCESSES. . CUSIP uses your Social Security Number to identify you because the Birth Certificate is a Security. It is an investment security and they have all the original Birth Certificates which are registered at the State level with the Department of Human Recourses and then they go to the Department of Commerce and the Federal level and then to the DTC (Depository Trust Corporation).

Judges and lawyers don’t understand commercial law. They do not teach commercial law at law school.They have a special school for them and it’s on a “need to know” basis. The law always assumes that you know, since you were doing this since you were born until you reach the age of accountability, which is 18 years of age or what they call adulthood. If your holding yourself out and using commercial paper on a daily basis, that legal definition makes you an expert or you wouldn’t be using it, so they presume that when you go into the courtroom you know all this stuff.

They have to give you an out. Whenever you create a liability, you always have to create a remedy. They’re on the Public side of the accounting ledger. You are on the Private side.

You have an account and your account is a “Demand Deposit” account and you are insured by the FDIA and the FDIC. The “Federal Depository Insurance Act” which insures the FDIC which is the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation under Title 12; they have a $10 Million Dollar Policy on you and YOU’RE WORTH MORE DEAD THAN YOU ARE ALIVE.

THEY WILL NEVER TELL YOU THIS STUFF!!

NOTE: All tradable Securities must be assigned a CUSIP NUMBER before it can be offered to investors. Birth Certificates and Social Security Applications are converted into Government Securities; assigned a CUSIP NUMBER; grouped into lots and then are marketed as a Mutual Fund Investment. Upon maturity, the profits are moved into a GOVERNMENT CESTA QUE TRUST and if you are still alive, the certified documents are reinvested. It is the funds contained in this CESTA QUE TRUST that the Judge, Clerk and County Prosecutor are really after or interested in! This Trust actually pays all of your debts but nobody tells you that because the Elite consider those assets to be their property and the Federal Reserve System is responsible for the management of those Investments.

Social Security; SSI; SSD; Medicare and Medicaid are all financed by the Trust. The government makes you pay TAXES and a potion of your wages supposedly to pay for these services, which they can borrow at any time for any reason since they cannot access the CESTA QUE TRUST to finance their Wars or to bail out Wall Street and their patron Corporations.

The public is encouraged to purchase all kinds of insurance protection when the TRUST actually pays for all physical damages; medical costs; new technology and death benefits. The hype to purchase insurance is a ploy to keep us in poverty and profit off our stupidity because the Vatican owns the controlling interest in all Insurance Companies.

You may receive a monthly statement from a Mortgage Company; Loan Company or Utility Company, which usually has already been paid by the TRUST. Almost all of these corporate businesses double dip and hope that you have been conditioned well enough by their Credit Scams, to pay them a second time. Instead of paying that Statement next time, sign it approved and mail it back to them. If they then contact you about payment, ask them to send you a TRUE BILL instead of a Statement and you will be glad to pay it? A Statement documents what was due and paid, whereas a TRUE BILL represents only what is due. Banks and Utility Companies have direct access into these Cesta Que Trusts and all they needed was your name; social security number and signature.

"If money is wanted by rulers who have in any manner oppressed the People, they may retain it until their grievances are redressed, and thus peaceably procure relief, without trusting to despised petitions or disturbing the public tranquility." Journals of the Continental Congress. 26 October, 1774©1789. Journals 1: 105©13.

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SPEEDY TRIAL

“Holding that an indictment left pending indefinitely constitutes a Sixth Amendment violation”
IN RE HIJAZI, 589 F.3d 401 (7th Cir. 2009)

“Holding that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Sixth Amendment applicable to states proceedings”
DIXON v. WHITE, 210 Fed.Appx. 498 (6th Cir. 2007)

“Holding that "the right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment"”
U.S. v. COPE, 312 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2002)

“Holding that the right to a speedy trial is incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment and thus applies to the states”
WILSON v. MITCHELL, 250 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2001)

“Holding State's nolle prosequi procedure to be an unconstitutional violation of right to speedy trial where statute of limitations was tolled during pendency”
U.S. v. MIDGLEY, 142 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 1998)

“Holding that the right to a speedy trial is fundamental and imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the States”
HAITHCOTE v. CASTILLO, No. 4:09-cv-4, Mattice/Lee. (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 29, 2010)

“Holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is "fundamental" and applies to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment”
Hartfield v. State, NUMBER 13-15-00428-CR (Tex. App. Jan. 19, 2017)

“Finding that an eighteen-month delay violated defendant's right to a speedy trial”
HARRIS v. RICCI, Civil Action No. 06-4276 (JAG). (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2007)

“Reversing conviction based on speedy trial violation”
STATE v. DAVIS, 898 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. 2008)

“Observing that each of the fifty states guarantees the right to a speedy trial”
Martinez v. United States, 828 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 2016)

“Noting that each of the fifty states guarantees the right to a speedy trial”
Martinez v. United States, 793 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2015)

“Incorporating the right to a speedy trial”
McKINNEY v. PATE, 985 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1993)

“Describing right to speedy trial as "fundamental"”
U.S. v. HASTINGS, 847 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1988)

“Discussing the fact that, the current procedural posture of the case against Klopfer left him "no means by which he can obtain a dismissal or have the case restored to the calendar for trial."”
U.S. v. HIJAZI, Case No. 05-40024-02. (C.D. Ill. Jul. 18, 2011)

“Discussing the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and the Magna Carta, and noting the fundamental importance of prompt criminal proceedings”
U.S. v. HANHARDT, (N.D.Ill. 2001), No. 00 CR 0853 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2001)

“Identifying the right to a speedy trial as fundamental and holding that it is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”
Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)

“Incorporating Sixth Amendment's speedy trial protection to States through Fourteenth Amendment to United States Constitution”
COMMONWEALTH v. DIXON, 458 Mass. 446 (Mass. 2010)

“Incorporating the federal mandate to the states”
COM. v. MEADIUS, 582 Pa. 174 (Pa. 2005)

“Identifying principle”
STATE v. HARBERTS, 331 Or. 72 (Or. 2000)

“Incorporating Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial”
SALDANA v. STATE, 846 P.2d 604 (Wyo. 1993)

“Applying federal constitutional speedy trial requirement to states”
GELFAND v. PEOPLE, 196 Colo. 487 (Colo. 1978)

“Incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial”
Rauf v. State, No. 39, 2016 (Del. Aug. 2, 2016)

“Applying the Sixth Amendment to the states through application of the Fourteenth Amendment”
State v. Fisher, 2012 Ohio 6144 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012)

“Stating that where prosecutor filed nolle prosequi but could activate charges at any time and have case restored for trial without further order of the court, constitutional right to speedy trial was violated”
STATE v. TALAMANTE, 2003-NMCA-135 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003)

“Describing the historical English and state antecedents to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution”
MIDDLEBROOK v. STATE, 802 A.2d 268 (Del. 2002)

the question to the judges PLEASE EXPLAIN WHAT THIS MEANS TO EVERYBODY

This Court has noted that the common law may aid contemporary inquiry into the meaning of the Amendment's term "seizure." See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, n. 2 (1991). At common law, an arrested person's seizure was deemed to continue even after release from official custody. See, e.g., 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown ("he that is bailed, is in supposition of law still in custody, and the parties that take him to bail are in law his keepers"); 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries (bail in both civil and criminal cases is "a delivery or bailment, of a person to his sureties, . . . he being supposed to continue in their friendly custody, instead of going to gaol").ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER•510 U.S. 266, 277 (1994)

Affidavit of Human trafficking for the profits For city , county state , Elected and public servants
fraud upon the court 17cr26377 Presented by Victoria L Ryan 'BAR"
British auxiliary accreditation number 165183




melissa-catherine damarel: bodda Crime victim Corpus delicti - literally "body of the crime"
No injury or loss... no criminal case. Whereas: melissa-catherine damarel: bodda Crime victim Corpus delicti (See Below) and identity thief Title 42 § 408(a)(8) Title 42 § 408 (a) In general Whoever -(8) discloses, uses, or compels the disclosure of the social security number of any person in violation of the laws of the United States; shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. melissa-catherine damarel: bodda Started with public servant acting police servant Cooper on or about the 24th of April 2017 assaulted me for ransom and personal So by statue,code and administration rules the police work for your Mayor and city council a Foreign Corporation are not the people. This So Simple State and federal law states corpus delicti No Victim No Crime. An It is up to the Victim How to proceed. Are they all should be unemployed. They Write ticket bonds for the city's county's and states. was traveling with a friend lawfully in my carriage. Melissa was traveling on southwest 4th ave into the mall area of Ontario Oregon to the

A policy or custom for which a municipality may be held liable can arise in four ways: (1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that "manifest [s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens"; or (4) through a practice that is so "persistent and widespread" as to constitute a "custom or usage with the force of law."
Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003)

Judges enforce Law. BAR Attorneys enforce International Maritime Law. You should know the difference and how to handle it. FRC vs. GE 281 U.S. 464, Keller vs. PE 261 U.S. 428, 1 Stat. 138 -178) “Judges do not enforce statutes and codes. Executive Administrators enforce statutes and codes.


McDonald's ordering in travel thru. Melissa I was unlawfully assaulted kidnap and held for ransom by an unknown to me public servant Officer Casey Walker. including Five unknown officers and unidentified who took participation in the assault kidnapping an held for ransom birth certificate bond to justify the city budget for a right of life liberty and pursuit of happiness, As Melissa called Edward ?Johnston, As Ed was on the phone with Alleged sergeant Jason Cooper. As the witnessed on telecommunication of him participating in her assult that ended in rape at the county jail When I requested “how may I help you?”, I was informed He claimed I was not wearing my seat belt on private property in a drive thru ordering food. When I asked “did I commit a crime?”"For a crime to exist, there must be an injured party. There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of Constitutional rights."- Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 945. AT LAW. "This phrase is used to point out that a thing is to be done according to the course of the common law; it is distinguished from a proceeding in equity." "All laws, rules and practices which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void" [Marbury v. Madison, 5th US (2 Cranch) 137, 180]
The common law is the real law, the Supreme Law of the land, the code, rules, regulations, policy and statutes are “not the law”, [Self v. Rhay, 61 Wn (2d) 261]


"The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the form and name of law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void and ineffective for any purpose, since its unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactment... In legal contemplation, it is as inoperative as if it had never been passed... Since an unconstitutional law is void, the general principles follow that it imposes no duties, confers no right, creates no office, bestows no power or authority on anyone, affords no protection and justifies no acts performed under it... A void act cannot be legally consistent with a valid one. An unconstitutional law cannot operate to supersede any existing law. Indeed insofar as a statute runs counter to the fundamental law of the land, (the Constitution) it is superseded thereby. No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it." [Bonnett v. Vallier, 116 N.W. 885, 136 Wis. 193 (1908); NORTON v. SHELBY COUNTY, 118 U.S. 425 (1886)],

City corporation Officer Casey Walker said “no” and then was asked my name I was amazed because most know who I am a woman and I refused to speak my name under the 5th amendment as I committed no crime. First Melissa hasThe First Amendment protects insulting, inflammatory, and even hate-filled speech. National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 97 S.Ct. 2205, 53 L.Ed.2d 96 (1977) (neo-Nazis permitted to walk through Jewish suburb); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387, 112 S.Ct. 2358, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (overturning conviction for cross burning); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) (statements advocating violence against blacks and Jews are protected). Speech is protected unless specific speech falls into a recognized category of unprotected speech such as “true threats.” Suggs v. Hamilton, 152 Wn.2d 74, 93 P.3d 161 (July 8, 2004); State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197, 213, 26 P.3d 890 (2002); Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition, 290 F.3d 1058 (2002).
Every man, however guilty, has a right to shun an illegal arrest by flight. The exercise of this right should not, and would not, subject him to be arrested as a fugitive." Thomas v. State, 91 Ga. 204, 206, 18 S.E. 305; cited with approval in Porter v. State, 124 Ga. 297, 52 S.E. 283.STATE V. ROUSSEAU The Supreme Court of Washington. Department Two.·40 Wn.2d 92 (Wash. 1952)


In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), we held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law."

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (U.S. 1996)

"Before a court may exercise judicial power to hear and determine a criminal prosecution, that court must possess three types of jurisdiction: jurisdiction over the defendant, jurisdiction over the alleged crime, and territorial jurisdiction." Const. Art. 1 sec. 9, State v. Legg, 9 S.W.3d 111 (1999) And if you know and understand the Four Organic Laws and the territorial limitations like U.S. Code › Title 28 › Part I › Chapter 5

Public servants OUR SWORN DUTY

An area of serious consideration for every police officer, is to understand that the most important law in our land he has taken an oath to protect, defend, AND ENFORCE, is not state laws, nor city or county ordinances, but, that law that supersede all other laws in our nation, – the U.S. Constitution. If laws in a particular police officer’s state, or local community are in conflict with the SUPREME LAW of our nation, there Is no question that the officer’s duty is to “uphold the U.S. Constitution.”

What does this mean to the “patrol officer” who will be the only sworn “Executive Officer” on the scene, when knowledgeable Citizens raise serious objections over possession of insurance, drivers licenses and other restrictions? It definitely means these officers will be faced with a hard decision. (Most certainly if that decision effects state, city or county revenues, such as the issuing of citations do.)

Example: If a state legislator, judge or a superior tells a police officer to proceed and enforce a contradictory, (illegal), state law rather than the Supreme Law of this country, what is that “sworn officer” to do? Although we may not want to hear it, there is but one right answer, – “the officer is duty bound to uphold his oath of office” and obey the highest laws of the nation. THIS IS OUR SWORN DUTY AND IT’S THE LAW!

Such a strong honest stand taken by a police officer, upholding his or her oath of office, takes moral strength of character. It will, without question, “SEPARATE THE MEN FROM THE BOYS.” Such honest and straight forward decisions on behalf of a government official have often caused pressure to be applied to force such officers to set aside, or compromise their morals or convictions.

As a solace for those brave souls in uniform that will stand up for law and justice, even when it’s unpopular, or uncomfortable to do so…let me say this. In any legal stand-off over a sworn official “violating” or “upholding” their oath of office, those that would side with the “violation” should inevitable lose.

Our Founding Fathers assured us, on many occasions, the following: Defending our freedoms in the face of people that would for “expedients sake,” or behind the guise, “for the safety and welfare of the masses,” ignore peoples rights, would forever demand sacrifice andvigilance from those that desired to remain free. That sounds a little like – “Freedom is not free!”

Every police officer should keep the following court ruling, that was covered earlier, in mind before issuing citations in regard to “mandatory licensing, registration and insurance” – verses – “the right of the people to travel unencumbered”:

Please explain the deference of Federal crime

Police are tax revenue agents for the city county state and federal tax collectors
93% of town's revenue is from traffic tickets and fees
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1QMy98cP3SY

State denies duty of care to injured police - The Age
www.theage.com.au/victoria/state-denies-duty-of-care-to...
The state government and Victoria Police are using an arcane legal ... claiming they owe no duty of care to ... State denies duty of care to injured police ...
Police Have No Duty To Protect Individuals
www.firearmsandliberty.com/kasler-protection.html Cached
Police Have No Duty To Protect Individuals ... concluding that Constitutional duties of care and protection only ... that they have no duty to ...

Warren v. District of Columbia - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warren_v._District_of_Columbia Cached
... District of Columbia Court of Appeals case that held that the police do not owe a specific duty to provide police ... no specific legal duty exists". The Court .

SUPREME COURT REAFFIRMS POLICE HAVE NO DUTY TO PROTECT YOU ...
www.wagc.com/supreme-court-reaffirms-police-have-no-duty... Cached
... SUPREME COURT REAFFIRMS POLICE HAVE NO DUTY TO ... which is to say you must get a gun. The police owe you no duty ... police have no duty

Police, revenue agents on collision course over tax ...
thenationonlineng.net/police-revenue-agents...tax-collection Cached
... have called on the Inspector General of Police, ... team to henceforth cease to invade revenue points and stop continuous harassment of revenue agents in the ...
POLICE STATE - Proof Cops Are Just Government Revenue Agents ...
www.youtube.com/watch?v=iCodV1JMJis Cached
Apr 30, 2010 · ... Proof Cops Are Just Government Revenue Agents With A Ticket Quota System trepnhard. Loading ... Police State: Ten Secrets The Police Don't Want You To .

Police Accountability: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zaD84DTGULo

Insulting a Police Officer Is Not a Crime - CityLab
www.citylab.com/crime/2015/07/everyone-has-the-right-to... Cached
"And then I hear him behind me say, 'do you have ... to insult police officers. In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court ... New Orleans, when the court ruled against an .

Police Officers' Duty to Rescue or Aid: Are They Only Good ...
scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=...
Police Officers' Duty to Rescue or Aid: Are They Only Good Samaritans Lisa McCabe ... determine what constitutes due care for a reasonable police officer, this
The Police Aren’t Legally Obligated To Protect You ...
disinfo.com/...police-arent-legally-obligated-to-protect-you Cached
The Police Aren’t Legally Obligated To Protect You ... claiming that the authorities have no duty to ... Here we have an idea called “duty of care” which ...

Duty to retreat - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duty_to_retreat Cached
... police officers are not required to retreat when acting in the ... some courts have found no duty to retreat exists when a victim is assaulted in a place ...
How 'duty to retreat' became 'stand your ground' - CNN.com
www.cnn.com/2012/03/21/opinion/bellin-stand-your-ground... Cached
Mar 21, 2012 · ... Special to CNN. ... decision by the police not to arrest George Zimmerman ... lawfully present has "no duty to retreat and has the right ...

Three arrested after victim assaulted, kidnapped for ransom ...
myfox8.com/2014/05/...victim-assaulted-kidnapped-for-ransom Cached
May 12, 2014 · Three arrested after victim assaulted, kidnapped for ransom in ... Three people were arrested after a person was kidnapped, assaulted and held for ransom ..





“THE CLAlM AND EXERCISE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RlGHT CANNOT BE CONVERTED INTO A CRIME.” – Miller v U.S., 230 F 2d 486. 489.

“Speech does not lose its protective character because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action.” NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215, 102 S.Ct. 3409 (1982)

Whereas: If a public entity denies an otherwise "qualified individual" "meaningful access" to its "services, programs, or activities" "solely by reason of" his or her disability, that individual may have an ADA claim against the public entity. Id. (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301-02, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985) (internal citation omitted)).LEE v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES•250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001)

PEOPLE COMPELLED TO FILE INCOME TAXES VIOLATES THE 5TH AMENDMENT" Supreme Court ruled that income taxes constitute the compelled testimony of a witness: "The information revealed in the preparation and filing of an income tax return is, for the purposes of Fifth Amendment analysis, the testimony of a witness." "Government compels the filing of a return much as it compels,for example, the appearance of a 'witness' before a grand jury." Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1975). :. Established that wages and income are NOT equivalent as far as taxes on income are concerned. "Decided cases have made the distinction between wages and income and have refused to equate the two in withholding or similar controversies. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21(1978); Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl. 318, 332, 373 F.2d 924, 932 (1967); Humble Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 944, 950, 442 F.2d 1353, 1356 (1971); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 920, 442 F.2d 1362 (1971); Stubbs, Overbeck & Associates v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142 (CA5 1971); Royster Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d, at 390; (4th Cir. 1973); Acacia Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 188 (Md. 1967). Supreme Court ruled that: "Waivers of Constitutional Rights not only must be voluntary, they must be knowingly intelligent acts, done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and consequences.": Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742 at 748 (1970) (a) not effectively connected with the conduct of a “trade or business” (public office per 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26)) in the United States (government),
(b) not earned from sources within the geographical federal 5 territory. See Newman-Green v. Alfonso Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989) “United States” defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9) and (a)(10),
(c) not subject to reporting per 26 U.S.C. §6041 because not connected to a statutory “trade or business” (public office)
(d) not subject to withholding because not statutory “income” per 26 U.S.C. §643(b) and earned by a “non-resident non-person non-taxpayer . Then I was Informed by public servant I was being kidnap and held for ransom aka under arrest for not giving him my name.
Paramedics showed up to check me out while I was having a panic attach caused by C. Walker. I called Rebecca Quick and then called Ed. They could not help me at that time. Then when he attacked and harmed me again I notified him that I was a disabled adult and I was federally protected several times. He twisted my left wrist until it popped causing a sprain and musculoskeletal pain (placing me in a wrist brace). Then he and another officer kidnapped me and sexually assaulted my body while I was terrified and refused my ada rights and accommodations. Thus they threw me on the ground and harming my injured spine while grabbing my Brest my automatic response is legs go up when thrown onto the ground. I did not cause the officer to straddle my legs. Thus they refused me my cane and being able to leave my carriage on my own. I was screaming for the pain and panic that they put me thru. When I was put in the cop car I was hurt again by the officer while he tried to belt me in the cop car. I was deigned proper medical care while my wrist was swelling up. I was deigned food and medication due to the jail refusing me my meds and proper medical care. I did not find out my charges until the next day just before the judge called my name. the charges did not pertain to why I was accosted by the officer for a crime that was not committed. Upon release my case manager had to pick me up and take me back to Ontario 26 miles away. I went to the hospital to get my wrist checked out and that is when I was placed in the brace.

Whereas.
Because artificial entities cannot take oaths, they cannot make affidavits. See, e.g., In re Empire Refining Co., 1 F. Supp. 548, 549 (SD Cal. 1932) ("It is, of course, conceded that a corporation cannot make an affidavit in its corporate name. It is an inanimate thing incapable of voicing an oath"); Moya Enterprises, Inc. v. Harry Anderson Trucking, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 39, 290 S.E.2d 145 (1982); Strand Restaurant Co. v. Parks Engineering Co., 91 A.2d 711 (D.C. 1952); 9A T. Bjur C. Slezak, Fletcher Cyclopedia of Law of Private Corporations § 4629 (Perm. ed. 1992) ("A document purporting to be the affidavit of a corporation is void, since a corporation cannot make a sworn statement") (footnote omitted).ROWLAND v. CALIFORNIA MEN'S COLONY•506 U.S. 194, 203 (1993)PENAL CODE


Corpus delicti - literally "body of the crime"
No injury or loss... no criminal case.(period.)

This common formulation of the corpus delicti rule encompasses two elements: (1) that a specific injury or loss occurred; and (2) that someone’s criminality (as opposed to, for example, an accident or a natural phenomenon) caused the injury or loss. See 7 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW § 2072, at 524 (James H. Chadmore ed., 1978).

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO A STATUTE
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure › TITLE II. COMMENCING AN ACTION; SERVICE OF PROCESS, PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS › Rule 5.1. Constitutional Challenge to a Statute
RULE 5.1. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO A STATUTE
(a) NOTICE BY A PARTY. A party that files a pleading, written motion, or other paper drawing into question the constitutionality of a federal or state statute must promptly:
(1) file a notice of constitutional question stating the question and identifying the paper that raises it, if:
(A) a federal statute is questioned and the parties do not include the United States, one of its agencies, or one of its officers or employees in an official capacity; or
(B) a state statute is questioned and the parties do not include the state, one of its agencies, or one of its officers or employees in an official capacity; and
(2) serve the notice and paper on the Attorney General of the United States if a federal statute is questioned—or on the state attorney general if a state statute is questioned—either by certified or registered mail or by sending it to an electronic address designated by the attorney general for this purpose.
(b) CERTIFICATION BY THE COURT. The court must, under 28 U.S.C. §2403, certify to the appropriate attorney general that a statute has been questioned.
(c) INTERVENTION; FINAL DECISION ON THE MERITS. Unless the court sets a later time, the attorney general may intervene within 60 days after the notice is filed or after the court certifies the challenge, whichever is earlier. Before the time to intervene expires, the court may reject the constitutional challenge, but may not enter a final judgment holding the statute unconstitutional.
(d) NO FORFEITURE. A party's failure to file and serve the notice, or the court's failure to certify, does not forfeit a constitutional claim or defense that is otherwise timely asserted.
NOTES
(As added Apr. 12, 2006, eff. Dec. 1, 2006; amended Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007.)
COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2006
Rule 5.1 implements 28 U.S.C. §2403, replacing the final three sentences of Rule 24(c). New Rule 5.1 requires a party that files a pleading, written motion, or other paper drawing in question the constitutionality of a federal or state statute to file a notice of constitutional question and serve it on the United States Attorney General or state attorney general. The party must promptly file and serve the notice of constitutional question. This notice requirement supplements the court's duty to certify a constitutional challenge to the United States Attorney General or state attorney general. The notice of constitutional question will ensure that the attorney general is notified of constitutional challenges and has an opportunity to exercise the statutory right to intervene at the earliest possible point in the litigation. The court's certification obligation remains, and is the only notice when the constitutionality of a federal or state statute is drawn in question by means other than a party's pleading, written motion, or other paper.
Moving the notice and certification provisions from Rule 24(c) to a new rule is designed to attract the parties’ attention to these provisions by locating them in the vicinity of the rules that require notice by service and pleading.
Rule 5.1 goes beyond the requirements of §2403 and the former Rule 24(c) provisions by requiring notice and certification of a constitutional challenge to any federal or state statute, not only those “affecting the public interest.” It is better to assure, through notice, that the attorney general is able to determine whether to seek intervention on the ground that the act or statute affects a public interest. Rule 5.1 refers to a “federal statute,” rather than the §2403 reference to an “Act of Congress,” to maintain consistency in the Civil Rules vocabulary. In Rule 5.1 “statute” means any congressional enactment that would qualify as an “Act of Congress.”
Unless the court sets a later time, the 60-day period for intervention runs from the time a party files a notice of constitutional question or from the time the court certifies a constitutional challenge, whichever is earlier. Rule 5.1(a) directs that a party promptly serve the notice of constitutional question. The court may extend the 60-[day] period on its own or on motion. One occasion for extension may arise if the court certifies a challenge under §2403 after a party files a notice of constitutional question. Pretrial activities may continue without interruption during the intervention period, and the court retains authority to grant interlocutory relief. The court may reject a constitutional challenge to a statute at any time. But the court may not enter a final judgment holding a statute unconstitutional before the attorney general has responded or the intervention period has expired without response. This rule does not displace any of the statutory or rule procedures that permit dismissal of all or part of an action—including a constitutional challenge—at any time, even before service of process.
Changes Made After Publication and Comment. Rule 5.1 as proposed for adoption incorporates several changes from the published draft. The changes were made in response to public comments and Advisory Committee discussion.
The Advisory Committee debated at length the question whether the party who files a notice of constitutional question should be required to serve the notice on the appropriate attorney general. The service requirement was retained, but the time for intervention was set to run from the earlier of the notice filing or the court's certification. The definition of the time to intervene was changed in tandem with this change. The published rule directed the court to set an intervention time not less than 60 days from the court's certification. This was changed to set a 60-day period in the rule “[u]nless the court sets a later time.” The Committee Note points out that the court may extend the 60-day period on its own or on motion, and recognizes that an occasion for extension may arise if the 60-day period begins with the filing of the notice of constitutional question.
The method of serving the notice of constitutional question set by the published rule called for serving the United States Attorney General under Civil Rule 4, and for serving a state attorney general by certified or registered mail. This proposal has been changed to provide service in all cases either by certified or registered mail or by sending the Notice to an electronic address designated by the attorney general for this purpose.
The rule proposed for adoption brings into subdivision (c) matters that were stated in the published Committee Note but not in the rule text. The court may reject a constitutional challenge at any time, but may not enter a final judgment holding a statute unconstitutional before the time set to intervene expires.
The published rule would have required notice and certification when an officer of the United States or a state brings suit in an official capacity. There is no need for notice in such circumstances. The words “is sued” were deleted to correct this oversight.
Several style changes were made at the Style Subcommittee's suggestion. One change that straddles the line between substance and style appears in Rule 5.1(d). The published version adopted the language of present Rule 24(c): failure to comply with the Notice or certification requirements does not forfeit a constitutional “right.” This expression is changed to “claim or defense” from concern that reference to a “right” may invite confusion of the no-forfeiture provision with the merits of the claim or defense that is not forfeited.
COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2007 AMENDMENT
The language of Rule 5.1 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only


melissa-catherine damarel: bodda Needs asp the IRS w9Form court filing recorded record on the birth certificate bond and city registration bond

Restrain Order on Assaulter Johnathan Laurenson and Jason Copper,
They both are aware of the Victim
COURT FEES ARE FOR PERSONS-PERSONS ARE NOT PEOPLE
9.1 – Bonding Jail Procedure A government, or an official, officer or clerk of a government, will lose its/his bond, will not be bonded and will not be bondable..

Chapter: 803 - Vehicle Title and Registration, Section: 035, Year: 2015, Last Accessed: 2016-07-16 https://www.oregonlaws.org/ors/803.035
2015 ORS 803.040¹
Effect of title Text News Annotations Related Statutes

(1) If this state has issued title for a vehicle, the vehicle shall remain titled by this state and subject to all of the provisions of the vehicle code relating to vehicles titled by this state until one of the following occurs:

(a) The vehicle becomes legally titled under the laws of another jurisdiction.

(b) The owner of the vehicle establishes that the vehicle is no longer subject to the vehicle titling requirements under the vehicle code by a method recognized or established by the Department of Transportation.

(c) A salvage title is issued for the vehicle.

(2) Subsection (1) of this section applies to a vehicle issued title by this state even if one of the following applies to the vehicle:

(a) At some time after issuance of the title by this state, the vehicle becomes eligible for an exemption from titling requirements under ORS 803.030 (Exemptions from title requirement) or for any other reason.

(b) The issuance of the title was permissive under ORS 803.035 (Optional titling).

(c) The vehicle is not required to comply with vehicle titling provisions of the vehicle code for any reason. [1985 c.333 §3; 1991 c.873 §30; 1993 c.233 §20]
ORS 803.310 - Optional registration - 2015 Oregon Revised ...
www.oregonlaws.org/ors/803.310

(1) The Department of Transportation, by rule, may provide for optional registration of vehicles that are exempt from vehicle registration requirements by ORS 803.305 ...
OR Rev Stat § 803.310 :: 803.310 Optional registration; rules ...
law.justia.com › … › ORS Chapter 803

ORS Chapter 803 803.310 Optional registration; rules. OR Rev Stat § 803.310 (through Leg Sess 2011) What's This? (1) The Department of Transportation, by rule, may ...


WHY DO THEY CALL THEM PASSENGER CARS?
"Passenger. One who travels in some public conveyance by virtue of a contract, express or implied, with the carrier, as for the payment of fare or that which is accepted as an equivalent therefor. A mere trespasser, a person who steals a ride upon a railroad train, or who is employed thereon, is not a passenger." s.c. 113 U.S. 218 (1885); 3 Monta. 99 (1878); 24 Cent. Law J. 219 (1887); 139 Mass. 238, 542

NEVADA …TITLE 39 MOTOR VEHICLES CHAPTER 39-01 DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS 84. "State" means a state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a province of the Dominion of Canada

U.S. SUPREME COURT RENO VS. CONDON JANUARY 12, 2000 "The activity licensed by STATE DMVs and in connection with which individuals must submit personal information to the DMV (the operations of motor vehicles) is itself integrally related to interstate commerce." RENO V. CONDON (98-1464) 528 U.S. 141 (2000) 155 F.3d 453, reversed

18 U.S. Code section 31--------------------- The term “motor vehicle” means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo.that means unless you are in commerce(making money to transport people or cargo) .Most of us are not commercial or in commerce,most of us just go from point A to point B.Most of us who are not Corporate Government employees or on Federal Jurisdiction.

Freedom of movement under United States Courpration law is governed primarily by the Privileges and ... However, the Supreme Court did not invest the federal government with the authority to protect freedom of movement. .... by the vehicle of one's choice, and courts struck down regional regulations that required licenses

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that motorists need not have licenses to drive ... as “U.S. Supreme Court Says No License Necessary to Drive Automobile on ...U.S. Supreme Court Says No License Necessary To Drive ... State of Oregon law states clearly

Janet Reno Right To Travel Brief 98-1464.pdf
https://scannedretina.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/janet-reno-right-to-travel-brief-98-1464.pdf
In the Supreme Court of the United States JANET RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CHARLIE CONDON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, ET AL. ON WRIT OF ...

The Insurrection Act of 3 March 1807 (is unconstitutional - DVM3): "That in all cases of insurrection, or obstruction of the laws * * * where it is lawful for the President * * * to call forth the militia for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection, or of causing the laws to be duly executed, it shall be lawful for him to employ, for the same purposes, such part of the land or naval force of the United States . ." -- In fact, the powers "to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections . ." are expressly enumerated to only be Militia powers, at Article I Section 8. - DVM3. . . . Section 15 of An Act Making Appropriations For the Support of the Army * * * of 18 June 1878: ". . it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army * * * as a posse comitatus * * * for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution (it isn't - DVM3) or by act of Congress (it could be) . ." Section 16: "That all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act be, and they are hereby, repealed." . . . This is codified in the U.S. Code cited in comment above. – Daniel Vincent McGonigle III : Constitutional Militia Scholar
Whereas :The mother allegedly abandons the child at birth in a hospital or government facility as the Informant on the CERTIFICATE OF LIVE BIRTH so, the 'State' (attorneys) "pick you up" and assume ownership and control over your body while your STRAW NAME remains on file at the STATE REGISTRAR'S OFFICE. Under the the Doctrine of parens patriae, "The STATE is your daddy". This is why CPS and DCF AGENTS are dispatched. They show up to claim their property. When the "STATE" becomes dissatisfied with your parenting skills or someone makes a phone call against you to an AGENT for the oppressive STATE, your child is taken. They come and take your child as part of a for-profit venture and modus operandi. The BAR attorneys want you to pay into the system to support their crooked attorney FIRM, support the BAR Association and pay the Vatican bankers fees in the CORPORATE COURTS.

The following facts should wake up anyone who understands basic math...the US and all states are 100% controlled by judicial and political prostitutes and the BAR is the entity that has taken over:
THE BAR , British auxiliary accreditation CONTROLS ALL THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT. Not the fourt thast is the Lawful Bloodline Americans 1884 Supreme court findings ..(See Below)
1.) The ABA/BAR has a 100% racketeering monopoly on Justice........they control every court every law; they control the entire Judicial Branch
2) Up to 70% of all members of every congress are BAR members.....So the BAR has infiltrated the Legislative Branch..up to 70%
3.) Barack Obama a former BAR member, Hillary a BAR member so they have a lock on the Executive Branch
4.) Many Governors are BAR members...........(Are you starting to see a pattern ...the evidence is blatant!)
5) Adding icing to their mafia racketeering cake is the kicker of all .............the BAR controls the FBI, the US marshals, the ATF, the DEA the ENTIRE Department of Justice via BAR member Loretta Lynch and Barack Obama
6.) And the final nail in our coffin is that the BAR controls every Sheriff in almost every Country via a BAR members called the DA.........

When one takes a birds eye view of their insidious work they will realize such infiltration started in 1783 at the Signing of the Treaty of Paris.

Not so. Consider some evidence of its historical significance: First, “titles of nobility” were prohibited in both Article VI of the Articles of Confederation (1777) and in Article I, Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution of the United States (1787);

OUTLINE OF OFFICIAL OATH AND BOND REQUIREMENTS ...
www.epcounty.com/auditor/payroll/outlineofoath&bond.pdf
and advice of legal counsel e.g., your county attorney.ааEach .... B.ааGeneral Bond Filing Requirements For County Officers. ..... ааCriminal District Attorney.

UNIFORM BONDING CODE ~ for PUBLIC SERVANTS ~ KNOW ...
www.resurrecttherepublic.com/uniform-bonding-code-for-public-servants-know-your-rights-abilities-in-a-republic/
Dec 8, 2014 ... 5.4 – Bonding of Judges. A judge shall lose his bonding, shall not be bonded, and shall be deemed unbondable: 1. if he fails to protect the U.S, ...


At the first reading, the meaning of this 13th Amendment (also called the “title of nobility” Amendment) seems obscure; unimportant. The references to “nobility,” “honour,” “emperor,” “king,” and “prince,” lead us to dismiss this Amendment as a petty post-revolution act of spite directed against the British monarchy. The U.S. modern world of Lady Di and Prince Charles, make anti-royalist sentiments seem so archaic and quaint, that the Amendment can be ignored.

Missing 13th Amendment Found: “No Lawyers In Public Office ...
www.linkedin.com/…/missing-13th-amendment-found-lawyers-pub…

Sep 7, 2016 ... The 13th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States has been altered ..... and exercise the attendant privileges and powers; non-lawyers cannot. ..... by lawyers who were unconstitutionally elected or appointed to their ...

"If the evidence is correct and no logical errors have been made, a 13th Amendment restricting lawyers from serving in government was ratified in 1819 and removed from US Constitution during the tumult of the Civil War. Since the Amendment was never lawfully repealed, it is still the Law today. The implications are enormous."

To create the present oligarchy (rule by lawyers) which the US now endures, the lawyers first had to remove the 13th "titles of nobility" Amendment that might otherwise have kept them in check. In fact, it was not until after the Civil War and after the disappearance of this 13th Amendment, that American bar associations began to appear and exercise political power.
Since the unlawful deletion of the 13th Amendment, the newly developing bar associations began working diligently to create a system wherein lawyers took on a title of privilege and nobility as "Esquires" and received the "honor" of offices and positions (like district attorney or judge) that only hold. By virtue of these titles, honors, and special privileges, lawyers have assumed political and economic advantages over the majority of U.S. citizens. Through these privileges, they have nearly established a two-tiered citizenship in this nation where a majority may vote, but only a minority (lawyers) may run for political office. This two-tiered citizenship is clearly contrary to Americans' political interests, the nation's economic welfare, and the Constitution's egalitarian spirit.
The significance of this missing 13th Amendment and its deletion from the Constitution is this: Since the amendment was never lawfully nullified, it is still in full force and effect and is the Law of the land. If public support could be awakened, this missing Amendment might provide a legal basis to challenge many existing laws and court decisions previously made by lawyers who were unconstitutionally elected or appointed to their positions of power; it might even mean the removal of lawyers from the current US government system.
At the very least, this missing 13th Amendment demonstrates that two centuries ago, lawyers were recognized as enemies of the people and nation. Some things never change.

National government. A national government is a government of a single state or nation, united as a community by what is termed the ‘social compact’, and possessing complete and perfect supremacy over persons and things, so far as they can be made the lawful objects of civil government. A federal government is distinguished from a national government, by its being the government of a community of independent and sovereign states, united by compact

In United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), the Court "adhere[d] to the view that a person is "seized" only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained." Id., at 553. The Court looked to whether the citizen who is questioned "remains free to disregard the questions and walk away," and, if she is able to do so, then "there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy" that would require some "particularized and objective justification" under the Constitution. Id., at 554. The test for a "seizure," as formulated by the Court in Mendenhall, was whether, "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Ibid. Examples of seizures include the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. Ibid. The Court's unwillingness today to adhere to the "reasonable person" standard, as formulated by Justice Stewart in Mendenhall, marks an unnecessary departure from Fourth Amendment case law.

Fourth Amendment decisions from 1914 to present requiring suppression of evidence seized (or remanding for lower court to make suppression determination) in a private home following an illegal arrest or search:

1. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (warrantless search)
2. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (warrantless arrest and search)
3. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (warrantless search)
4. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) (invalid warrant)
5. United States v. Berkeness, 275 U.S. 149 (1927) (invalid warrant; insufficient affidavit)
6. Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (warrantless search)
7. Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932) (invalid warrant; insufficient affidavit)
8. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933) (invalid warrant; insufficient affidavit)
9. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) (warrantless arrest and search)
10. Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957) ( per curiam) (warrantless search)
11. Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960) (search beyond scope of warrant)
12. Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505 (1961) (warrantless use of electronic device)
13. Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610 (1961) (warrantless search)
14. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961) (warrantless search)
15. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963) (warrantless search and arrest)
16. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U. S. 85 (1963) (warrantless search)
17. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964) (invalid warrant; insufficient affidavit)
18. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476 (1965) (invalid warrant; particularity defect)
19. James v. Louisiana, 382 U. S. 36 (1965) ( per curiam) (warrantless search)
20. Riggan v. Virginia, 384 U. S. 152 (1966) ( per curiam) (invalid warrant; insufficient affidavit)
21. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U. S. 543 (1968) (lack of valid consent to search)
22. Recznik v. City of Lorain, 393 U. S. 166 (1968) ( per curiam) (warrantless search)
23. Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969) (invalid search incident to arrest)
24. Von Cleef v. New Jersey, 395 U. S. 814 (1969) ( per curiam) (invalid search incident to arrest)
25. Shipley v. California, 395 U. S. 818 (1969) ( per curiam) (invalid search incident to arrest)
26. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U. S. 30 (1970) (invalid search incident to arrest)
27. Connolly v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 245 (1977) ( per curiam) (invalid warrant; magistrate judge not neutral)
28. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978) (warrantless search)
29. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (1978) (warrantless search)
30. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154 (1978) (invalid warrant; obtained through perjury)
31. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980) (warrantless arrest)
32. Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204 (1981) (warrantless search)
33. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U. S. 287 (1984) (warrantless search)
34. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740 (1984) (warrantless entry into home without exigent circumstances)
35. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U. S. 17 (1984) ( per curiam) (warrantless search)
36. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321 (1987) (unreasonable search)
37. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U. S. 91 (1990) (warrantless entry into home)
38. Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U. S. 11 (1999) ( per curiam) (warrantless search)
39. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27 (2001) (warrantless use of heat-imaging technology)
40. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U. S. 635 (2002) ( per curiam) (warrantless arrest and search)
41. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U. S. 626 (2003) ( per curiam) (warrantless search)

RULE 5.1. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO A STATUTE

Whereas: 1778 ratified Constitution and Oregon original 1846 Constitution, Oregon law say one dose not need to register ones self and or property with the state of Oregon inc. if one dose not one is put in jail and possibility of have their children taken for personal gain of elected and public servants unions and claiming our public lands buy depriving lawful bloodline Americans and legal citizens illegally selling are lands for their personal gains , public servant funded foster care at the expenses of the state budget
Federal courts say COURT RULINGS THAT SAY POLICE DO NOT HAVE OBLIGATION TO PROTECT CITIZENS FROM They are to monitor elected and public servants immigration for code breakers,

US GOV Elected and public servants aka employees laughing about stealing land also raping and robbing, kidnapping holding woman man and children for ransom as filed destroying family's for personal gain and British foreign 1871 government contracted as elected and public servants service of employment . https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MFGlIvY6oTw&t=629s ,,,,,,,,,Gov't employee

42 U.S. Code § 1985 - Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights

Whereas: all Elected and public servants including all legal immigration must be registered with 376 U.S. 605
The Foreign Agents Registration Act was first enacted by Congress on June 8, 1938. It required agents of foreign principals to register with the Secretary of State.' '(A)gent of a foreign principal' was defined as 'any person who acts or engages or agrees to act as a public-relations counsel, publicity agent, or as agent, servant, representative, or attorney for a foreign principal * * *.' 52 Stat. 631, 632. (Emphasis added.) 'Foreign principal' was defined as 'the government of a foreign country, a political party of a foreign country, a person domiciled abroad, or any foreign business, partnership, association, corporation, or political organization * * *.' Exempted from the definition of 'agent of a foreign principal' was 'a person, other than a public-relations counsel, or publicity agent, performing only private, non-political, financial, mercantile, or other activities in furtherance of the bona fide trade or commerce of such foreign principal.' 52 Stat. 631, 632. (Emphasis added.) In 1961, the exemption section was amended to apply to persons 'engaging or agreeing to engage only in private and non-political, financial or mercantile activities in furtherance of the bona fide trade or commerce of such foreign principal * * *.

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.(Civil Rights) 42 U.S.C. 1963.

As At a House Intelligence Committee hearing, FBI Director James Comey answers questions on the Trump campaign and the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).Comey: Failure to register under FARA could lead to prison sentence and treason against the lawful bloodline Americans.1938

The Oath of office is a quid pro quo contract cf [U.S. Const. Art. 6, Clauses 2 and 3, Davis Vs. Lawyers Surety Corporation., 459 S.W. 2nd. 655, 657., Tex. Civ. App.] in which clerks, officials, or officers of the government pledge to perform (Support and uphold the United States and state Constitutions) in return for substance (wages, perks, benefits). Proponents are subjected to the penalties and remedies for Breach of Contract, Conspiracy cf [Title 18 U.S.C., Sections 241, 242]. Treason under the Constitution at Article 3, Section 3., and Intrinsic Fraud cf [Auerbach v Samuels, 10 Utah 2nd. 152, 349 P. 2nd. 1112,1114. Alleghany Corp v Kirby., D.C.N.Y. 218 F. Supp. 164, 183., and Keeton Packing Co. v State., 437 S.W. 20, 28]. Refusing to live by their oath places them in direct violation of their oath, in every case. Violating their oath is not just cause for immediate dismissal and removal from office, it is a federal crime. Federal law regulating oath of office by government officials is divided into four parts along with an executive order which further defines the law for purposes of enforcement. 5 U.S.C. 3331, provides the text of the actual oath of office members of Congress are required to take before assuming office. 5 U.S.C. 3333 requires members of Congress sign an affidavit that they have taken the oath of office required by 5 U.S.C. 3331 and have not or will not violate that oath of office during their tenure of office as defined by the third part of the law, 5 U.S.C. 7311 which explicitly makes it a federal criminal offense (and a violation of oath of office) for anyone employed in the United States Government (including members of Congress) to “advocate the overthrow of our constitutional form of government”

"The fact is, property is a tree; income is the fruit; labour is a tree; income the fruit; capital, the tree; income the 'fruit.' The fruit, if not consumed (severed) as fast as it ripens, will germinate from the seed... and will produce other trees and grow into more property; but so long as it is fruit merely, and plucked (severed) to eat... it is no tree, and will produce itself no fruit." Waring v. City of Savennah. 60 Ga. 93, 100 (1878.}

The point being made is that the tree (private property, land, wages, salaries, compensation) is NOT taxable, while the "fruit" (or "income" FROM said property or wages) of the tree CAN possibly be taxed, (but only according to constitutional provisions). Tax upon income derived from, say, rental property, CAN be taxed possibly could be considered interest of the investment if one is a registration voter ,

All Citizens have the right to a home and personal property, and this property cannot be taxed unless in accordance with the two forms of Constitutional taxation mentioned above."Personal liberty, or the Right to enjoyment of life and liberty, is one of the fundamental or natural Rights, which has been protected by its inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions, which is not derived from, or dependent on, the U.S. Constitution, which may not be submitted to a vote and may not depend on the outcome of an election. It is one of the most sacred and valuable Rights, as sacred as the Right to private property...and is regarded as UNALIENABLE." 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sect.202, p.987

Justice Department warns local courts about illegal enforcement of fees and fines
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/justice_department_warns_local_courts_about_illegal_enforcement_of_fees_and

Judge Rules that Government Debt is Covered by FDCPA, Forcing Collection Agency to Defend
https://www.insidearm.com/news/00005574-judge-rules-that-government-debt-is-cover/

Well it has been a long time coming, but all along there have been discussions behind closed doors (never in public) that the Administrative Law Courts established with the New Deal were totally unfounded and unconstitutional. With the anniversary of Magna Carta and the right to a jury trial coming up on June 15 after 800 years, the era of Roosevelt’s big government is quietly unraveling.

A federal judge’s ruling against the Securities and Exchange Commission for using its own Administrative Law judges in an insider trading case is perhaps the beginning of the end of an alternative system of justice that took root in the New Deal. Constitutionally, the socialists tore everything about the idea of a Democracy apart. It was more than taxing one party to the cheers of another in denial of equal protection. It was about creating administrative agencies (1) delegating them to create rules with the force of law as if passed by Congress sanctioned by the people; (2) the creation of administrative courts that defeated the Tripartite government structure usurping all power into the hand of the executive branch, as if this were a dictatorship run by the great hoard of unelected officials.

Not discussed in the coverage of this story is that the Administrative Law Courts are a fiefdom, to put it mildly. They have long been corrupt and traditionally rule in favor of their agencies, making it very costly for anyone to even try to defend themselves. If someone were to attempt this feat, first they have to wear the costs of an Administration proceeding and appeal to an Article III court judge, then they must appeal to the Court of Appeals, and finally plea to the Supreme Court. The cost of such adventures is well into the millions, and good luck on actually getting justice.

Furthermore, Administrative Law Courts cannot sentence you to prison, but they can fine you into bankruptcy. So the lack of a criminal prosecution meant the judges did not have to be lawyers. They could be anyone’s brother-in-law looking for a job where he just rules in favor of the agency not to be bothered with law. Unless the victim has a pile of money, there is no real chance that he or she can afford to defend themselves. This is why the agencies cut deals with the big houses and prosecute the small upstarts who lack the funds to defend themselves.

In a 45-page ruling, U.S. District Judge Leigh Martin May in Atlanta issued an injunction halting Administrative Law proceedings against Charles Hill, a businessman who the SEC accused of reaping an illegal $744,000 profit trading in Radian Systems stock. This is typical. The legal fees involved will exceed the amount of money he is alleged to have made, the typical result is to just pay the fine and they go away, it is cheaper.

The judge ruled that the SEC agency violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution by subjecting Hill to proceedings before an Administrative Law judge, who isn’t directly accountable to the president, officials in charge of the SEC, or the courts under Article III. The ruling is 81 years overdue. The entire structure of administrative agencies blackmailing people has been outrageous. Then you take the banks who just entered a plea of CRIMINALLY guilty to manipulating markets. They are now formally FELONS who engaged in violating SEC rules and thus under the SEC rules, they are no longer eligible for a banking license. The banks are “too big to jail” and the SEC has waived their own rules, of course, to exempt the banks. So they can engage in fraud and manipulation, get caught, pay billions in fines, and the SEC exempts them from losing their licenses. This is how corrupt the administrative agencies really are.
16 Am. Jur. 2d, Const. Law Sec. 543:
"No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or any wise destroyed; nor shall we go upon him, nor send upon him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."

Problem is, corporate US citizens aren't any freeman's peers. And due to that fact, you gotta demand that you're judged by the law of the land, which is the organic US Constitution and all pre-1933 Supreme court decisions.

Lilburne-Pamphlet

This new decision calling the Administrative Law Courts what they really are is reminiscent of the notorious extrajudicial proceedings of the Star Chamber operated by King James I. The court of Chancery set up outside of the King’s Bench, so there were no trials by jury. It had the same purpose, to circumvent the law. This is where our Fifth Amendment privilege came into being. That came about following the trial of John Lilburne (1615-1657) for handing out a pamphlet the government did not like.

lilburnetrial2

The Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966) decision of the Supreme Court came only after decades of abuse by American police against citizens, not unlike what we are watching today. The Miranda decision is hated by police, prosecutors, right-wing judges, politicians, and citizens. The decision is based upon the history of the right not to be coerced that began with the famous trial of John Lilburn before the English court of the Star Chamber in 1637 where he stood tall and objected to the King’s torture. Lilburn’s crime was handing out pamphlets against the king. John Lilburne (1615–1657) was a leader in the Leveller Movement of the 1640s and was a prolific pamphleteer who defended religious and individual liberty of the people. He was imprisoned many times for his views and was active in the army of the New Parliament rising to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In October 1649, he was arrested and tried for High Treason for printing and circulating books and pamphlets critical of the government but was acquitted of all charges by a jury of his peers.

Sec. 34. RIGHT TO HUNT, FISH, AND HARVEST WILDLIFE. (a) The people have the right to hunt, fish, and harvest wildlife, including by the use of traditional methods, subject to laws or regulations to conserve and manage wildlife and preserve the future of hunting and fishing.
(b) Hunting and fishing are preferred methods of managing and controlling wildlife.
(c) This section does not affect any provision of law relating to trespass, property rights, or eminent domain.
(d) This section does not affect the power of the legislature to authorize a municipality to regulate the discharge of a weapon in a populated area in the interest of public safety.
title 7 penal-code chapter 31 thief sec 3101.(1) A 2 sec, 3105 (a) (d) (e)
3101 ,01(2) deprive means (A) (B) (C) 3101 ,01 (3) (A)
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933) (invalid warrant; insufficient affidavit)

under Oregon records law et seq., a.k.a. ORS 192 , including The Federal Records Act of 1950, as amended, establishes the framework for records management programs in Federal Agencies.

Federal and state , income taxes Lawful Bloodline Americans are except for all federal state including property taxes , Bankruptcy act , the British Government not the united states of forty eight state never filed bankruptcy not constitution 48 states lawful bloodline American including legal immigration who are not aka welfare ,, Legal immigration Key Case Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103: “wages”
are not income within the meaning of the income tax amendment to the Constitution, or any other provision of the Constitution.

"Liability in damages for unconstitutional or otherwise illegal conduct has the very desirable effect of deterring such conduct. Indeed, this was precisely the proposition upon which 42 USC section 1983 was enacted." '" "Judges may be punished criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional right on the strength of 18 USC Section 241- 242." (Civil Rights) (Imbler vs Pachtman, U.S. 47 L.Ed. 2nd 128, 96 S.Ct.)
"State officers may be held personally liable for damages based upon actions taken in their official capacities." Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991).
All government officials and agencies, including all State legislatures, are bound by the Constitution and must NOT create any defacto laws which counter the Constitution:The U.S. Supreme Court, in 1895, ruled unconstitutional a federal law containing income taxes, Bills,statutes and codes with arguments concerning class warfare and the definition of a direct tax."Herein...Ohio's Doctrine of Governmental Immunity was held unconstitutional and others to numerous to mention." (Civil Rights) (Krause vs Ohio, app 2d 1 L.N.W. 2d 321 1971.) Reich vs State Highway Dept. 336, Mich 617: 194 N.W. 2d 700 197"Employees of a city or state are not immune from suit under statute relating civil rights for deprivations of rights on ground that officials were acting within the scope of their ground that officials were acting within the Scope of their responsibilities of performing a discretionary act." (Bunch vs Barnett 376 F.Sup. 23.)"Title 28 Section 1391, this section makes it possible to bring actions against government officials and agencies in district court outside D.C." (Civil Rights) (Norton vs Mcshane 14 L.Ed. 2d 274.)A suit in detinue or replevin in personam should lie to gain possession of property seized by the state. (Civil Rights) Stephen, Pleading (3rd Am ed) p. 47, 52, 69, 74; Ames Lectures on legal history, p. 64, 71; Wilkins v. Despard, 5 Term Rep- 112; Roberts v. Withered, % Mod. 193, 12 Mod. 92.

No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it." Bonnett v. Vallier, 116 N.W. 885, 136 Wis. 193 (1908); NORTON v. SHELBY COUNTY, 118 U.S. 425 (1886). See also Bonnett v Vallier, 136 Wis 193, 200; 116 NW 885, 887 (1908); State ex rel Ballard v Goodland, 159 Wis 393, 395; 150 NW 488, 489 (1915); State ex rel Kleist v Donald, 164 Wis 545, 552-553; 160 NW 1067, 1070 (1917); State ex rel Martin v Zimmerman, 233 Wis 16, 21; 288 NW 454, 457 (1939); State ex rel Commissioners of Public Lands v Anderson, 56 Wis 2d 666, 672; 203 NW2d 84, 87 (1973); and Butzlaffer v Van Der Geest & Sons, Inc, Wis, 115 Wis 2d 539; 340 NW2d 742, 744-745 (1983).

Any laws created by government which are repugnant to the Constitution carry NO force of law and are VOID:An unconstitutional law states and codes cannot operate to supersede any existing law. Indeed insofar as a statute runs counter to the fundamental law of the land, (the Constitution JTM) it is superseded thereby. No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it." Bonnett v. Vallier, 116 N.W. 885, 136 Wis. 193 (1908); NORTON v. SHELBY COUNTY, 118 U.S. 425 (1886). See also Bonnett v Vallier, 136 Wis 193, 200; 116 NW 885, 887 (1908); State ex rel Ballard v Goodland, 159 Wis 393, 395; 150 NW 488, 489 (1915); State ex rel Kleist v Donald, 164 Wis 545, 552-553; 160 NW 1067, 1070 (1917); State ex rel Martin v Zimmerman, 233 Wis 16, 21; 288 NW 454, 457 (1939); State ex rel Commissioners of Public Lands v Anderson, 56 Wis 2d 666, 672; 203 NW2d 84, 87 (1973); and Butzlaffer v Van Der Geest & Sons, Inc, Wis, 115 Wis 2d 539; 340 NW2d 742, 744-745 (1983).

A "public official” has no rights in relation to their employer, the state or federal government:

“The restrictions that the Constitution places upon the government in its capacity as lawmaker, i.e., as the regulator of private conduct, are not the same as the restrictions that it places upon the government in its capacity as employer. We have recognized this in many contexts, with respect to many different constitutional guarantees. Private citizens perhaps cannot be prevented from wearing long hair, but policemen can. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976). Private citizens cannot have their property searched without probable cause, but in many circumstances government employees can. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (plurality opinion); id., at 732 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). Private citizens cannot be punished for refusing to provide the government information that may incriminate them, but government employees can be dismissed when the incriminating information that they refuse to provide relates to the performance of
their job. Gardner v. Broderick, [497 U.S. 62, 95] 392 U.S. 273, 277 -278 (1968). With regard to freedom of speech in particular: Private citizens cannot be punished for speech of merely private concern, but government employees can be fired for that reason. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). Private citizens cannot be punished for partisan political activity, but federal and state employees can be dismissed and otherwise punished for that reason. Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947); Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 616 -617 (1973).”
[Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990)]

"Fraud On The Court By An Officer Of The Court"
And "Disqualification Of Judges, State and Federal"
1. Who is an "officer of the court"?
2. What is "fraud on the court"?
3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding?
4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"
1. Who is an "officer of the court"?
A judge is an officer of the court, as well as are all attorneys. A state judge is a state judicial
officer, paid by the State to act impartially and lawfully. A federal judge is a federal judicial officer,
paid by the federal government to act impartially and lawfully. State and federal attorneys fall into
the same general category and must meet the same requirements. A judge is not the court.
People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980).
2. What is "fraud on the court"?
Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is
engaged in "fraud upon the court". In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir.
1985), the court stated "Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery
itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. ...
It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the
judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court
have been directly corrupted."
"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace
that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by
officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its
impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d
689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a
decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes
final."
3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding?
"Fraud upon the court" makes void the orders and judgments of that court.
It is also clear and well-settled Illinois law that any attempt to commit "fraud upon the court"
vitiates the entire proceeding. The People of the State of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354;
192 N.E. 229 (1934) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies
to judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions."); Allen F. Moore v. Stanley F.
Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into
which it enters ..."); In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that
fraud vitiates everything."); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894), affirmed 162 Ill. 589
(1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949);
Thomas Stasel v. The American Home Security Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935).
Under Illinois and Federal law, when any officer of the court has committed "fraud upon the
court", the orders and judgment of that court are void, of no legal force or effect.
4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"
Federal law requires the automatic disqualification of a Federal judge under certain
circumstances.
In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an objective
observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude
or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is
unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162
(1994).
Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a
requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486
U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its
appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is
directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.")
("Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from
actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial
process.").
That Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any
proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d
1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is
important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has
received justice."
The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt
v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). A judge receiving a bribe from an
interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of justice.
"Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in support of
recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the stated circumstances."
Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).
Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for
his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this
language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is
filed." Balistrieri, at 1202.
Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow
the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given
another example of his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge.
Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has
evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself/herself. None of the
orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. It would
appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect.
Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause
of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a
tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process
Clause.").
Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has
been denied of any of his / her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal
Crime of "interference with interstate commerce". The judge has acted in the judge's personal
capacity and not in the judge's judicial capacity. It has been said that this judge, acting in this
manner, has no more lawful authority than someone's next-door neighbor (provided that he is not
a judge). However some judges may not follow the law.
If you were a non-represented litigant, and should the court not follow the law as to non-
represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance of partiality" and, under the
law, it would seem that he/she has disqualified him/herself.
However, since not all judges keep up to date in the law, and since not all judges follow the
law, it is possible that a judge may not know the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court and the other
courts on this subject. Notice that it states "disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be
disqualified" under certain circumstances.
The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts
without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has
been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that
he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the
interference with interstate commerce.
Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts. Since both
treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts.

"If money is wanted by rulers who have in any manner oppressed the People, they may retain it until their grievances are redressed, and thus peaceably procure relief, without trusting to despised petitions or disturbing the public tranquility." Journals of the Continental Congress. 26 October, 1774©1789. Journals 1: 105©13."Government immunity violates the common law maxim that everyone shall have a remedy for an injury done to his person or property." (Civil Rights) (Firemens Ins Co of Newark, N.J. vs Washington County. 2 Wisc 2d 214; 85 N.W.2d 840 1957.) CORPS and Engineers AKA Corporation and company's LLC , City county states Federal 501 C-3-9s are Black ink On White Paper the term AKA Black ans White, Mostly the have no Blood or bloodline Soul or heart beat.Thereof. Only CORPS And Including corporation Can Be liable of Suit under Color of Law Fraud Scam.

CORPS AKA Corporation Company's LLC City county states Federal are DEAD entity And only Exit in the minds of Men

As to the Civil War Grace the Lawful bloodline American's Elected and public servants to honor thy OATH of Services Know as the 1776 1778 Ratified Constitution Law of Theseus Forty eight now fifty union States of Constitution oath of public servitude

All government officials and agencies, including all State legislatures, are bound by the Constitution and must NOT create any defacto laws which counter the Constitution:The U.S. Supreme Court, in 1895, ruled unconstitutional a federal law containing income taxes, Bills,statutes and codes with arguments concerning class warfare and the definition of a direct tax."Herein...Ohio's Doctrine of Governmental Immunity was held unconstitutional and others to numerous to mention." (Civil Rights) (Krause vs Ohio, app 2d 1 L.N.W. 2d 321 1971.) Reich vs State Highway Dept. 336, Mich 617: 194 N.W. 2d 700 197"Employees of a city or state are not immune from suit under statute relating civil rights for deprivations of rights on ground that officials were acting within the scope of their ground that officials were acting within the Scope of their responsibilities of performing a discretionary act." (Bunch vs Barnett 376 F.Sup. 23.)"Title 28 Section 1391, this section makes it possible to bring actions against government officials and agencies in district court outside D.C." (Civil Rights) (Norton vs Mcshane 14 L.Ed. 2d 274.)A suit in detinue or replevin in personam should lie to gain possession of property seized by the state. (Civil Rights) Stephen, Pleading (3rd Am ed) p. 47, 52, 69, 74; Ames Lectures on legal history, p. 64, 71; Wilkins v. Despard, 5 Term Rep- 112; Roberts v. Withered, % Mod. 193, 12 Mod. 92.

Whereas the IMF/IRS are unregistered foreign agents as is the 28 U.S.C. @ 3002 definition 15) United States means A) FEDERAL CORPORATION This corporation is de facto without standing in law as it was and remains to this day Treason against the 1776, ratified 1778, Constitution for the United States of America, violation of Oath of Office, Misprision's, Collusion, Hones Service Fraud, Extortion, R.I.C.O., land theft, Identity Theft, Personage whereas No Constitutional Amendment authorized our elected, appointed and hired employees to create this Corporation

"The state” acts in two capacities: governmental and proprietary. The distinction between the two is best stated in Cincinnati v. Cameron, 33 Ohio St. 336, approved by this court in Seattle v. Stirrat, 55 Wash. 560, 104 Pac. 834, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1275:

"In its governmental or public character, it represents the state, while in the other it is a mere private corporation. As a political institution, the municipality occupies a different position, and is
subject to different liabilities from those which are imposed upon the private corporation. But because these two characters are united in the same legal entity, it does not follow that the shield
which covers the political equally protects the private corporation." STRAND v. STATE., 16
Wn.(2d) 107, 116 (January 6, 1943)

“Every State law must conform in the first place to the Constitution of the United States, and then to the subordinate constitutions of the particular state; and if it infringes upon the provisions of either, it is so far void.” Houston v. Moore, 18 US 1, 5 L.Ed 19 (1840). It is abiding truth that “nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.” Mapp v. Ohio,367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961). HARRIS V. NEW YORK U.S. Supreme Court·401 U.S. 222 (1971).

Tax Crimes
Employers who aid or abet the preparation of false tax returns by failing to pay income or Social Security taxes for illegal alien employees, or who knowingly make payments using false names or Social Security numbers, are subject to IRS criminal and civil sanctions. U.S. nationals who have suffered intentional discrimination because of citizenship or national origin by an employer with more than three employees may file a complaint within 180 days of the discriminatory act with the Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices, U.S. Department of Justice. In additon to the federal statutes summarized, state laws and local ordinances controlling fair labor practices, workers compensation, zoning, safe housing and rental property, nuisance, licensing, street vending, and solicitations by contractors may also apply to activities that involve illegal aliens.

9 TRILLION Dollars Missing from Federal Reserve!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GYNVNhB-m0o

Exhibit #05.051: Former IRS Commissioner Steven Miller says the income tax is "voluntary" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MG2mcjAuLo4

Key Case Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103: “wages”
are not income within the meaning of the income tax amendment to the Constitution, or any other provision of the Constitution.

[1] This is a BOLD LIE,the 16th Amendment it was never ratified per Article V of the U.S. Constitution (Congressional Record House, June 13, 1967, pg 15641-15646 and Dyett v Turner (1968) are VERY CLEAR about this)House Joint Resolution 192 of June 5, 1933

On June 5, 1933, Congress passed House Joint Resolution (HJR 192). HJR 192 was passed to suspend the gold standard and abrogate the gold clause in the national constitution. Since then no one in America has been able to lawfully pay a debt. This resolution declared: Lawful Bloodline Americans only

The IRS is not who you think they are, IRS agents are neither trained nor paid by the United States government. Pursuant to Treasury Delegation Order No. 92, the IRS is trained under the direction of the Division of Human Resources United Nations (U.N.) and the Commissioner (International), by the office of Personnel Management.

In the 1979 edition of 22 USCA 278, "The United Nations," you will find Executive Order 10422. The Office of Personnel Management is under the direction of the Secretary of the United Nations. Pursuant to Treasury Delegation Order No. 91, the IRS entered a "Service Agreement" with the US Treasury Dept (See Public Law 94-564, Legislative History, pg.5967, Reorganization (BANKRUPTCY!!!)Plan No. 26) and the Agency for International Development.

This agency is an international paramilitary operation and according to the Dept of the Army Field manual (1969) 41-10, pgs 1-4, Sec. 1-7(b) & 1-6, Sec. 1-10 (7) (c) (1), and 22 USCA 284, includes such activities as, "Assumption of Full or partial executive, legislative, and judicial authority over a country or area."

The IRS is also an agency/member of a 169 Nation pact called the International Criminal Police organization, or INTERPOL, found at 22 USCA 263a. The memorandum of Understanding (MOU), between the Secretary of Treasury, AKA the corporate governor of "The Fund" and "The Bank" (International Monetary Fund, and the International Bank of for reconstruction and Development), indicated that the Attorney General and it's associates are soliciting and collecting information for foreign principles; the international organizations, corporations, and associations, exemplified by 22 USCA 286f.

According to the 1994 US Government Manual, at page 390, the Attorney General is the permanent representative to INTERPOL, and the Secretary of Treasury is the alternate member. Under Article 30 of the INTERPOL constitution, these individuals must expatriate their citizenship. They serve no allegiance to the United States of America.

The IRS is paid by "The Fund" and "The Bank". Thus it appears from the documentary evidence that the Internal Revenue Service agents are "Agents of a Foreign Principle" within the meaning and intent of the "Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938" for private, not public, gain !

The IRS is directed and controlled by the corporate Governor of "The Fund" and "The Bank". The Federal Reserve Bank and the IRS collection agency are both privately owned and operated under private statutes. The IRS operates under public policy, not the Constitutional Law, and in the interest of our nation's foreign creditors.

The Constitution only permits Congress to lay and collect taxes. It does not authorize Congress to delegate the tax collection power to a private corporation, which collects our taxes for a private bank, the Federal Reserve, who then deposits it into the Treasury of the IMF !

The IRS is not allowed to state that they collect taxes for the United States Treasury. They only refer to "The Treasury."
PRIVATE PROPERTY IS TAX EXEMPT.
Most people don't know that there's a SECRET LIEN on all property bought with FRN's. One guy actually paid off that lien with gold coins, and had his property reclassified as PRIVATE, and didn't have to pay property tax after that. I mean, doh, what do you think is the COLLATERAL for the federal (national) debt? Property of all US PERSONS!

"Property which is taxed is always identified by one of three commercial classifications: residential, industrial or agricultural. Private property cannot be taxed!
Contact your Tax Assessor and ask for a written explanation of the numbered codes appearing on your property tax statement. Once you have deciphered the statement, you will find your property classified by one of the above commercial designations.
Write a letter to your Tax Assessor, explaining that you have discovered an error in your tax statement. Do not mention the tax itself, as the error in question relates only to the classification. Explain that your property has mistakenly been classified as ____________ (agricultural, industrial, residential), and to please correct the classification to read "private." Ask the Assessor to notify you by mail once the matter has been handled. Be polite and sign the letter, using words like "Sincerely", "Best wishes", etc. There is no reason be belligerent at this point.
If the Assessor honors your wishes, you will never see a property tax statement again. If, as is more likely, the Assessor writes back, refusing to adjust his records, you may now open up discussion as to why not. Ask whether you have the right to own private property. He will say yes, of course. Ask why he refuses to classify it as private property. He will either explain to you that he cannot tax property unless it is classified pursuant to constitutional limitations (residential, industrial, agricultural), or he will reveal to you that you do not really own the property (in which case he has admitted to fraud, nullifying the transfer of property in the first place, since you were not aware of what you were doing at the time).
In either case, once the Assessor brings up taxation, you can now make the argument that your real property has been re-classified, without your per mission, for the sole purpose of taxation. This is the firm basis for a lawsuit."

If prospective IRS employees including Elected and public servants are the Vatican are required to disclose their prior Forms 1040, those prospective employees were not U.S. Individuals i.e. federal citizens or resident aliens,in many cases:https://www.irs.gov/irm/part6/irm_06-300-001.html#d0e55

6.300.1.5 (11-06-2009) Declaration of Filing Income Tax Returns

The IRS mission is the enforcement of Federal tax laws; Prospective and current employees are required to fully comply with all Federal, State, and other local tax laws
Prospective employees (permanent, temporary, and term) who fail to abide by Federal, State, and local tax laws may be subject to non-selection.
To determine whether applicants are compliant with applicable laws concerning Federal tax filing and paying, all applicants will be asked to complete Form 13362, Consent To Disclosure of Return Information (Form 13362), prior to entry on duty. Servicing HCO, ETS, EOs are responsible for establishing procedures for processing Form 13362. Pre-employment inquiries (including Form 13362) are filed in the recruitment file, not in the Official Personnel Folder (OPF). www.opm.gov/feddata/recguide2008.pdf

JOINT RESOLUTION
PUBLIC LAW 97-280 96 STAT. 1211 97th Congress Approved October 4, 1982
Authorizing and requesting the President to proclaim 1983 as The "Year of the Bible"
Whereas the Bible, the Word of God, has made a unique contribution in shaping the United States as a distinctive and blessed nation and people;
Whereas deeply held religious convictions springing from the Holy Scriptures led to the early settlement of our Nation;
Whereas Biblical teachings inspired concepts of civil government that are contained in our Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States;
Whereas many of our great national leaders-among them Presidents Washington, Jackson, Lincoln, and Wilson-paid tribute to the surpassing influence of the Bible in our country's development, as in the words of President Jackson that the Bible is "the rock on which our Republic rests";
Whereas the history of our Nation clearly illustrates the value of voluntarily applying the teachings of the Scriptures in the lives of individuals, families, and societies;
Whereas this Nation now faces great challenges that will test this Nation as it has never been tested before; and
Whereas that renewing our knowledge of and faith in God through Holy Scripture can strengthen us as a nation and a people:
Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is authorized and requested to designate 1983 as a national "Year of the Bible" in recognition of both the formative influence the Bible has been for our Nation, and our national need to study and apply the teachings of the Holy Scriptures


PENAL CODE

TITLE 7. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY CHAPTER 31. THEFT

Sec. 31.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter:
(1) "Deception" means:
(A) creating or confirming by words or conduct a false impression of law or fact that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction, and that the actor does not believe to be true;

(B) failing to correct a false impression of law or fact that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction, that the actor previously created or confirmed by words or conduct, and that the actor does not now believe to be true;

(C) preventing another from acquiring information likely to affect his judgment in the transaction;

(D) selling or otherwise transferring or encumbering property without disclosing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, security interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid, or is or is not a matter of official record; or

(E) promising performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction and that the actor does not intend to perform or knows will not be performed, except that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promise would not be performed.

(2) "Deprive" means:

(A) to withhold property from the owner permanently or for so extended a period of time that a major

"In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel * * *." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1654.
"The Constitution does not force an attorney upon a defendant." Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S. Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268.DUKE v. UNITED STATES•255 F.2d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 1958)

“It is a clearly established principle of law that an attorney must represent a corporation, it being incorporeal and a creature of the law. An attorney representing an artificial entity must appear with the corporate charter and law in his hand. A person acting as an attorney for a foreign principal must be registered to act on the principal’s behalf.” See, Foreign Agents Registration Act” (22 USC § 612 et seq.); Victor Rabinowitz et. at. v. Robert F. Kennedy,376 US 605. “Failure to file the "Foreign Agents Registrations Statement" goes directly to the jurisdiction and lack of standing to be before the court, and is a felony pursuant to 18 USC §§ 219, 951. The conflict of law, interest and allegiance is obvious.

Civil Actions for False Imprisonment

False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of a person without consent or legal justification. False imprisonment can be committed by words, acts, or by both[i]. The common law tort of false imprisonment is defined as an unlawful restraint of an individual’s personal liberty or freedom of movement[ii]. In order to constitute the wrong it is not necessary that the individual be actually confined or assaulted[iii].

It is to be noted that, there is no necessity in a false imprisonment case to prove that a person used physical violence or laid hands on another person. It is sufficient to show that at any time or place the person in any manner deprived another person of his/her liberty without sufficient legal authority[iv].

False arrest is sometimes used interchangeably with false imprisonment. False arrest is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another consisting of detention without sufficient legal authority. In order to establish a false arrest claim, the person detained must prove that the arrest is unlawful and such unlawful arrest resulted in injury. An arrest is unlawful when the police officers in question did not have probable cause to make the arrest[v].

An arresting officer who fails to take the arrested person before a court or magistrate within a reasonable time or without unnecessary delay is guilty of false imprisonment. Similarly, an officer who arrests a person without a warrant is liable for false imprisonment by detaining the prisoner an unreasonable time[vi].

Generally, false arrest is one of several means of committing false imprisonment. False arrest describes the setting for false imprisonment when it is committed by a peace officer or by one who claims the power to make an arrest. Thus, a tort action for false imprisonment based on false arrest against a person who is not a peace officer implies that the detention or restraint to support the tort was done by one who claims the power of arrest[vii].

However, false arrest is almost indistinguishable from false imprisonment[viii]. The only distinction lies in the manner in which they arise. False arrest is merely one means of committing a false imprisonment. Whereas, false imprisonment is committed without any thought of attempting arrest[ix].

The principal element of damages in an action for false imprisonment is the loss of freedom. Sometimes, a court also takes into account the fear and nervousness suffered as a result of the detention[x]. The tort of false imprisonment involves an unlawful restraint on freedom of movement or personal liberty. Therefore, two essential elements to constitute false imprisonment are[xi]:

Detention or restraint against a person’s will,
Unlawfulness of the detention or restraint.

Whereas, after liability is established for false arrest, the person who suffered may recover nominal damages as well as compensation for mental suffering, including fright, shame, and mortification from the indignity and disgrace, consequent upon an illegal detention[xii]. However, in a suit for false arrest and false imprisonment, a person cannot recover attorney’s fees incurred or loss of earnings suffered while defending an underlying criminal action[xiii].

The elements to be considered by the jury in awarding compensatory damages in a false imprisonment case are physical suffering, mental suffering and humiliation, loss of time and interruption of business, reasonable and necessary expenses incurred, and injury to reputation[xiv]. However, it is to be noted that a mere loss of freedom will not constitute false imprisonment[xv].

In a suit for false imprisonment, the damages award may include compensation for loss of earnings while imprisoned, for bodily and mental suffering caused by the imprisonment, and for expenses incurred in securing discharge from restraint including a reasonable attorney fee[xvi].

The measure of damages for false imprisonment is a sum that will fairly and reasonably compensate the injured person for the injuries caused by the wrongful act including any special pecuniary loss which is a direct result of the false imprisonment[xvii]. A jury can award punitive damages in a false arrest or imprisonment case, if the requisite level of malice or other requisite mental state is established.

All persons who personally participate or cause an unlawful detention are held to be liable. Similarly, persons other than those who actually cause an imprisonment may be held jointly liable with others, as instigators or participants. However, passive knowledge or consent to the acts of another, or acting on a superior’s order, is not sufficient to make a person liable for false imprisonment.

It is to be noted that the jail officials are also held liable for false imprisonment for holding a person for an unreasonable time. A jail official is liable for false imprisonment if s/he knows that an arrest was illegal and that there is no right to imprison the person so arrested.

The liability of a principal for the act of an agent in causing a false arrest or imprisonment depends upon whether the principal previously authorized the act, or subsequently ratified it, or whether the act was within the scope of the employee’s or agent’s employment[xviii]. However, an employer will not be held liable for false imprisonment for the actions of an employee which are outside the scope of employment.

In order to avoid liability in an action for false imprisonment, a person must establish that s/he did not imprison the other person or s/he must justify the imprisonment. The presence of probable cause for imprisonment is a defense if it constitutes reasonable grounds for acting in defense of property or making an arrest without a warrant. A person is not liable for false imprisonment, if the person restrained is a child under the age of seventeen upon certain conditions. However, contributory negligence is not considered a defense if the wrong is something more than mere negligence[xix].

A false imprisonment action cannot be maintained if a person is properly arrested by lawful authority without a warrant. In order to justify an arrest without a warrant, the arrestor must proceed as soon as may be to make the arrest. Therefore, a private person can arrest another for a public offense committed or attempted in his/her presence[xx].

Certain officials and professionals are exempted from civil liability for false imprisonment under certain circumstances. They are:

Judicial officers;
Government officials entrusted with judicial functions;
Attorneys;
Physicians.

A judicial officer who has jurisdiction of the person and of the subject matter is exempted from civil liability for false imprisonment so long as the judge acts within that jurisdiction and in a judicial capacity[xxi]. Similarly, officers in other government departments are also exempted from liability for false imprisonment whenever they are entrusted with the judicial exercise of discretionary power. Likewise, an attorney is also protected from personal liability for false imprisonment if s/he acts in good faith on behalf of his/her client. It is to be noted that physicians who give evidence in proceedings to determine sanity are also immune from liability for false imprisonment.

In the case of false imprisonment, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the false arrest. The plaintiff in a false imprisonment action must prove that the defendant proximately caused the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks damages[xxii].

[i] Dietz v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 754 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

[ii] Pechulis v. City of Chicago, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11856 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 1997).

[iii] Whitman v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 85 Kan. 150 (Kan. 1911).

[iv] Pechulis v. City of Chicago, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11856 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 1997).

[v] Landry v. Duncan, 902 So. 2d 1098 (La.App. 5 Cir. Apr. 26, 2005).

[vi] Dragna v. White, 45 Cal. 2d 469 (Cal. 1955).

[vii] Rife v. D.T. Corner, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 761 (Iowa 2002).

[viii] Kraft v. Bettendorf, 359 N.W.2d 466 (Iowa 1984).

[ix] Harrer v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 124 Mont. 295 (Mont. 1950).

[x] Pitts v. State, 51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 29 (Ill. Ct. Cl. 1999).

[xi] Ette v. Linn-Mar Cmty. Sch. Dist., 656 N.W.2d 62 (Iowa 2002).

[xii] Barnes v. District of Columbia, 452 A.2d 1198 (D.C. 1982).

[xiii] Id.

[xiv] Jenkins v. Pic-n-Pay Shoes, Inc., 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. July 15, 1985).

[xv] Gee v. State, 21 Ill. Ct. Cl. 573 (Ill. Ct. Cl. 1954).

[xvi] Phillips v. District of Columbia, 458 A.2d 722 (D.C. 1983).

[xvii] Sindle v. New York City Transit Authority, 64 Misc. 2d 995 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).

[xviii] Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Steele, 23 Tenn. App. 275 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

[xix] Aiken v. Holyoke S. R. Co., 184 Mass. 269, 271 (Mass. 1903).

[xx] Hill v. Levy, 117 Cal. App. 2d 667 (Cal. App. 1953).

[xxi] Bahakel v. Tate, 503 So. 2d 837 (Ala. 1987).

[xxii] Fischer v. Famous-Barr Co., 618 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).

A "public official” has no rights in relation to their employer, the state or federal government:

“The restrictions that the Constitution places upon the government in its capacity as lawmaker, i.e., as the regulator of private conduct, are not the same as the restrictions that it places upon the government in its capacity as employer. We have recognized this in many contexts, with respect to many different constitutional guarantees. Private citizens perhaps cannot be prevented from wearing long hair, but policemen can. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976). Private citizens cannot have their property searched without probable cause, but in many circumstances government employees can. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (plurality opinion); id., at 732 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). Private citizens cannot be punished for refusing to provide the government information that may incriminate them, but government employees can be dismissed when the incriminating information that they refuse to provide relates to the performance of their job. Gardner v. Broderick, [497 U.S. 62, 95] 392 U.S. 273, 277 -278 (1968). With regard to freedom of speech in particular: Private citizens cannot be punished for speech of merely private concern, but government employees can be fired for that reason. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). Private citizens cannot be punished for partisan political activity, but federal and state employees can be dismissed and otherwise punished for that reason. Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947); Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 616 -617 (1973).” [Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990)]


Whereas : MILITARY FLAG WITH THE GOLD FRINGE

Martial Law Flag "Pursuant to 4 U.S.C. chapter 1, §§1, 2, & 3; Executive Order 10834, August 21, 1959; 24 F.R.6865; a military flag is a flag that resembles the regular flag of the United States, except that it has a YELLOW FRINGE border on three sides. The President of the United States designates this deviation from the regular flag, by executive order, and in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the military. The placing of a fringe on the national flag, the dimensions of the flag and the arrangement of the stars in the union are matters of detail not controlled by statute, but are within the discretion of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy." 34 Ops. Atty. Gen. 83.The Law of the Flag regulates the laws under which contracts entered into will be governed. (See Ruhstrat v. People.)

Any courtroom that displays such a flag behind the Judge is a military courtroom which Is operating under military law and not constitutional law, or common law, or civil law, or statute law, Restrictions. (Note added: This court is thereby receiving public funds under false and fraudulent pretense and is committing Treason against the Constitution under the 16th American Jurist Prudence Section 177).

Whereas : 1,2 American Flag such as a gold fringe MUTILATES the flag and carries a one year prison term. This is confirmed by the authority of Title 36, Section § 176 (g). The gold fringe is a fourth color and, purportedly, represents “color of military law” jurisdiction and when placed on the Title 4 U.S.C. Section §§ 1,2 Flag, mutilates the flag and suspends the Constitution. Refer to Title 18 U.S.C. Section 242, see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY.

Attorney's License? Ain't No Such Thing! ATTORNEY'S LICENSE??? AIN'T NO SUCH THING!!! Bigger text (+) ... ALL LAWYERS AND LAWYER

Title 42 § 408(a)(8) Title 42 § 408
(a) In general
Whoever -
(8) discloses, uses, or compels the disclosure of the social security number of any person in violation of the laws of the United States; shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.

this is why it has to be done in Admiralty law: In Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, in the chapter and section that defines “court,” “debt,” “judgment,” and “United States” (Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure, Section 3002), “United States” means a Federal corporation (28 U.S.C. 3002(15)).Title 28 United States Code” means, literally, Title 28 District of Columbia Municipal Corporation Code.the states and district courts are all run by privately hired corporation.. we are treated in court as: Executive Order 6 and 7 Vol XV app-45 Only has signature of the Secretary of the state (William H Seward) Andrew Johnson the president was against the 14th Amendment He stated it creates a DEFACTO GOVERNMENT. Then, in 1868, the 14th Amendment created a different citizen making all “PERSONS”, corporations, citizens of the “UNITED STATES” and “SUBJECT TO” the “JURISDICTION” “THEREOF”.y it has to be done in Admiralty law: In Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, in the chapter and section that defines “court,” “debt,” “judgment,” and “United States” (Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure, Section 3002), “United States” means a Federal corporation (28 U.S.C. 3002(15)).Title 28 United States Code” means, literally, Title 28 District of Columbia Municipal Corporation Code.the states and district courts are all run by privately hired corporation.. we are treated in court as: Executive Order 6 and 7 Vol XV app-45 Only has signature of the Secretary of the state (William H Seward) Andrew Johnson the president was against the 14th Amendment He stated it creates a DEFACTO GOVERNMENT. Then, in 1868, the 14th Amendment created a different citizen making all “PERSONS”, corporations, citizens of the “UNITED STATES” and “SUBJECT TO” the “JURISDICTION” “THEREOF”.
Merely being native born within the territorial boundaries of the United States of America does not make such an inhabitant a Citizen of the United States, unless an American Indian original to this land, subject to the jurisdiction of the Fourteenth Amendment “...Elk v. Wilkins, Neb (1884) 5 s.ct.41,112 U.S. 99,28 L.Ed. 643.
Trey Gowdy lays down facts about illegal immigration https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NaqvzN3HDgA

8 U.S. Code § 1401 - Nationals and citizens of United States at birth

1978—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 95–432, § 3, struck out “(a)” before “The following” and redesignated pars. (1) to (7) as (a) to (g), respectively.

U.S. citizens were declared enemies of the U.S. by F.D.R. by Executive Order No. 2040 and ratified by Congress on March 9, 1933

FDR changed the meaning of The Trading with the Enemy Act of December 6, 1917 by changing the word "without" to citizens "within" the United States

To cover the debt in 1933 and future debt, the corporate government determined and established the value of the future labor of each incorporated individual in its jurisdiction to be $630,000. A bond of $630,000 is set on each Certificate of Live Birth. The certificates are bundled together into sets and then placed as securities on the open market. These certificates are then purchased by the Federal Reserve and/or foreign bankers. The purchaser is the "holder" of "Title." This process made each and every person in this jurisdiction a bond servant.

U.S. nationals and or citizens were declared enemies of the U.S. by F.D.R. by Executive Order No. 2040 and ratified



I hereby state that the information above is true, to the best of my knowledge and comprehension. .


Born Given melissa-catherine damarel: bodda

Autograph of Living Woman and Victim ____________________________________-Date___________

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY ABRIDGED 6TH EDITION

POLICE POWER… PAGE 801 Police power: An authority conferred by the American constitutional system in the Tenth Amendment, U.S. Const., upon the individual states, and in turn delegated to local governments, through which that are enabled to establish a special department of police; adopt such laws and regulations as tend prevent the commission of fraud and crime, and secure generally the comfort, safety, morals, health, and prosperity of its citizens by preserving the public order; preventing a conflict of rights in the common intercourse of the citizens, and enjoyment of all the privileges conferred upon him or her by the general laws. The power of the State to place restraints on personal freedom and property rights of persons for the protection of the public safety, health, and morals or the promotion of the public convenience and general prosperity. The police power is subject to the limitations of the federal and State constitutions, and especially to the requirement of due process. Police power is the exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order; safety, security, health, morals and general welfare within constitutional limits and is an essential attribute of government. Read this closely citizen v person

Public Notice to California Elected and public servant to the state , city county court of Clerk~

The minute you receive any document, it is recorded according to the following case site.

Biffle v. Morton Rubber Indus., Inc., 785 S.W.2d 143, 144 (Tex.1990).
“An instrument is deemed in law filed at the time it is delivered to the clerk, regardless of whether the instrument is “file-marked.”

Should you refuse to record My documents, once deposited with you, you are committing a crime under Title18 USC § 2071 and it is punishable by fines and imprisonment. If your attorney told you not to file any documents like mine, you are still responsible, as I do not accept any third party intervenors. Any attorney, district attorney, or anyone from the lawyering craft are all third parties and do not have a license or bond to make a legal determination in this matter as they do not represent Me and you, the state city or county clerk, and do not have the authority to represent Me.

Title 18 USC – Crimes and Criminal Procedure
Part I – Crimes
Chapter 101 – Records and Reports
Section 2071 – Concealment, removal, or mutilation generally
(a) Whoever willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, or destroys, or attempts to do so, or, with intent to do so takes and carries away any record, proceeding, map, book, paper, document, or other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the United States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or public officer of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
(b) Whoever, having the custody of any such record, proceeding, map, book, document, paper, or other thing, willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, falsifies, or destroys the same, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both; and shall forfeit his office and be disqualified from holding any office under the United States. As used in this subsection, the term ''office'' does not include the office held by any person as a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Justice Department warns local courts about illegal enforcement of fees and fines
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/justice_department_warns_local_courts_about_illegal_enforcement_of_fees_and

Judge Rules that Government Debt is Covered by FDCPA, Forcing Collection Agency to Defend
https://www.insidearm.com/news/00005574-judge-rules-that-government-debt-is-cover/

Supreme Court Rejects Guilty Until Proven Innocent, Says ...www.motorists.org/news/supreme-court-rejects...
Supreme Court Rejects Guilty Until Proven Innocent, Says States Cannot Keep Money From The Innocent; Supreme Court Rejects Guilty Until Proven Innocent, .

Revised Statutes of The United States, 1st session, 43 Congress 1873-1874.
Title LXX.---CRIMES.--- CH. 4. CRIMES AGAINST JUSTICE
SEC. 5403. (Destroying, &c., public records.)
Every person who willfully destroys or attempts to destroy, or, with intent to steal or destroy, takes and carries away any record, paper, or proceeding of a court of justice, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of such court, or any paper, or document, or record filed or deposited in any public office, or with any judicial or public officer, shall, without reference to the value of the record, paper, document, or proceeding so taken, pay a fine of not more than two thousand dollars, or suffer imprisonment, at hard labor, not more than three years, or both: [See § § 5408, 5411, 5412.1]
SEC. 5407. (Conspiracy to defeat enforcement of the laws.)
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws, each of such persons shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, not less than six months nor more than six years, or by both such fine and imprisonment. See § § 1977-1991, 2004-2010, 5506-5510.1
SEC. 5408. (Destroying record by officer in charge.)
Every officer, having the custody of any record, document, paper, or proceeding specified in section fifty-four hundred and three, who fraudulently takes away, or withdraws, or destroys any such record, document, paper, or proceeding filed in his office or deposited with him or in his custody, shall pay a fine of not more than two thousand dollars, or suffer imprisonment at hard labor not more than three years, or both-, and shall, moreover, forfeit his office and be forever afterward disqualified from holding any office under the Government of the United States. Federal Law also prohibits Cities and Counties from issuing citations against businesses, see Title 18 U.S.C.891-896, quoting Section 891 "An extortionate means is any means which involves the use, or an express or implicit threat of use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property."

"Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading. . . Our revenue system is based on the good faith of the voluntary taxpayer and the voluntary taxpayers should be able to expect the same from the government in its enforcement and collection activities. If that is the case we hope our message is clear. This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be corrected immediately." U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299. See also U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1032; Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932.2.7-14

LAW OF THE LAND: Finally, the Supreme Court says, "He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their Rights." The Sovereign indivi...dual does not have to pay taxes. If you should discuss Hale v. Henkel with a run-of-the-mill attorney, he or she will tell you that the case is "old" and that it has been "overturned." If you ask that attorney for a citation of the case or cases that overturned Hale v. Henkel, there will not be a meaningful response. We have researched Hale v. Henkel and here is what we found :We know that Hale v. Henkel was decided in 1905 in the U. S. Supreme Court. Since it was the Supreme Court, the case is binding on all courts of the land, until another Supreme Court case says it isn't. Has another Supreme Court case overturned Hale v. Henkel? The answer is NO. As a matter of fact, since 1905, the Supreme Court has cited Hale v. Henkel a total of 144 times. A fact more astounding is that since 1905, Hale v. Henkel has been cited by all of the federal and STATE appellate court systems a total of over 1600 times. None of the various issues of this case has ever been overruled. So if the STATE through the office of the judge continues to threaten or does imprison you, they are trying to force you into the STATE created office of "person." As long as you continue to claim your Rightful office of Sovereign, the STATE lacks all jurisdictions over you. The STATE needs someone filling the office of "person" in order to continue prosecuting a case in their Courts. A few weeks in jail puts intense pressure upon most "persons." Jail means the loss of job opportunities, separation from loved ones, and the piling up of debts. Judges will apply this pressure when they attempt to arraign you. When brought in chains before a crowded courtroom the issue of counsel will quickly come up and you can tell the court you are In Propria Persona or simply "PRO PER", as yourself and you need no other. Do not sign their papers or cooperate with them because most things about your life are private and are not the STATE's business to evaluate. Here is the Sovereign People's command in the constitution that the STATE respect their privacy: Right of privacy -- Every man or woman has the Right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into their private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's Right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law. See U.S. Constitution, Ninth Amendment If the judge is stupid enough to actually follow through with his threats and send you to jail, you will soon be released without even being arraigned and all charges will be dropped. You will then have documented prima facie grounds for false arrest and false imprisonment charges against him personally. Now that you know the hidden evil in the word "person", try to stop using it in everyday conversation. Simply use the correct term, MAN or WOMAN. Train yourself, your family and your friends to never use the derogatory word "person" ever again. This can be your first step in the journey to get yourself free from all STATE COUNTY and CITY Elected and public Servant's control.

wake up are forefathers made term limits
QUOTE FROM THE SEPTEMBER 17, 1787 CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

POWERS FORBIDDEN TO CONGRESS

SECTION 9.[8]

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

Where was the Consent of Congress whereby the Queen knighted SIR TED KENNEDY? Was Kennedy not an Esquire = Attorney? A Barrister = Tax Collector for the Crown? See “inn of court” BLACKS' LAW DICTIONARY, 8TH ED. Page 805.

Article II [5] = Office of the President

[5] No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the Untied States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution shall be eligible to the Office of the President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-five, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.

AMENDMENT XIV
CIVIL RIGHTS

Section 3.

No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military,under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

QUOTE FROM THE SEPTEMBER 17, 1787 CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Term limits were therefore established by this Constitution for the President, Vice-President, Senate and House of Representatives:
Article 1
THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
Section2.
[1] The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
Section 2.
[2] No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State I which he shall be chosen.
Section 3.
[1] The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, [chosen by the Legislature thereof,] (Note: Changed by the section 1 of the Seventeenth Amendment.) for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.

AMENDMENT XVII
DIRECT ELECTION OF SENATORS
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.

AMENDMENT XVI
INCOME TAX = VOID = NEVER RATIFIED
1993) Key Case: U. S. v. LLOYDE R LONG; FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT TN.; CASE NO. CR-1-93-91 Not guilty on all charges whereas the 16th Amendment was never lawfully ratified.

Notice: All Rights Reserved. Permission to distribute for non-commercial purposes is hereby granted, in whole or part, provided attribution and a link to this article is included. Commercial distribution without the written permission of the author is prohibited. This Public email message, including any attachment(s) is limited to the sole use of the intended recipient and may contain Privileged and/or Confidential Information. Any and All Political, Private or Public Entities, Federal, State, or Local Corporate Government(s), Municipality(ies), International Organizations, Corporation(s), agent(s), investigator(s), or informant(s), et. al., and/or Third Party(ies) working in collusion by collecting and/or monitoring My email(s),and any other means of spying and collecting these Communications Without my Exclusive Permission are Barred from Any and All Unauthorized Review, Use, Disclosure or Distribution. With Explicit Reservation of All My Rights,Without Prejudice and Without Recourse to Me. Any omission does not constitute a waiver of any and/or ALL Intellectual Property Rights or Reserved Rights Notice.Copy right lawful bloodline Americans , lawful Americans 2013*The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 119 Sections 2510-2521 et seq., governs distribution of this “Message,” including attachments. The originator intended this Message for the specified recipients only; it may contain the originator’s confidential and proprietary information. The originator hereby notifies unintended recipients that they have received this Message in error, and strictly proscribes their Message review, dissemination, copying, and content-based actions. Recipients-in-error shall notify the originator immediately by e-mail, and delete the original message. Authorized carriers of this message shall expeditiously deliver this Message to intended recipients. See: Quon v. Arch. Anything stated in this email may be limited in the content and is not to be taken out of context.**Wireless Copyright Notice**. Federal and State laws govern copyrights to this Message. You must have the originator’s full written consent to alter, copy, or use this Message.Originator acknowledges others’ copyrighted content in this Message. Otherwise Without Prejudice and Without Recourse to Me. Any omission does not constitute a waiver of any and/or ALL Intellectual Property Rights or Reserved Rights U.C.C, 1-207.1-308. NOTICE TO AGENTS IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPALS. NOTICE TO PRINCIPALS IS NOTICE TO AGENTS

Legatus Non Violatur ,Without Prejudice , Non Assumptsit , I-207--I-308 All Rights Reserved






Autograph in red ink ______________________________________-Seal______________





ACKNOWLEDGMENT jurat State of California incorporation




County of _____________________________)



On _________________________ before me, _________________________________________




personally appeared ______________________________________________________________,
who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the woman , man or person(s) whose name(s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same in his/her/their authorized autograph, and that by his/her/their Autograph s) on this instrument the woman or man non corporation person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the woman or man(s) acted, executed the instrument.paragraph is true and correct.WITNESS my hand and official seal.





Autograph or Signature notary



__________________________________________________(Seal_____________________

also 49 CFR 396.7 requires a chance to fix it BE4 any tickets issued so if ticketed plead not guilty, demand a jury trial, tell the jury they r required to abide by federal law, get a NOT GUILTY verdict & then sue, 42 USC 1983 & ask for damages by Trezevant vs City of Tampa, then ask for Treble damages per US vs Cooper 312 US 600 (1947) with punitive damages & send me some CHANGE ;<{D


Speeding, running stop signs, travelling without license plates, or registration are not threats to public safety, and thus are not arrestable offenses." Christy v. Elloit, 216 I 131, 74 HE 1035, LRA NS 1905-1910
"Speeding, driving without a license, wrong plates or no plates, no registration, no tags etc.. have been held to be non-arrestable offenses" (Cal v. Farley, 98 Cal. Rep. 89, 20 CA 3d 1032)
Licenses are for the conduct of business, profession, occupation, the exercise of such when they are a privilege, licensing is in the nature of SPECIAL PRIVILEGE entitling licensee to do some thing that he would not be entitled to do without a license. San Francisco v Liverpool, 74 Cal 113

Rights to Travel Explained Oct 14 City of Toledo Ore City Council

State Senator Arnie Roblan on the Rights to travel and Uninsured Motorist fund 05/13/2013

https://www.oregon.gov/ohcs/CRD/mcrc/docs/oregon-revised-statute-chapter-446.html
(33) “Recreational vehicle” means a vehicle with or without motive power, that is designed for human occupancy and to be used temporarily for recreational, seasonal or emergency purposes and as further defined, by rule, by the director
ORS 803.035 - Optional titling - 2015 Oregon Revised Statutes
www.oregonlaws.org/ors/803.035

Chapter: 803 - Vehicle Title and Registration, Section: 035, Year: 2015, Last Accessed: 2016-07-16 https://www.oregonlaws.org/ors/803.035
2015 ORS 803.040¹
Effect of title

Text News Annotations Related Statutes

(1) If this state has issued title for a vehicle, the vehicle shall remain titled by this state and subject to all of the provisions of the vehicle code relating to vehicles titled by this state until one of the following occurs:

(a) The vehicle becomes legally titled under the laws of another jurisdiction.

(b) The owner of the vehicle establishes that the vehicle is no longer subject to the vehicle titling requirements under the vehicle code by a method recognized or established by the Department of Transportation.

© A salvage title is issued for the vehicle.

(2) Subsection (1) of this section applies to a vehicle issued title by this state even if one of the following applies to the vehicle:

(a) At some time after issuance of the title by this state, the vehicle becomes eligible for an exemption from titling requirements under ORS 803.030 (Exemptions from title requirement) or for any other reason.

(b) The issuance of the title was permissive under ORS 803.035 (Optional titling).

© The vehicle is not required to comply with vehicle titling provisions of the vehicle code for any reason. [1985 c.333 §3; 1991 c.873 §30; 1993 c.233 §20]
ORS 803.310 - Optional registration - 2015 Oregon Revised …
www.oregonlaws.org/ors/803.310

(1) The Department of Transportation, by rule, may provide for optional registration of vehicles that are exempt from vehicle registration requirements by ORS 803.305 …
OR Rev Stat § 803.310 :: 803.310 Optional registration; rules …

law.justia.com › … › ORS Chapter 803

ORS Chapter 803 803.310 Optional registration; rules. OR Rev Stat § 803.310 (through Leg Sess 2011) What’s This? (1) The Department of Transportation, by rule, may …

Attorney Licensing Is a Fraud
(1957) and is located for all to read at the following pages in volume 353 U.S. pgs.238, 239 of the United States Reports. Here is a quote from that case:
Chat Conversation End
Type a message…

§ 3-504. EXCUSED PRESENTMENT AND NOTICE OF DISHONOR.

(a) Presentment for payment or acceptance of an instrument is excused if (i) the person entitled to present the instrument cannot with reasonable diligence make presentment, (ii) the maker or acceptor has repudiated an obligation to pay the instrument or is dead or in insolvency proceedings, (iii) by the terms of the instrument presentment is not necessary to enforce the obligation of indorsers or the drawer, (iv) the drawer or indorser whose obligation is being enforced has waived presentment or otherwise has no reason to expect or right to require that the instrument be paid or accepted, or (v) the drawer instructed the drawee not to pay or accept the draft or the drawee was not obligated to the drawer to pay the draft.

(b) Notice of dishonor is excused if (i) by the terms of the instrument notice of dishonor is not necessary to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the instrument, or (ii) the party whose obligation is being enforced waived notice of dishonor. A waiver of presentment is also a waiver of notice of dishonor.

(c) Delay in giving notice of dishonor is excused if the delay was caused by circumstances beyond the control of the person giving the notice and the person giving the notice exercised reasonable diligence after the cause of the delay ceased to operate.

SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT

“Holding that a constitutional speedy trial claim can succeed only where "there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial"”
United States v. Truby, No. 14-8039 (10th Cir. Dec. 18, 2014)
“Holding that dismissal of indictment "is the only possible remedy" for violation of constitutional speedy trial right”
United States v. Hill, No. 11-4790-cr (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2012)

“Holding that prejudice was minimal because "there [wa]s no claim that any of Barker's witnesses died or otherwise became unavailable owing to the delay. The trial transcript indicate[d] only two very minor lapses of memory — one on the part of a prosecution witness — which were in no way significant to the outcome"”
U.S. v. KNOWLES, 390 Fed.Appx. 915 (11th Cir. 2010)

“Holding that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial does not forever waive that constitutional right”
U.S. v. ANDREWS, 365 Fed.Appx. 480 (4th Cir. 2010)

“Holding that criminal defendants may waive their fundamental Sixth Amendment right to a "speedy trial," despite the facts ( inter alia) that: "[t]he inability of courts to provide a prompt [criminal] trial has contributed to a large backlog of cases in urban courts which, among other things, enables defendants to negotiate more effectively for pleas of guilty to lesser offenses and otherwise manipulate the system."”
U.S. v. BLACKWELL, 12 F.3d 44 (5th Cir. 1994)

“Holding that balancing test applies when determining whether defendant has been deprived of right to speedy trial, including four relevant factors: "[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant"”
Hanson v. Jones, Case No. 4:13cv16-WS/CAS (N.D. Fla. Sep. 28, 2015)

“Holding that a five year delay between arrest and trial did not deprive defendant of right to speedy trial where defendant could show no impairment to defense due to delay”
Villasenor v. Brazelton, No. C 12-4829 LHK (PR) (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014)

“Holding that more than a five year delay, while extraordinary, did not violate the defendant's right to a speedy trial”
United States v. Hunter, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 2:12cr124 (E.D. Va. Jun. 9, 2014)

“Holding that five-year delay did not violate defendant's right to speedy trial even though most of the delay was not based on a "strong excuse"”
Gable v. Wengler, Case No. 1:10-cv-00644-REB (D. Idaho Aug. 13, 2013)

“Holding that a defense is impaired if "[i]f witnesses die or disappear during a delay" or "defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past"”
United States v. Velazquez, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 05-432-03 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 11, 2012)

“Holding that failure to assert right to speedy trial "will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial"”
Winer v. Comm'r of Corr., PRISONER CASE NO. 3:10cv743 (JCH) (D. Conn. Feb. 17, 2012)

“Holding that delay of over five years did not violate right to speedy trial”
Dearstyne v. Mazzuca, 48 F.Supp.3d 222 (N.D.N.Y. 2011)

“Holding that the four factors are length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and prejudice to the defendant”
U.S. v. JONES, 1:05-cr-617-WSD. (N.D. Ga. Jul. 19, 2007)

“Holding that defendant's speedy-trial rights were not violated even though he spent "ten months in jail before trial" and "was prejudiced to some extent by living for over four years under a cloud of suspicion and anxiety"”
U.S. v. NUNEZ, 00-CR-199S-19. (W.D.N.Y. Jul. 17, 2006)

“Holding that the burden of protecting the speedy trial right falls on the government since clearly "[a] defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial"”
U.S. v. GOMEZ-OLMEDA, Criminal No. 03-073 (JAF) (D.P.R. Nov. 12, 2003)

“Holding that where defendant was not seriously prejudiced by delay of more than five years, defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial not violated”
U.S. v. KETRON, (W.D.Va. 2003), Case No. 1:01CR00058. (W.D. Va. Jun. 4, 2003)

“Holding that "a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay," but that it is ultimately the responsibility of the government to bring a defendant to trial”
Lowe v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State, No. 68042 (Nev. Jul. 21, 2015)

“Holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendant's right to a speedy trial, courts must consider the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, whether the defendant asserted his rights, and the resulting prejudice to the defendant”
One 1970 Mercury Cougar v. Tunica Cnty., 115 So.3d 792 (Miss. 2013)

“Holding that deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused's ability to defend himself”
Kelly v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 90 (Ark. 2013)

“Holding that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial does not waive that right; instead, a "defendant's assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of the right"”
BOUCHER v. STATE, 2011 WY 2 (Wyo. 2011)

“Holding that even though a delay of five years was extraordinary, the fact that the defendant was minimally prejudiced and did not request a speedy trial counterbalanced the extraordinary delay”
STATE v. KANNEH, 403 Md. 678 (Md. 2008)

“Holding that five-year delay attributable to prosecution, including ten months of incarceration, was extraordinary, but did not justify writ of habeas corpus for lack of speedy trial when defendant acquiesced to three years of delay without prejudice”
STATE v. BRILLON, 2008 VT 35 (Vt. 2008)

“Holding that a defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial can be determined only on an ad hoc basis in which the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant are weighed and balanced and certain factors considered, including the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant”
COM. v. WEST, 595 Pa. 483 (Pa. 2007)

“Holding that none of the factors alone is sufficient to establish a violation and that all must be considered together”
STATE v. SPIVEY, 357 N.C. 114 (N.C. 2003)

“Holding that none of the four factors is "either a necessary or sufficient condition" to a finding of deprivation of speedy trial right”
GRAVES v. UNITED STATES, 490 A.2d 1086 (D.C. 1984)

Civil Actions for False Imprisonment

False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of a person without consent or legal justification. False imprisonment can be committed by words, acts, or by both[i]. The common law tort of false imprisonment is defined as an unlawful restraint of an individual’s personal liberty or freedom of movement[ii]. In order to constitute the wrong it is not necessary that the individual be actually confined or assaulted[iii].

It is to be noted that, there is no necessity in a false imprisonment case to prove that a person used physical violence or laid hands on another person. It is sufficient to show that at any time or place the person in any manner deprived another person of his/her liberty without sufficient legal authority[iv].

False arrest is sometimes used interchangeably with false imprisonment. False arrest is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another consisting of detention without sufficient legal authority. In order to establish a false arrest claim, the person detained must prove that the arrest is unlawful and such unlawful arrest resulted in injury. An arrest is unlawful when the police officers in question did not have probable cause to make the arrest[v].

An arresting officer who fails to take the arrested person before a court or magistrate within a reasonable time or without unnecessary delay is guilty of false imprisonment. Similarly, an officer who arrests a person without a warrant is liable for false imprisonment by detaining the prisoner an unreasonable time[vi].

Generally, false arrest is one of several means of committing false imprisonment. False arrest describes the setting for false imprisonment when it is committed by a peace officer or by one who claims the power to make an arrest. Thus, a tort action for false imprisonment based on false arrest against a person who is not a peace officer implies that the detention or restraint to support the tort was done by one who claims the power of arrest[vii].

However, false arrest is almost indistinguishable from false imprisonment[viii]. The only distinction lies in the manner in which they arise. False arrest is merely one means of committing a false imprisonment. Whereas, false imprisonment is committed without any thought of attempting arrest[ix].

The principal element of damages in an action for false imprisonment is the loss of freedom. Sometimes, a court also takes into account the fear and nervousness suffered as a result of the detention[x]. The tort of false imprisonment involves an unlawful restraint on freedom of movement or personal liberty. Therefore, two essential elements to constitute false imprisonment are[xi]:

Detention or restraint against a person’s will,
Unlawfulness of the detention or restraint.

Whereas, after liability is established for false arrest, the person who suffered may recover nominal damages as well as compensation for mental suffering, including fright, shame, and mortification from the indignity and disgrace, consequent upon an illegal detention[xii]. However, in a suit for false arrest and false imprisonment, a person cannot recover attorney’s fees incurred or loss of earnings suffered while defending an underlying criminal action[xiii].

The elements to be considered by the jury in awarding compensatory damages in a false imprisonment case are physical suffering, mental suffering and humiliation, loss of time and interruption of business, reasonable and necessary expenses incurred, and injury to reputation[xiv]. However, it is to be noted that a mere loss of freedom will not constitute false imprisonment[xv].

In a suit for false imprisonment, the damages award may include compensation for loss of earnings while imprisoned, for bodily and mental suffering caused by the imprisonment, and for expenses incurred in securing discharge from restraint including a reasonable attorney fee[xvi].

The measure of damages for false imprisonment is a sum that will fairly and reasonably compensate the injured person for the injuries caused by the wrongful act including any special pecuniary loss which is a direct result of the false imprisonment[xvii]. A jury can award punitive damages in a false arrest or imprisonment case, if the requisite level of malice or other requisite mental state is established.

NO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

“Holding that "if the actions of an officer do not conflict with the terms of his valid statutory authority, then they are the actions of the sovereign"”
BLANEY v. U.S, 34 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 1994)

“Holding that a suit is against individuals in their official capacity if the relief sought would be paid for or accomplished by the sovereign entity”
S. Fork Livestock P'ship v. United States, 183 F.Supp.3d 1111 (D. Nev. 2016)

“Holding that a suit for injunctive relief against a federal officer, acting in his official capacity and within his statutory and constitutional authority, was barred by sovereign immunity”
Sitkovestskiy v. Young, CIVIL CASE NUMBER: 3:15-cv-1073 (VLB) (D. Conn. Feb. 1, 2016)

“Holding that, where it is alleged that the federal officials "were acting unconstitutionally or pursuant to an unconstitutional grant of power," sovereign immunity does not apply in cases for prospective relief”
MILLIGAN v. U.S, Case No. 3:07-1053. (M.D. Tenn. May. 3, 2008)

“Holding that request for declaratory and injunctive relief against the government based on the actions of individual defendant officers was an action against the United States”
EDWARDS v. SAMUELS, Civil Action No. 06-3758 (RMB). (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2007)

“Holding that request for declaratory and injunctive relief against the government based on the actions of individual defendants was an action against the United States”
BOND v. EVERSON, No. CV-F-05-1339 REC SMS. (E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2006)

“Holding that district court lacked jurisdiction over action for equitable relief”
F.D.I.C. v. WALKER, (N.D.Tex. 1993), 815 F. Supp. 987 (N.D. Tex. 1993)

“Concluding that sovereign immunity bars suits challenging a government official's decision, even if that decision was "based on an incorrect decision as to law or fact, if the officer making the decision was empowered to do so"”
MUIRHEAD v. MECHAM, 427 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2005)

“Rejecting the view "that an officer given the power to make decisions is only given the power to make correct decisions"”
VERIZON MARYLAND INC. v. RCN TELECOM SERVICES, INC., (D.Md. 2002), 232 F. Supp.2d 539 (D. Md. 2002)

“Recognizing that "the jurisdiction of the court to hear the case may depend . . . upon the decision which it ultimately reaches on the merits"”
WYOMING v. U.S, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2002)

“Recognizing that federal officials sued in their individual capacities are not immune from suit”
Palacios v. Corr. Corp. of Am., CV 11-0584 MV/WPL (D.N.M. Sep. 14, 2012)

“Recognizing that the old notion that the “King can do no wrong” still applies in the realm of sovereign immunity”
Desoto Cnty. v. Dennis, 160 So.3d 1154 (Miss. 2015)

“Contrasting `damages' and `specific relief' and including in the latter category `the recovery of specific property or monies'”
BOWEN v. MASSACHUSETTS, 487 U.S. 879 (1988)

“Suggesting extension of Ex parte Young to tribal sovereign immunity context”
VANN v. KEMPTHORNE, 534 F.3d 741 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

“Noting that Congress had provided for amenability to suit by different means, in some cases "entrust[ing] the business of the Government to agencies which may contract in their own names and which are subject to suit in their own names," and in others "permitt[ing] suits for damages . . . in the Court of Claims"”
PUERTO RICO v. FED. MARITIME, 531 F.3d 868 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

“Noting that, in actions for habeas corpus, "the conduct against which specific relief is sought is beyond the officer's powers and is, therefore, not the conduct of the sovereign"”
POODRY v. TONAWANDA BAND OF SENECA INDIANS, 85 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1996)

“Noting that sovereign immunity does not protect federal officials in the performance of acts that are unconstitutional or beyond their statutory authority”
U.S. v. HORN, 29 F.3d 754 (1st Cir. 1994)

“Explaining that, in deciding whether a suit against a government officer is an official-capacity or individual-capacity suit, "the crucial question is whether the relief sought . . . is relief against the sovereign"”
AMERICAN POLICYHOLDERS v. NYACOL PRODUCTS, 989 F.2d 1256 (1st Cir. 1993)

“Referring to "interference with government property"”
BARTLETT v. BOWEN, 816 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

“Noting that when suits seek to restrain the actions of government agencies, they are "barred, not because it is a suit against an officer of the Government, but because it is, in substance, a suit against the Government over which the court, in the absence of consent, has no jurisdiction"”
Consol. Envtl. Mgmt., Inc. v. McCarthy, CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-1432 SECTION "R" (1) (E.D. La. Nov. 22, 2016)

“Outlining the test to determine whether a federal officer's actions are excepted from the protection of sovereign immunity”
Temple v. Horses, 163 F.Supp.3d 602 (D.S.D. 2016)

“Explaining that actions that transgressions of constitutional or statutory limitations are deemed individual and not sovereign actions”
Mackinac Tribe v. Jewell, 87 F.Supp.3d 127 (D.D.C. 2015)

“Reasoning that where a "statute or order conferring power upon the officer to take action in the sovereign's name is claimed to be unconstitutional[,]" "the conduct against which specific relief is sought is beyond the officer's powers and is, therefore, not the conduct of the sovereign"”
KURTZ v. U.S, Civil Action No. 10-1270 (RWR). (D.D.C. Jul. 26, 2011)

“Noting sovereign immunity does not protect federal officials acting outside their authority”
ANDERSON v. DREW, Civil Action No.: 1:10-996-RMG. (D.S.C. Jun. 21, 2011)

“Noting that "the jurisdiction of the court to hear the case may depend . . . upon the decision which it ultimately reaches on the merits"”
ROUSSEAU v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, CIVIL ACTION NO. 04-4368 (MLC). (D.N.J. Feb. 5, 2010)

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

“Holding that moving stereo equipment in plain view a “few inches” to record the equipment's serial numbers constituted a search”
United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2016)

“Holding that in order to seize property under the plain view doctrine, police must have "probable cause to believe that the item in question is evidence of a crime or is contraband"”
U.S. v. TATMAN, 397 Fed.Appx. 152 (6th Cir. 2010)

“Holding that "probable cause is required"”
U.S. v. COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING, 513 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008)

“Holding that observance of stereo turntable in plain view did not justify police moving turntable in order to read its serial number when they lacked probable cause”
U.S. v. BANKS, 514 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2008
)
“Holding that an officer's movement of stereo components to examine their serial numbers was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”
U.S. v. DAVIS, 332 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2003)

“Holding that police, lawfully present to search, because of exigent circumstances, for the perpetrator of a crime, his victims, and weapons, could not seize property not in plain view that they only suspected had been stolen”
U.S. v. McDONALD, 100 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir. 1996)

“Holding that "probable cause to believe the equipment was stolen was required" to justify officer's search of stereo found in plain view”
U.S. v. BUCHANAN, 70 F.3d 818 (5th Cir. 1996)

“Holding that, absent "special operational necessities," probable cause is presumptively required”
ROMO v. CHAMPION, 46 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 1995)

“Holding that police must have probable cause in order to search or seize evidence in plain view”
U.S. v. ROBERTSON, 21 F.3d 1030 (10th Cir. 1994)

“Holding that officer must have probable cause to seize items under the plain view doctrine”
U.S. v. WAYNE, 903 F.2d 1188 (8th Cir. 1990)

“Holding that simply moving an object to record a serial number did not "meaningfully interfere" with an individual's possessory interest”
McVea v. Swan, 5:14-CV-073-RP (W.D. Tex. Jul. 17, 2015)

“Holding that merely copying serial numbers did not "meaningfully interfere" with possessory interest in property”
Finley v. City of Philadelphia, NO. 11-1205 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2011)

“Holding that officer's "moving of" stereo equipment to read serial numbers constituted a search”
U.S. v. GUZMAN, 724 F. Supp.2d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

“Holding probable cause required to invoke the plain view doctrine”
U.S. v. WILLIAMS, (M.D.Ala. 2003), 267 F. Supp.2d 1130 (M.D. Ala. 2003)

“Holding observation of that which is already observable—"without disturbing it—is not a 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes"”
State v. Stanley, 2017 S.D. 32 (S.D. 2017)

“Holding that moving stereo equipment to obtain its serial number constituted a search”
Collins v. Commonwealth, 790 S.E.2d 611 (Va. 2016)

“Holding that the officer, performing an exigent circumstances search of a residence in response to a shooting, violated the Fourth Amendment by moving stereo equipment observed during the search in order to reveal its serial number”
STATE v. KETELSON, 2011-NMSC-023 (N.M. 2011)

“Holding that an officer may seize nonthreatening evidence unrelated to the search if the incriminating character of this other evidence lies within the officer's plain view and he or she need not conduct any further search”
STATE v. BLACK, 721 A.2d 826 (R.I. 1998)

“Holding that the mere act of moving a piece of stereo equipment to expose its serial number "produce[d] a[n] . . . invasion of respondent's privacy" in violation of the fourth amendment without any suggestion that the defendant intentionally concealed the serial number from view”
STATE v. JOYCE, 229 Conn. 10 (Conn. 1994)

“Holding an officer's movement of stereo equipment to view a serial number constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment”
State v. Edwards, 782 S.E.2d 124 (S.C. Ct. App. 2016)

“Holding that a search for shooting victims or weapons following a shooting in an apartment building did not extend, without additional justification, to moving stereo equipment in order to record the serial numbers to determine if it was stolen”
State v. Polk, 57 N.E.3d 318 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016)

“Holding that, when warrantless entry into apartment to search for shooter was justified based on exigent circumstances, seizure of stereo equipment in plain view in the apartment was illegal because police did not have probable cause to believe the stereo equipment was evidence of a crime”
Peters v. State, No. 1800 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 26, 2015)

“Holding that the police officer's act of moving stereo equipment “did constitute a ‘search’ separate and apart from the search for the shooter, victims, and weapons that was the lawful objective of his entry into the apartment.... [and that] taking action, unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents, did produce a new invasion of respondent's privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated the entry””
State v. Miller, 746 S.E.2d 421 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013)

“Holding that reasonable suspicion is insufficient to conduct a search or seizure under the plain view doctrine”
State v. Lorenzo, 2012 Ohio 3145 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012)

“Holding that police officer's actions in moving stereo equipment came within the purview of the Fourth Amendment as a "search" independent of the search which was justified by the exigent circumstances validating the entry of the apartment and pointing out, "A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable."”
STATE v. BERRIOS, W2005-01179-CCA-R9-CD (Tenn.Crim.App. 3-3-2006), No. W2005-01179-CCA-R9-CD. (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2006)

"An illegal arrest is an assault and battery. The person so attempted to be restrained of his liberty has the same right to use force in defending himself as he would in repelling any other assault and battery."
(State v. Robinson, 145 ME. 77, 72 ATL. 260).

"Each person has the right to resist an unlawful arrest. In such a case, the person attempting the arrest stands in the position of a wrongdoer and may be resisted by the use of force, as in self- defense."
(State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E. 2d 100).

"One may come to the aid of another being unlawfully arrested, just as he may where one is being assaulted, molested, raped or kidnapped. Thus it is not an offense to liberate one from the unlawful custody of an officer, even though he may have submitted to such custody, without resistance."
(Adams v. State, 121 Ga. 16, 48 S.E. 910).
.
"These principles apply as well to an officer attempting to make an arrest, who abuses his authority and transcends the bounds thereof by the use of unnecessary force and violence, as they do to a private individual who unlawfully uses such force and violence."
Jones v. State, 26 Tex. App. I; Beaverts v. State, 4 Tex. App. 1 75; Skidmore v. State, 43 Tex. 93, 903.

also 49 CFR 396.7 requires a chance to fix it BE4 any tickets issued so if ticketed plead not guilty, demand a jury trial, tell the jury they r required to abide by federal law, get a NOT GUILTY verdict & then sue, 42 USC 1983 & ask for damages by Trezevant vs City of Tampa, then ask for Treble damages per US vs Cooper 312 US 600 (1947) with punitive damages & send me some CHANGE ;<{D


Speeding, running stop signs, travelling without license plates, or registration are not threats to public safety, and thus are not arrestable offenses." Christy v. Elloit, 216 I 131, 74 HE 1035, LRA NS 1905-1910
"Speeding, driving without a license, wrong plates or no plates, no registration, no tags etc.. have been held to be non-arrestable offenses" (Cal v. Farley, 98 Cal. Rep. 89, 20 CA 3d 1032)
Licenses are for the conduct of business, profession, occupation, the exercise of such when they are a privilege, licensing is in the nature of SPECIAL PRIVILEGE entitling licensee to do some thing that he would not be entitled to do without a license. San Francisco v Liverpool, 74 Cal 113



IT IS THE COURTS RESPONSIBILITY AND LAWFUL DUTY TO PROTECT MY RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND RIGHT TO "IMPARTIAL AND DISINTERESTED" ARBITER!!!!
( US v Lee, 106 US 196, 220 (1882) )
Due Process provides an impartial and disinterested tribunal in BOTH civil and criminal cases!!!!

Excessive Force

“Holding it was reasonable for police to force individuals onto the ground and detain them for 25 minutes during a dangerous, "swiftly developing" drug raid”
Lawal v. McDonald, No. 13-1881 (3d Cir. Feb. 26, 2014)

“Holding that while officers conducting a drug raid could place a mother, her seventeen- and fifteen-year-old daughters and seventeen-year-old son who were ascending the stairs of the target residence on the ground, handcuffing them and keeping weapons pointed at them for ten to fifteen minutes while they identified them constituted excessive force”
CHIDESTER v. UTAH COUNTY, 268 Fed.Appx. 718 (10th Cir. 2008)

“Holding that an excessive force claim was appropriate where a woman and her minor children approached a house where a search warrant was being carried out, had guns pointed at them, and were handcuffed for up to twenty-five minutes”
CORTEZ v. MCCAULEY, 478 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2007)

“Holding that officers were not justified in handcuffing a mother and her teenage children who were approaching a residence where the officers were executing a search warrant for narcotics”
MEREDITH v. ERATH, 342 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2003)

“Holding that a police officer may be held liable for excessive force under section 1983 even where he did not personally use excessive force or direct others to use it”
Adams ex rel. Adams v. Springmeyer, Civil Action No. 11-790 (W.D. Pa. May. 22, 2012)

“Holding that actual knowledge may be reasonably inferred from the circumstances”
White v. New Jersey, Civil Action No. 09-4802(SRC) (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2012)

“Holding that Summers pertains only to the residents of the house under warrant, although police may stop people coming to or going from the house to ascertain whether they live there”
U.S. v. GUADARRAMA, Case No. 00-CR-124. (E.D. Wis. Jan. 12, 2001)

“Finding excessive force where police held suspect's family members, two of whom were minors, on the ground at gunpoint while they searched the alleged suspect's house”
Stiegel v. Peters Twp., No. 14-1631 (3d Cir. Dec. 9, 2014)

“Finding liability for excessive force where officers pointed guns at and handcuffed several members of a family where there was "simply no evidence of anything that should have caused the officers to use the kind of force they are alleged to have used"”
COUDEN v. DUFFY, 446 F.3d 483 (3d Cir. 2006)

“Finding that officers violated the Fourth Amendment by pointing guns at family members, pushing them down to the ground and handcuffing them where there was "simply no evidence of anything that should have caused the officers to use the kind of force they are alleged to have used"”
Payano v. City of Camden, Civil No. 13-2528 (NLH) (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2016)

“Finding personal involvement where a supervisor was present at the scene of but did not direct nor see the unlawful conduct”
Bornstein v. Cnty. of Monmouth, Civ. No. 11-5336 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2014)

“Finding knowledge and acquiescence where a supervisor was present at the scene of the alleged violation, but did not see it”
Womack v. Moleins, Civ. No. 10-2932 (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2014)

“Finding no qualified immunity where officer on a drug raid acquiesced to other officers' acts of pointing guns at a mother and her children "without any reason to feel threatened" by them”
HAMMOCK v. BOROUGH OF UPPER DARBY, CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-CV-1006. (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2007)

“Finding officers used excessive force against family who was merely on the scene where officers were serving warrant”
GLASS v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, 455 F. Supp.2d 302 (E.D. Pa. 2006)

“Concluding that the plaintiffs had presented evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment where officers pointed guns at the plaintiffs, including three minors, aged seventeen, seventeen, and fifteen, and handcuffed some of them for up to twenty-five minutes, where there was "simply no evidence of anything that should have caused the officers to use the kind of force they are alleged to have used"”
TEKLE v. U.S, 511 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2007)

“Upholding detention of defendant who arrived on the scene "just as the police were initiating a drug raid"”
U.S. v. BANKS, 628 F. Supp.2d 811 (N.D. Ill. 2009)

“Granting defendant township's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's failure to train claims, and stating that it is unreasonable to expect a township to retrain officers from the County prosecutor's office and the Drug Enforcement Agency, and that the plaintiff provided no evidence showing that the township had a reason to think retraining was necessary”
Estep v. Mackey, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-207 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2015)

“Granting motion for summary judgment in favor of township on section 1983 claim where plaintiff failed to show policy of custom of the township which violated plaintiff's constitutional rights”
DIBLASI v. BOROUGH OF EAST RUTHERFORD, Civil Action No. 05-1980 (JAP). (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2006)

“Denying police supervisor's summary judgment motion where sufficient evidence existed as to supervisor's actual knowledge of and acquiescence to subordinates' use of excessive force”
Gentry v. Lancaster Cnty., CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-2350 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 4, 2014)

“Denying officer's motion for summary judgment where plaintiff presented evidence that officer "knew of and acquiesced" to allegedly unlawful treatment of plaintiff”
BRENNER v. TOWNSHIP OF MOORESTOWN, Civil No. 09-219 (RBK/KMW), (Doc. Nos. 40, 44, 50). (D.N.J. May. 17, 2011)

“Reversing summary judgment on grounds that constitutional violation could be found if officers had, as alleged, pointed guns at fifteen- and seventeen-year-olds and handcuffed some of them for up to twenty-five minutes when they were merely visiting house that was being searched”
MLODZINSKI v. LEWIS, 648 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2011)

“Reversing grant of summary judgment in favor of supervising police officer when warrant did not authorize search and detention of plaintiffs and evidence presented factual issue of whether supervising officer actually knew and acquiesced to other officers handcuffing, detaining, and pointing guns directly at plaintiffs”
TAFT v. VINES, 83 F.3d 681 (4th Cir. 1996)

“Reversing dismissal of claim against supervising officer because there was "sufficient evidence to permit an inference that Armstrong knew of and acquiesced in the treatment the Bakers were receiving at the hands of the other officers acting under his supervision"”
Hilburn v. State of New Jersey Dep't of Corr., Civil No. 7-6064 (D.N.J. Jul. 31, 2012)

“Reversing summary judgment and remanding for trial § 1983 supervisory liability claim where there was sufficient evidence to create reasonable inference that supervisor, who was not present during alleged use of excessive force by subordinates, knew of and acquiesced in such treatment”
HILL v. ALGOR, (D.N.J. 2000), 85 F. Supp.2d 391 (D.N.J. 2000)
“Recognizing that prolonged detention may ripen into an arrest”
LEVETO v. LAPINA, 258 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2001)

Police Officers

         Are

Policy Officers

They Enforce

Policy set by

the Corporations


They know the

S.C.O.A.R.R.

Statutes

Codes

Ordinances

Admenistrative

Rules

Regulations

But they are trained to ignore the Constitution LAW


INTRUSION

“Holding that the right to privacy at home is "[a]t the very core" of what the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect”
United States v. Riley, No. 16-6149 (6th Cir. Jun. 5, 2017)

“Holding that an unauthorized intrusion only inches inside a home is "an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area"”
Smith v. City of Wyo., No. 15-3336 (6th Cir. May. 18, 2016)

“Holding that it was a physical intrusion to extend a microphone into a house”
FISHER v. CITY OF SAN JOSE, 475 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2007)

“Holding that officers' insertion of electronic instrument from adjacent vacant row house through common wall to heating duct constituted a physical intrusion of the home in violation of the Fourth Amendment”
United States v. Bain, Criminal No.14-cr-10115-IT (D. Mass. Feb. 17, 2015)

“Finding Fourth Amendment violation where “spike mike” used to listen in on a defendant's conversations penetrated wall and made physical contact with heating duct, and distinguishing cases in which no unauthorized physical intrusion occurred”
State v. Mitchell, 323 P.3d 69 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014)

“Gambling offenses”
MINNESOTA v. CARTER, 525 U.S. 83 (1998)

“Basing its decision "upon the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area," the Court held that inserting a microphone a few inches into a home constituted an entry of the home”
Dalcour v. City of Lakewood, No. 11-1117 (10th Cir. Aug. 6, 2012)

“Observing that "[a]t the very core" of the Fourth Amendment "stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."”
DELIA v. CITY OF RIALTO, 09-55514 (9th Cir. 9-9-2010), No. 09-55514. (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 2010)

“Noting that because agents had failed to secure a search warrant as "required by the Fourth Amendment and Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure," the electronic surveillance was illegal”
UNITED STATES v. BIASUCCI, 786 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1986)

“Eavesdropping accomplished by means of unauthorized physical penetration of premises violated Fourth Amendment”
JUIDE v. CITY OF ANN ARBOR, (E.D.Mich. 1993), 839 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Mich. 1993)

“Abandoning theory of trespass and relying on concept of a "constitutionally protected area" to suppress overhead evidence”
U.S. v. FERRARA, (D.Mass. 1991), 771 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Mass. 1991)

“Involving insertion of "spike" microphone into building heating system in order to listen to conversations going on inside the building”
STATE v. MacELMAN, 154 N.H. 304 (N.H. 2006)

“Eavesdropping accomplished by means of "spike mike" inserted through wall of adjoining house made contact with heating duct in defendant's house, which then acted as a "giant microphone," held to violate Fourth Amendment rights.”
STATE v. GERAW, 173 Vt. 350 (Vt. 2002)

“Distinguishing permissible police eavesdropping which "had not been accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical encroachment within a constitutionally protected area," with impermissible warrantless physical intrusion of a "spike mike" that made physical contact with a heating duct serving a house under police investigation”
James v. State, 506 S.W.3d 560 (Tex. App. 2016)
--------------------------------------------
On Sun, 7/16/17, ed johnston <edjohnston2003@yahoo.com> wrote:

Subject: Re: site
To: LinxTruth@gmx.com
Date: Sunday, July 16, 2017, 1:34 PM

SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT

“Holding that a constitutional speedy
trial claim can succeed only where "there is some delay
which is presumptively prejudicial"”
United States v. Truby, No. 14-8039
(10th Cir. Dec. 18, 2014)
“Holding that dismissal of indictment
"is the only possible remedy" for violation of
constitutional speedy trial right”
United States v. Hill, No. 11-4790-cr
(2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2012)

“Holding that prejudice was minimal
because "there [wa]s no claim that any of Barker's witnesses
died or otherwise became unavailable owing to the delay. The
trial transcript indicate[d] only two very minor lapses of
memory — one on the part of a prosecution witness —
which were in no way significant to the outcome"”
U.S. v. KNOWLES, 390 Fed.Appx. 915
(11th Cir. 2010)

“Holding that a defendant who fails
to demand a speedy trial does not forever waive that
constitutional right”
U.S. v. ANDREWS, 365 Fed.Appx. 480 (4th
Cir. 2010)

“Holding that criminal defendants may
waive their fundamental Sixth Amendment right to a "speedy
trial," despite the facts ( inter alia) that: "[t]he
inability of courts to provide a prompt [criminal] trial has
contributed to a large backlog of cases in urban courts
which, among other things, enables defendants to negotiate
more effectively for pleas of guilty to lesser offenses and
otherwise manipulate the system."”
U.S. v. BLACKWELL, 12 F.3d 44 (5th Cir.
1994)

“Holding that balancing test applies
when determining whether defendant has been deprived of
right to speedy trial, including four relevant factors:
"[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant"”
Hanson v. Jones, Case No.
4:13cv16-WS/CAS (N.D. Fla. Sep. 28, 2015)

“Holding that a five year delay
between arrest and trial did not deprive defendant of right
to speedy trial where defendant could show no impairment to
defense due to delay”
Villasenor v. Brazelton, No. C 12-4829
LHK (PR) (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014)

“Holding that more than a five year
delay, while extraordinary, did not violate the defendant's
right to a speedy trial”
United States v. Hunter, CRIMINAL
ACTION NO. 2:12cr124 (E.D. Va. Jun. 9, 2014)

“Holding that five-year delay did not
violate defendant's right to speedy trial even though most
of the delay was not based on a "strong excuse"”
Gable v. Wengler, Case No.
1:10-cv-00644-REB (D. Idaho Aug. 13, 2013)

“Holding that a defense is impaired
if "[i]f witnesses die or disappear during a delay" or
"defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of
the distant past"”
United States v. Velazquez, CRIMINAL
ACTION NO. 05-432-03 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 11, 2012)

“Holding that failure to assert right
to speedy trial "will make it difficult for a defendant to
prove that he was denied a speedy trial"”
Winer v. Comm'r of Corr., PRISONER CASE
NO. 3:10cv743 (JCH) (D. Conn. Feb. 17, 2012)

“Holding that delay of over five
years did not violate right to speedy trial”
Dearstyne v. Mazzuca, 48 F.Supp.3d 222
(N.D.N.Y. 2011)

“Holding that the four factors are
length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and
prejudice to the defendant”
U.S. v. JONES, 1:05-cr-617-WSD. (N.D.
Ga. Jul. 19, 2007)

“Holding that defendant's
speedy-trial rights were not violated even though he spent
"ten months in jail before trial" and "was prejudiced to
some extent by living for over four years under a cloud of
suspicion and anxiety"”
U.S. v. NUNEZ, 00-CR-199S-19. (W.D.N.Y.
Jul. 17, 2006)

“Holding that the burden of
protecting the speedy trial right falls on the government
since clearly "[a] defendant has no duty to bring himself to
trial"”
U.S. v. GOMEZ-OLMEDA, Criminal No.
03-073 (JAF) (D.P.R. Nov. 12, 2003)

“Holding that where defendant was not
seriously prejudiced by delay of more than five years,
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial not
violated”
U.S. v. KETRON, (W.D.Va. 2003), Case
No. 1:01CR00058. (W.D. Va. Jun. 4, 2003)

“Holding that "a valid reason, such
as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate
delay," but that it is ultimately the responsibility of the
government to bring a defendant to trial”
Lowe v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of
State, No. 68042 (Nev. Jul. 21, 2015)

“Holding that when determining
whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendant's right
to a speedy trial, courts must consider the length of the
delay, the reason for the delay, whether the defendant
asserted his rights, and the resulting prejudice to the
defendant”
One 1970 Mercury Cougar v. Tunica
Cnty., 115 So.3d 792 (Miss. 2013)

“Holding that deprivation of the
right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the
accused's ability to defend himself”
Kelly v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 90 (Ark.
2013)

“Holding that a defendant who fails
to demand a speedy trial does not waive that right; instead,
a "defendant's assertion of or failure to assert his right
to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be considered in
an inquiry into the deprivation of the right"”
BOUCHER v. STATE, 2011 WY 2 (Wyo.
2011)

“Holding that even though a delay of
five years was extraordinary, the fact that the defendant
was minimally prejudiced and did not request a speedy trial
counterbalanced the extraordinary delay”
STATE v. KANNEH, 403 Md. 678 (Md.
2008)

“Holding that five-year delay
attributable to prosecution, including ten months of
incarceration, was extraordinary, but did not justify writ
of habeas corpus for lack of speedy trial when defendant
acquiesced to three years of delay without prejudice”
STATE v. BRILLON, 2008 VT 35 (Vt.
2008)

“Holding that a defendant's
constitutional right to speedy trial can be determined only
on an ad hoc basis in which the conduct of the prosecution
and the defendant are weighed and balanced and certain
factors considered, including the length of delay, the
reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his
right, and prejudice to the defendant”
COM. v. WEST, 595 Pa. 483 (Pa. 2007)

“Holding that none of the factors
alone is sufficient to establish a violation and that all
must be considered together”
STATE v. SPIVEY, 357 N.C. 114 (N.C.
2003)

“Holding that none of the four
factors is "either a necessary or sufficient condition" to a
finding of deprivation of speedy trial right”
GRAVES v. UNITED STATES, 490 A.2d 1086
(D.C. 1984)

“Since the officer was outside the municipality's city limits when he first observed petitioner, he had no police authority to detain him. See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-40 (1985).” State v. McAteer, 340 S.C. 644, 646 (S.C. 2000)




POLICE CAN NOT MAKE A PRIVATE CITIZENS ARREST OUTSIDE JURISDICTION

“Finding an officer outside his municipality's city limits did not have the authority to detain the petitioner until a highway patrolman arrived because (1) he was outside his jurisdiction when he first observed the petitioner violate the law and (2) he did not have the authority to make a private citizen's arrest”
State v. Alexander, Appellate Case No. 2014-001919 (S.C. Ct. App. Jul. 27, 2016)

“Concluding that "[s]ince the officer was outside the municipality's city limits when he first observed petitioner, he had no police authority to detain him."”
STATE v. PADGETT, 354 S.C. 268 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003)

“Granting of rehearing en banc by the Court of Appeals effectively vacates the original panel opinion”
WILLIAMSON v. MIDDLETON, 383 S.C. 490 (S.C. 2009)

“Vacating portion of appellate opinion that discussed an issue unnecessary to the resolution of the case”
Bailey v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, Appellate Case No. 2013-000195 (S.C. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2015)



The Constitution is not a physical substance. It is in the nature of a grant or power, or what would be termed, in private law, a power of attorney. A real Constitution is a grant of rights or powers by a sovereign. The sovereign cannot be limited, for he is the source of all law. Judge Matthews in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 370.

If the sovereign, so called, is limited by some external power, then he is not the real sovereign; it is the power imposing the limitation that possesses sovereignty. This is so because sovereignty is something which cannot be limited. It is the ultimate power. The sovereignty in the United States is in the people of the States. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 35 (U.S. 1901)





“ The judge denied the motion on June 19, 1990, in an order holding that "Dorchester County is a municipality subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that Sheriff McKelvey is a policymaker for the county when operating the Dorchester County Jail . . . ."” Dotson v. Chester, 937 F.2d 920, 922 (4th Cir. 1991)

The Dorchester County Sheriff, in managing and operating the County Jail acts in the guise of, in essence, is a county official — he holds the final county policymaking authority over the County Jail. If he is without sufficient funds to satisfy a settled upon fee ordered in a court proceeding, the County properly is required to satisfy his obligation. That responsibility extends to fees awarded which represent attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in seeking collection of the original fee award.

AFFIRMED. Dotson v. Chester, 937 F.2d 920, 934 (4th Cir. 1991)


In North Carolina, the Office of Sheriff is a legal entity, established by the state constitution and state statutes, separate and distinct from the Board of County Commissioners because a sheriff is elected by the people, not employed by the county. See N.C.Gen.Stat. § 162-1 (2000). The sheriff, not the county, has final policymaking authority over the personnel decisions in his office. Clark v. Burke County, 117 N.C. App. 85, 89, 450 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1994) ("any injury resulting from [the deputy sheriff's] actions in this case cannot result in liability for Burke County and summary judgment is therefore affirmed for Burke County"). N.C.Gen.Stat. § 153A-103 provides that each elected sheriff "has the exclusive right to hire, discharge, and supervise the employees in his office." This authority may not be delegated to another person or entity. N.C.Gen.Stat. § 162-24 (2000).
Little v. Smith, (w.d.n.c. 2000), 114 F. Supp.2d 437, 446 (W.D.N.C. 2000)


POLICE CAN NOT MAKE A PRIVATE CITIZENS ARREST OUTSIDE JURISDICTION

“Finding an officer outside his municipality's city limits did not have the authority to detain the petitioner until a highway patrolman arrived because (1) he was outside his jurisdiction when he first observed the petitioner violate the law and (2) he did not have the authority to make a private citizen's arrest”
State v. Alexander, Appellate Case No. 2014-001919 (S.C. Ct. App. Jul. 27, 2016)

“Concluding that "[s]ince the officer was outside the municipality's city limits when he first observed petitioner, he had no police authority to detain him."”
STATE v. PADGETT, 354 S.C. 268 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003)

“Granting of rehearing en banc by the Court of Appeals effectively vacates the original panel opinion”
WILLIAMSON v. MIDDLETON, 383 S.C. 490 (S.C. 2009)

“Vacating portion of appellate opinion that discussed an issue unnecessary to the resolution of the case”
Bailey v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, Appellate Case No. 2013-000195 (S.C. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2015)


“We hold there is no common law right to make warrantless citizen's arrests of any kind and that such rights as exist are created by statute in South Carolina. Accordingly, petitioner's arrest was unlawful, and his conviction is reversed and the matter remanded.” State v. McAteer, 340 S.C. 644, 650-51 (S.C. 2000)





“Since the officer was outside the municipality's city limits when he first observed petitioner, he had no police authority to detain him. See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-40 (1985).” State v. McAteer, 340 S.C. 644, 646 (S.C. 2000)



Officer Nelson's moving of the equipment, however, did constitute a "search" separate and apart from the search for the shooter, victims, and weapons that was the lawful objective of his entry into the apartment. Merely inspecting those parts of the turntable that came into view during the latter search would not have constituted an independent search, because it would have produced no additional invasion of respondent's privacy interest. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983). But taking action, unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents, did produce a new invasion of respondent's privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated the entry. This is why, contrary to JUSTICE POWELL'S suggestion, post, at 333, the "distinction between `looking' at a suspicious object in plain view and `moving' it even a few inches" is much more than trivial for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. It matters not that the search uncovered nothing of any great personal value to respondent — serial numbers rather than (what might conceivably have been hidden behind or under the equipment) letters or photographs. A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.

Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (U.S. 1987)


Indeed, under more extreme circumstances the pointing of a gun has been held to violate even the more rigorous standard applicable before Graham, when plaintiffs were required to establish conduct so excessive that it "shocked the conscience." In McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1984), we held that a raid not supported by probable cause involved excessive conduct that shocked the conscience where, among other things, police officers "pressed the barrels of their guns against appellants' heads." In so holding, we relied upon Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1981). In Black the Third Circuit affirmed a jury verdict against an officer for excessive force under the "shocks the conscience" standard where the officer, in the course of arresting a plaintiff, pointed a gun at his head with his wife directly in the line of fire. Id. at 188-89. See also McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1992) (pointing gun at the head of a nine-year-old boy and threatening to shoot during a search of the boy's parents' apartment is excessive force).

Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001)


There may be, of course, suits for specific relief against officers of the sovereign which are not suits against the sovereign. If the officer purports to act as an individual and not as an official, a suit directed against that action is not a suit against the sovereign. If the War Assets Administrator had completed a sale of his personal home, he presumably could be enjoined from later conveying it to a third person. On a similar theory, where the officer's powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and not sovereign actions. The officer is not doing the business which the sovereign has empowered him to do or he is doing it in a way which the sovereign has forbidden. His actions are ultra vires his authority and therefore may be made the object of specific relief. It is important to note that in such cases the relief can be granted, without impleading the sovereign, only because of the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient. And, since the jurisdiction of the court to hear the case may depend, as we have recently recognized, upon the decision which it ultimately reaches on the merits, it is necessary that the plaintiff set out in his complaint the statutory limitation on which he relies.

Larson v. Domestic Foreign Corp, 337 U.S. 682, 689-90 (U.S. 1949)




B. Individual Capacity
Gilbert is correct in his assertion that this and other courts have recognized that sovereign immunity does not bar damage actions against federal officials in their individual capacity for violation of an individual's constitutional rights. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971); Larson, supra, 337 U.S. at 689, 69 S.Ct. at 1461; Hutchinson, supra. It is equally clear, however, that in order to bring a damage action against a federal official in his individual capacity, and thereby avoid the bar of sovereign immunity, the normal rules for establishing in personam jurisdiction apply. Hutchinson, supra. at 1327-28. Gilbert v. Dagrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1459 (9th Cir. 1985)


I got case from book called Constitutional Law and then researched through google scholar



Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights have been violated; thus, a dismissal of the Indictment is warranted.

The Court being fully advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment ( Ct. Rec. 46) is GRANTED. The Indictment shall be dismissed, with prejudice, all pending motions are denied as moot, and the trial schedule is vacated.
U.S. v. Barajas, No. CR-04-2011-FVS. (E.D. Wash. Feb. 15, 2011)



A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (U.S. 1972)




We hold here that the right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment. That right has its roots at the very foundation of our English law heritage. Its first articulation in modern jurisprudence appears to have been made in Magna Carta (1215), wherein it was written, "We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right"; but evidence of recognition of the right to speedy justice in even earlier times is found in the Assize of Clarendon (1166). Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (U.S. 1967)



Aug 05, 2016 12:26am
Our recognition that the First Amendment protects the filming of government officials in public spaces accords with the decisions of numerous circuit and district courts. See, e.g., Smith v. City of dimming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) ("The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest."); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing a "First Amendment right to film matters of public interest"); Demarest v. Athol/Orange Cmty. Television, Inc., 188 F.Supp.2d 82, 94-95 (D.Mass. 2002) (finding it "highly probable" that filming of a public official on street outside his home by contributors to public access cable show was protected by the First Amendment, and noting that, "[a]t base, plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected right to record matters of public interest"); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F.Supp. 634, 638 (D.Minn. 1972) (holding that police interference with television newsman's filming of crime scene and seizure of video camera constituted unlawful prior restraint under First Amendment); cf. Schnell v. City of Chi, 407 F.2d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir. 1969) (reversing dismissal for failure to state a claim of suit claiming police interference with news reporters and photographers`"constitutional right to gather and report news, and to photograph news events" under the First Amendment (internal quotation mark omitted)), overruled on other grounds by City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973); Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F.Supp. 465, 471-72 (D.N.H. 1990) (denying qualified immunity from First Amendment claim to police chief who prevented free-lance photographer from taking pictures of car accident).GLIK v. CUNNIFFE•655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011)



In the present case the Supreme Court of Delaware held, as a matter of first impression for it, that a defendant under no circumstances may so challenge the veracity of a sworn statement used by police to procure a search warrant. We reverse, and we hold that, where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (U.S. 1978)





Judicial notice is governed by statute, indicating “[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is ... (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 201(b) (2011). “This Court may take judicial notice of the public records of other courts within the state judicial system.” State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483, 497, 508 S.E.2d 277, 286 (1998). If a party requests that the court take judicial notice and provides the necessary information, it is mandatory that a court take judicial notice. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 201(d) (2011). “Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding[,]” including on appeal. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 201(f) (2011); State ex rel. Utilities Comm. v. Southern Bell Telephone Co., 289 N.C. 286, 288, 221 S.E.2d 322, 323 (1976).

State �v. King, 721 S.E.2d 327, 330 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012)



Excessive Force In The Course Of Handcuffing

“Holding that even though neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit had addressed the issue, the right to be free from excessive force in the course of handcuffing was clearly established based on the case law of other circuits”
KELLY v. BOROUGH OF CARLISLE, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010)

“Holding that officer used excessive force by placing excessively tight handcuffs on the plaintiff and refusing to loosen them for ten minutes”
KENYON v. EDWARDS, 462 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2006)

“Holding right to be free from excessive force in the course of handcuffing suspect was clearly established”
Barnes v. Edwards, Civil Action No. 13-4239 (JBS-KMW) (D.N.J. Jun. 24, 2016)

“Holding that police officers could be liable for a Fourth Amendment violation after employing excessive force in the course of handcuffing an arrestee, despite the fact that there had been no prior Supreme Court or Third Circuit ruling to that precise effect”
Hinterberger v. Iroquois Sch. Dist., 898 F.Supp.2d 772 (W.D. Pa. 2012)

“Holding that first step of qualified immunity analysis satisfied, as plaintiff put forth facts sufficient, if proven, to establish Fourth Amendment excessive force violation”
LYMAN v. LONG, CIVIL ACTION NO. 08-5303 (MLC). (D.N.J. Apr. 20, 2011)

“Holding that first step of qualified immunity analysis is satisfied by plaintiff asserting facts that if proven would establish an excessive force violation”
HARMON v. CITY OF CAMDEN, CIVIL ACTION NO. 08-5074 (JEI/AMD). (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2010)

“Holding that summary judgment is appropriate on excessive force claim where, after resolving all factual disputes in favor of plaintiff, district court concludes that use of force was objectively reasonable under circumstances”
MORALES v. CITY OF JERSEY CITY, Civil Action No. 05-5423 (SRC). (D.N.J. Jul. 7, 2009)

“Holding that "the right of an arrestee to be free from the use of excessive force in the course of his handcuffing clearly was established" for purposes of a qualified immunity inquiry”
GLASS v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, 455 F. Supp.2d 302 (E.D. Pa. 2006)

“Finding that excessively tight handcuffs violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law despite lower court's finding of no excessive force”
SCHMIDT v. CREEDON, 639 F.3d 587 (3d Cir. 2011)

“Finding petitioner's allegations and facts, if credited, would establish excessive force on a tight handcuffing claim, and holding that the right of an arrestee to be free from the use of excessive force "in the course of his handcuffing" was clearly established”
FISHER v. CITY OF LAS CRUCES, 584 F.3d 888 (10th Cir. 2009)

“Finding that plaintiff's alleged facts that an officer kept tight handcuffs on him and failed to respond to his pleas to loosen them, if proven, would establish excessive force”
Geba v. Norris, ACTION NO. 2:14cv612 (E.D. Va. Apr. 4, 2016)

“Finding excessive force when handcuffs placed behind the back caused permanent nerve damage to plaintiff's wrist”
Young v. Brock, Civil Action No. 10-cv-01513-WJM-CBS (D. Colo. Jun. 4, 2014)

“Finding an officer entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claim "`after resolving all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, [] the officer's use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances'"”
MIDDLEBROOKS v. ALBA, Civil Action No. 08-6291 (WJM). (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2011)

“Finding that a claim for excessive force must involve a "seizure" that was unreasonable”
BROWN v. CUSCINO, Civil Action No. 08-1224. (W.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2011)

“Finding that claim of excessive force presented jury question when officer accused of ignoring complaints that handcuffs were too tight "faced rather benign circumstances that hardly justified his failure to respond more promptly" to those complaints made by man accused of trespassing”
RAMSEY v. CONNER, Case number 4:09cv1754 TCM. (E.D. Mo. Jan. 3, 2011)

“Finding summary judgment and qualified immunity unwarranted where plaintiff asserted that officer placed handcuffs on him that were excessively tight and failed for ten minutes to loosen them despite repeated requests”
CASTRO v. COUNTY OF NASSAU, 739 F. Supp.2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)

“Finding an officer was entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claim "`after resolving all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, [] the officer's use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.'"”
VILLARI v. TOWNSHIP OF WALL, Civil Action No. 06-0004 (FLW). (D.N.J. Sep. 15, 2009)

“Finding no qualified immunity where officer ignored plaintiff's requests to loosen his handcuffs due to extreme pain when he was arrested for disorderly conduct”
HAMMOCK v. BOROUGH OF UPPER DARBY, CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-CV-1006. (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2007)

“Finding that placing needlessly tight handcuffs on arrestee, failing to respond to pleas to loosen them, which resulted in permanent never damage, stated claim of excessive force”
JAMES v. YORK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Civil Action No. 1:01-CV-1015. (M.D. Pa. May. 6, 2005)

“Denying officer's motion for summary judgment where arrestee was treated by hand surgeon for over one year as a result of handcuffing”
ESMONT v. CITY OF NEW YORK, 371 F. Supp.2d 202 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)

“Reversing summary judgment on excessive force claim where the plaintiff's extreme pain from handcuffing would have been obvious to arresting officers, as he made repeated complaints about pain, fell to the ground and began to faint, and suffered permanent nerve damage in one wrist as a result of the handcuffing, for which he sought medical treatment”
Pruchnic v. Wright, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-235 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2016)

“Reversing grant of summary judgment for arresting officer, and holding that use of force was excessive in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where plaintiff alleged that officer excessively tightened handcuffs and ignored his repeated requests to loosen them for ten minutes and that he suffered permanent nerve damage”
Mehr v. Atl. City, Civil No. 12-4499 (RBK/AMD) (D.N.J. Sep. 2, 2014)

“Reversing summary judgment for defendant on excessive force claim because officer "faced rather benign circumstances" and "was not. . .in the midst of a dangerous situation involving a serious crime or armed criminals."”
Bannan v. City of Philadelphia, CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-cv-04680 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2012)

“Reversing summary judgment for defendant where handcuffs caused plaintiff extreme pain and permanent nerve damages”
Dormu v. Dist. of D.C., 795 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 2011)

“Reversing grant of summary judgment for arresting officer where plaintiff alleged that officer excessively tightened handcuffs and ignored his repeated requests to loosen them for ten minutes and that he suffered permanent nerve damage, and where court found that given lack of danger, delay in loosening handcuffs was not justified”
CINCERELLA v. EGG HARBOR TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, (Docket Entry Nos. 38, 39, 47, 51), Civil No. 06-1183 (RBK). (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2009)


Arrest warrant does not authorize officers to enter the homes of third parties

“Holding search warrant necessary to protect privacy interests of third party whose home is searched for subject of arrest warrant”
United States v. Bohannon, 824 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2016)

“Holding that arguments not developed in district court are forfeited on appeal”
U.S. Commonwealth v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2013)

“Holding that an arrest warrant does not authorize officers to enter the homes of third parties to execute the warrant, absent exigent circumstances, without first obtaining a warrant to enter the premises”
AL-KIDD v. ASHCROFT, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009)

“Holding that an arrest warrant alone does not authorize officers to enter the home of a third party and that, absent exigent circumstances or consent of the resident, officers must obtain a search warrant before entering the third party's home”
EL BEY v. ROOP, 530 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2008)

“Holding that absent exigent circumstances, law enforcement officers must obtain a search warrant or consent prior to entering a home for the purpose of effecting an arrest”
U.S. v. MORELAND, 437 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2006)

“Holding that officers could not enter and search the house of a third party simply because they had a "reasonable . . . belief" that the subject of an arrest warrant was a guest there; they had to have evidence that he was a co-resident”
MOTLEY v. PARKS, 383 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2004)

“Holding no exigent circumstances where, upon learning that a federal fugitive might be staying at a house in Atlanta, Georgia, federal agents waited two days before searching the house without a warrant”
U.S. v. WICKS, 995 F.2d 964 (10th Cir. 1993)

“Holding that government lost right to raise lack of expectation of privacy argument on appeal when it failed to raise argument below”
U.S. v. SWEPSTON, 987 F.2d 1510 (10th Cir. 1993)

“Holding that police may not lawfully enter the home of a third party to search for a person named in an arrest warrant without first obtaining a search warrant”
Franklin v. Civil City of S. Bend, CAUSE NO.: 3:13-CV-207-TLS (N.D. Ind. Sep. 3, 2015)

“Holding that, in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances, a law enforcement officer must procure a search warrant before “search[ing] for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party””
Adams v. Springmeyer, 17 F.Supp.3d 478 (W.D. Pa. 2014)

“Holding that an arrest warrant is insufficient to provide authority to enter the home of a third person to look for the suspect.”
United States v. Powers, 1 F.Supp.3d 470 (M.D.N.C. 2014)

“Holding that a search warrant is required to enter the home of a third party to make an arrest absent consent or exigent circumstances”
Engleman v. Cumberland Cnty., No. 5:12-cv-00147-FL (E.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2013)

“Holding that absent consent or exigent circumstances, law enforcement officers cannot legally search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining a search warrant”
Muhammad v. United States, 884 F.Supp.2d 306 (E.D. Pa. 2012)

“Holding that absent exigent circumstances, law enforcement officers with an arrest warrant may not enter a third party's home to search for the subject of the arrest warrant”
Carter v. St. John Baptist Parish Sheriff's Office, CIVIL ACTION NO: 11-1401 (E.D. La. May. 16, 2012)

“Holding that, "in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances," search inside residence "is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless done pursuant to a warrant"”
Molieri v. Cnty. of Marin, No. C-10-5430 MMC (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012)

“Holding that officials may not enter a third-party's home to locate the subject of an arrest warrant unless they also hold a search warrant for the home”
Carter v. St. John Baptist Parish Sheriff's Office, CIVIL ACTION NO: 11-1401 (E.D. La. Dec. 8, 2011)

“Holding that an arrest warrant-without a search warrant-does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third party's home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant”
U.S. v. CORREA, 635 F. Supp.2d 379 (D.N.J. 2009)

“Holding police may enter one's home under "exigent circumstances"”
MATTHEWS v. MALKUS, 377 F. Supp.2d 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)

“Holding that absent exigent circumstances, police must obtain a valid search warrant "when the police seek to use an arrest warrant as legal authority to enter the home of a third party to conduct a search."”
CLAYTON v. CITY OF KINGSTON, (N.D.N.Y. 1999), 44 F. Supp.2d 177 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)

“Holding that prosecution was precluded from raising legitimate expectation of privacy question where issue was not raised in lower courts”
PEOPLE v. McKINSTREY, 852 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1993)

“Holding that police cannot legally enter a third party's home to execute an arrest warrant for another individual absent consent, exigent circumstances, or a search warrant”
Jones v. State, 723 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)

“Holding that absent exigent circumstances or consent, police officers cannot lawfully search for the subject of an arrest warrant in a third person's home without first obtaining a search warrant”
STATE v. CRAWFORD, Unpublished Decision (1-24-2005), Nos. 8-04-21, 8-04-22, 8-04-23. (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2005)

“Holding that an arrest warrant for a third party was insufficient to justify law enforcement officers in entering the defendant's house to search for the third party”
NOEL v. COMMONWEALTH, 1730-99-2, Unpublished (Va.App. 6-20-2000), Record No. 1730-99-2 (Va. Ct. App. Jun. 20, 2000)

“Holding that Government could not raise for first time on certiorari to Supreme Court issue of whether defendant possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in a house which had been searched by police”
COM. v. GOVENS, 429 Pa. Super. 464 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)

“Finding that, "absent exigent circumstances or consent," a search warrant is required in order to "search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party"”
TURK v. COMERFORD, Case No. 09-CV-868. (N.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2011)




ACTED UNDER COLOR OF LAW

“Holding that an off-duty police officer employed as a bank security guard acted under color of law when he identified himself as a police officer to a bank robbery suspect”
Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2012)

“Holding that off-duty police officer working as security teller at a bank was a state actor when that position was part of a "secondary hiring" program and the security teller's "primary duty was to the [police] department, not to the bank"”
United States v. Cintron, No. 11-6316 (10th Cir. Jun. 5, 2012)

“Holding that an off-duty officer serving as a security officer at a bank was acting under color of law when the officer flashed police identification when arresting the plaintiff”
VILLEGAS v. GILROY GARLIC, 541 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2008)

“Finding off-duty police officer working as a security teller through police department's secondary hiring program, with primary responsibility in the event of a crime to the police department rather than the bank, exercised discretionary duty when he detained customer”
White v. City of Birmingham, Case No.: 2:13-cv-00099-KOB (LEAD CASE) (N.D. Ala. May. 27, 2015)

“Concluding an off-duty police officer working as a security teller, with primary responsibility in the event of a crime to the police department rather than the bank, exercised discretionary duty when he detained a customer”
Wardlow v. Whiten, Case Number: 2:15-cv-00367-JHE (N.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2017)

“Adopting a four-factor discretionary standard”
GILLESPIE v. SEARS, ROEBUCK CO, 386 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2004)

“Adopting a discretionary standard with multiple factors”
KERKHOF v. MCI WORLDCOM, INC, 282 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2002)

“Questioning jury about its internal deliberations or manner in which it arrived at its verdict should be discouraged”
HARD v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN R.R, 812 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1987)

“Outlining the factors which a court should consider in deciding whether to exercise its discretion to affirm despite an error with respect to one theory of liability”
HUNTER v. REARDON SMITH LINES, LTD, 719 F.2d 1108 (11th Cir. 1983)

“Looking to circumstances surrounding off-duty police officer's conduct for "indicia of state action"”
ANTHONY v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, DEPT., (E.D.Cal. 1994), 845 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D. Cal. 1994)

“Applying Cal. law”
LEIGH FURNITURE AND CARPET CO. v. ISOM, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982)



police

ACTING UNDER THE COLOR OF STATE LAW

“Holding an amusement park employee had engaged in state action”
HARRIS v. JOINT SCHOOL DIST. NO. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994)

“Holding that "[i]f an individual is possessed of state authority and purports to act under that authority, his action is state action"”
JONES v. GUTSCHENRITTER, 909 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1990)

“Holding that where a security guard at a privately-owned park "was subject to the control and direction" of his private employer but had been deputized as a sheriff and wore the badge and uniform of a deputy sheriff, the guard acted under color of state law when, while "purport[ing] to exercise the authority of a deputy sheriff," he arrested the petitioners for trespassing after they refused his and his and his private employer's instructions to leave the premises”
El-Bey v. Menefee, CIVIL ACT. NO. 3:14-CV-47-WKW (WO) (M.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2014)

“Holding that a deputy sheriff, acting as a private security guard and as agent of the park operator rather than as agent of the state, acted under color of state law when he identified himself as a deputy sheriff and ordered the plaintiff to leave the park, escorted him off the premises, and arrested him for criminal trespass”
SAZON v. N.Y, 11 Civ. 3666 (HB). (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011)

“Holding that an off-duty police officer acted under color of state law when he wore his uniform and official identification while working as a security guard”
RUCHAK v. CENTURY SECURITY SERVICES, INC. (M.D.Pa. 9-14-2009), Case No. 3:09-CV-412. (M.D. Pa. Sep. 14, 2009)

“Holding that the deputy sheriff "arrested [petitioners] . . . because they were Negroes. This was state action forbidden by the [Equal Protection Clause of] the Fourteenth Amendment"”
ASHTON v. BROWN, 339 Md. 70 (Md. 1995)

“Finding that special deputy was state actor because if "an individual is possessed of state authority and purports to act under that authority, his action is state action"”
DOE v. PROSECUTOR, MARION COUNTY, INDIANA (S.D.Ind. 2008), 566 F. Supp.2d 862 (S.D. Ind. 2008)

“Analyzing state action necessary for a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”
BARNA v. CITY OF PERTH AMBOY, 42 F.3d 809 (3d Cir. 1994)

“Noting that "[i]f an individual is possessed of state authority and purports to act under that authority, his action is state action"”
NADER v. McAULIFFE, 593 F. Supp.2d 95 (D.D.C. 2009)

“Noting as part of the under-color-of-state-law analysis that a park guard "wore a sheriffs badge and consistently identified himself as a deputy sheriff"”
PRYER v. PHILADELPHIA, CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-4678 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2004)


The Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Liability Reform Act or Act) limits the relief available to persons injured by Government employees acting within the scope of their employment. For persons so injured, the Act provides that "[t]he remedy against the United States" under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) "is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages." 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). Subject to certain exceptions, the FTCA permits a person injured by a Government employee acting within the scope of his or her employment to seek tort damages against the Government.

United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 161-62 (U.S. 1991)






. Thus, in McCall, we abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id. at 246, 329 S.E.2d at 742.

In response to our decision in McCall, the legislature implemented a comprehensive act providing for the logical disposition of governmental liability. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 to -190 (Supp. 1993). The Act first completely restores sovereign immunity. S.C. Code Ann § 15-78-20(b). The Act then provides specific waivers and limitations on actions against governmental entities. Id. Thus, the Torts Claims Act is a limited waiver of governmental immunity.

"In enacting such a limited waiver of immunity, it appears to us rational for the state to limit actions to those instances when the governmental entity is given reasonably early notice of the claim." Faucher v. City of Auburn, 465 A.2d 1120, 1125 (Me. 1983). A shorter statute of limitations period can be said to "be rationally designed to minimize the undue burden on the public entity brought by late filed claims which increase the cost of litigation and reduce the likelihood of settlement by making the full investigation of a claim a difficult, time and money consuming process." See id. Accordingly, we find no equal protection violation.

Murphy v. Richland Memorial Hospital, 317 S.C. 560, 563-64 (S.C. 1995)




The lawful acts of an officer, of course, can create no liability whatever; but if an officer, a State Constable, while attempting to execute some duty of his office, abuses or exceeds his authority or executes it in an unlawful manner, to the injury of another, his bond is liable. To illustrate: If a State Constable, in an attempt to discharge a duty of his office, in the seizure of contraband liquor or the arrest of one openly violating the dispensary law, should, without just excuse, commit an assault and battery, or if in overcoming resistance, he should so exceed his duty as to become the aggressor in an assault and battery, to the injury of another, then there is liability upon his bond. But an assault and battery committed by a constable under a bald assumption and usurpation of authority, without process or authority of any kind, would not be covered by the terms of his bond. These conclusions are not only the result of our own cases, but are supported by the general trend of authority in other jurisdictions, among which we cite the following: Drolesbaugh v. Hill (Ohio), 60 N.E. Rep., 202; Hawkins v. Thomas (Ind.), 29 N.E. Rep., 157; Brown v. Weaver (Miss.), 42 L.R.A., 423; Johnson v. Williams (Ky.), 54 L.R.A., 220; Clancy v. Kenworthy (Iowa), 7 Amer. St. Rep., 508.

Wieters v. May Et Al, 71 S.C. 9, 15-16 (S.C. 1905)