. “INDIAN COUNTRY” . . . THAT IS OWNED BY . . . “THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX INDIAN TRIBE” . . . PURSUANT TO . . . “ARTICLE VI, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION; THE TREATY OF FORT LARAMIE WITH SIOUX, ETC., 1851, Sept. 17, 1851. | 11 Stats., p. 749; 18 U.S.C. § 1151; 18 U.S.C. § 1153; 18 U.S.C. § 1154; 18 U.S.C. § 1161; 25 U.S.C. § 1321; 25 U.S.C. § 1322; 25 U.S.C. 1360 (b); 42 U.S.C. § 1437; 42 U.S.C. § 1437J; 25 U.S.C. § 323; 25 U.S.C. § 324; 25 U.S.C. § 325; 25 U.S.C. § 464; 25 U.S.C. § 474; 25 U.S.C. § 2201; 24 CFR 131.1; 24 CFR 805.218 (2); 24 CFR 805.425 (b); 25 U.S.C. § 311; 36 C.F.R. § 800.2 (c)(ii)(2)(i)(A)(B)(ii)(C)(D)(E)(F)(3) AND 25 CFR Part 169 - Rights - of - Way Over Indian Lands.”


ONLY THE STANDING ROCK TRIBAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER IT’S OWN LAND TO MAKE ANY DECISIONS OR CONTRACTS WITH ANY PRIVATE OIL COMPANY IT CHOOSES TO DO BUSINESS WITH OR CHOOSES NOT TO DO BUSINESS WITH OVER ALL . . . “INDIAN COUNTRY” . . . PURSUANT TO . . . “ARTICLE VI, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION; THE TREATY OF FORT LARAMIE WITH SIOUX, ETC., 1851, Sept. 17, 1851. | 11 Stats., p. 749; 18 U.S.C. § 1151; 18 U.S.C. § 1153; 18 U.S.C. § 1154; 18 U.S.C. § 1161; 25 U.S.C. § 1321; 25 U.S.C. § 1322; 25 U.S.C. 1360 (b); 42 U.S.C. § 1437; 42 U.S.C. § 1437J; 25 U.S.C. § 323; 25 U.S.C. § 324; 25 U.S.C. § 325; 25 U.S.C. § 464; 25 U.S.C. § 474; 25 U.S.C. § 2201; 24 CFR 131.1; 24 CFR 805.218 (2); 24 CFR 805.425 (b); 25 U.S.C. § 311; 36 C.F.R. § 800.2 (c)(ii)(2)(i)(A)(B)(ii)(C)(D)(E)(F)(3) AND 25 CFR Part 169 - RIGHTS - OF - WAY OVER INDIAN LANDS” . . . BECAUSE THE NATIONAL FOREST SERVICE DOES NOT OWN THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX INDIAN TRIBE’S LAND, THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS DOES NOT HAVE ANY AUTHORITY TO ISSUE ANY DAPL PERMITS PERIOD!!!

THE US ARMY CORPS CANNOT LEGALLY ISSUE ANY DAPL PERMIT OVER . . . “INDIAN COUNTRY” . . . PURSUANT TO . . . “ARTICLE VI, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION; THE TREATY OF FORT LARAMIE WITH SIOUX, ETC., 1851, Sept. 17, 1851. | 11 Stats., p. 749; 18 U.S.C. § 1151; 18 U.S.C. § 1153; 18 U.S.C. § 1154; 18 U.S.C. § 1161; 25 U.S.C. § 1321; 25 U.S.C. § 1322; 25 U.S.C. 1360 (b); 42 U.S.C. § 1437; 42 U.S.C. § 1437J; 25 U.S.C. § 323; 25 U.S.C. § 324; 25 U.S.C. § 325; 25 U.S.C. § 464; 25 U.S.C. § 474; 25 U.S.C. § 2201; 24 CFR 131.1; 24 CFR 805.218 (2); 24 CFR 805.425 (b); 25 U.S.C. § 311; 36 C.F.R. § 800.2 (c)(ii)(2)(i)(A)(B)(ii)(C)(D)(E)(F)(3) AND 25 CFR Part 169 - RIGHTS - OF - WAY OVER INDIAN LANDS.”

THE US ARMY CORPS ONLY HAS AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A DAPL PERMIT REGARDING LANDS OWNED BY . . . “THE NATIONAL FOREST SERVICE.” The US Army Corps Cannot Legally Issue the Final DAPL Permit! http://www.honorearth.org/octletter

While the great body of private relations usually fall within the control of the state, a treaty may override the power of the state.” State of Mo. v. Holland, 40 S.Ct. 382, 252 U.S. 416, 64 L.Ed. 641, 11 A.L.R. 984 (1920).
“The provision of the constitution of the United States that all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of that government, shall be the supreme law of the land, extends not only to treaties thereafter made, but also to those in existence when the constitution was ratified by the several legislatures.” Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 3 Dall. 199, 1 L.Ed. 568 (1796). And;
“A treaty, as a public law, is a part of the law of every case depending in the supreme court of the United States, and need not be spread on the record, but is obligatory on the court in rendering judgement on a writ of error.” Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816). And’
“Treaties” are the law of the land, and a rule of decision in all courts.” Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. 410, 12 Pet. 410, 9 L.Ed. 1137 (1838). And;
“Congress is bound to regard public Treaties.” Reichert v. Felps, 73 U.S. 160, 6 Wall. 160, 18 L.Ed. 849 (1867). And;
“Congress cannot by legislation enlarge the federal jurisdiction, and it cannot be enlarged under the treaty making power.” Mayor, Alderman and Inhabitants of City of New Orleans v. U.S., 35 U.S. 662, 10 Pet. 662, 9 L.Ed. 573 (1836). And;
“A treaty is more than a contract, since the constitution declares it to be the law of the land.” Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. 32, 9 Wall. 32, 19 L.Ed. 571 (1869). And;
“U.S.Mo. 1920. Valid treaties are binding within the territorial limits of the states as throughout the dominion of the United States.” State of Mo. v. Holland, 40 S.Ct. 382, 252 U.S. 416, 64 L.Ed. 641, 11 A.L.R. 984 (1920). And;
"Government is not sovereignty. Government is the machinery or expedient for expressing the will of the sovereign power...This sovereign power in our government belongs to the people, and the government of the United States and the governments of the several states are but the machinery for expounding or expressing the will of the sovereign power . . . But it must be remembered, under our government, all sovereign power is lodged in the people; and the government, by its different departments, can exercise only such power as has been delegated to it by the people. None of these delegated powers can be by the government delegated to some one else. They are only granted to the government to be in proper cases exercised by it, and not to be given to another to be exercised by that other...Because neither congress nor the treaty-making power can grant away the sovereign powers of the government, but they can only exercise them for the people to whom they belong.” Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. R. Co., 33 F. 900, 908-13 (1888).
See also Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan et al., 44 U.S. (3 How) 212, 220 and 229 (1845), the Northwest Ordinance and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.

TREATY WITH THE BLACKFEET SIOUX, 1865.

Oct. 19, 1865. | 14 Stat., 727. | Ratified Mar. 5, 1866. | Proclaimed Mar. 17, 1866.

ALL STANDING ROCK TRIBAL POLICE OFFICERS HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DEPUTIZE AND TO ORDER ALL STANDING ROCK DEPUTIES TO FORCIBLY REMOVE ALL NORTH DAKOTA STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS FROM THE STANDING ROCK RESERVATION AND NEITHER THE STANDING ROCK POLICE OFFICERS OR THE STANDING ROCK DEPUTIES CAN BE SUED IN A STATE OR FEDERAL COURT BECAUSE THEY HAVE ABSOLUTE . . . “SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY” . . . ! – SEE Worcestor v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 554, 557, 561 (1832); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1676, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978); Berrey v. Asarco Inc., 439 F.3d 636, 643 (10th Cir. 2006); Cook v. AVI Casino Enterprises, Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 725 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 2159 (2009); Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Techs. Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998); Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1107, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 2007); Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571, 2 S. Ct. 871, 27 L.Ed. 826 (1883); Native American Church of North America v. Navaho Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (9th Cir. (1959); F. Cohen, supra, at 242; Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 I.D. 14, 57, 1 Opinions of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior, Indian Affairs 445, 447, 472 (Oct. 25, 1934); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165, 171-173, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 2620-2621, 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977) (Puyallup III); Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1112, 111 S. Ct. ____ (1991); California ex rel. Cal. Dep’t of Fish and Game v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 595 F.2d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 1979); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n., 411 U.S. 164, 168-169, 172-173 93 S. Ct. 1257, 1263, 36 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1973). And;

Indian Tribes enjoy immunity because they are sovereigns predating the constitution, and immunity is thought necessary to preserve autonomous tribal existence. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512-13, 60 S.Ct. 653, 656, 84 L.Ed. 894 (1940); Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 357-58, 39 S.Ct. 109, 110, 63 L.Ed. 291 (1919); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 2583, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15-18, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832). See also Pan Am. Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians, 884 F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir. 1989). And;

Indeed, absent an express congressional abrogation of a tribe’s sovereign immunity, neither it nor it’s employees who are acting within the scope of their authority as tribal officers may be sued in a state court. United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1013 N. 8 (9th Cir. 1981). And;

Tribal Sovereign Immunity protects tribal officials “acting within the scope of their official capacities.” Crowe & Dunlevy, 640 F.3d at 1154. See also Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997); Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1174 (10th Cir. 1997). See also Filer v. Tohono O’odham Gaming Enterprise, 212 Ariz. 167, 170, 129 P.3d 78, 81 (App. 2006) (quoting Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991)). And;

Indeed an action against officials acting within their official capacity is an unviable claim against the sovereign itself. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985); see also Native Am. Distrib., 546 F.3d at 1296 (“the interest in preserving the inherent right of self government in Indian tribes is equally strong when suit is brought against individual officers of the tribal organization as when brought against the tribe itself’).

The immunity afforded Indian Tribes extends to Tribal governmental officers acting within their respective capacity and within the scope of their authority. United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1013 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1981); Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribes, 779 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1985). And;

“However late, this objection has been made, or may be made in any cause, in an inferior or appellate court of the United States, it must be considered and decided before any court can move one further step in the cause: as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction. . . . appearance does not cure the defect of it’s judicial power.” Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 718, at 719 12 Pet. 657 (1838). And;

“The attack is well founded. Absent an effective waiver or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a recognized Indian Tribe. This Court, United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra; the Washington Supreme Court, see, e.g., State ex rel. Adams v. Superior Court, 57 Wash. 2d 181, 182-185, 356 P.2d 985, 987-988 (1960); and the commentators, see, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Interior, Federal Indian Law 491-494 (1958), all concur.” PUYALLUP TRIBE v. WASHINGTON GAME DEPT., 433 U.S. 165, 172-173 (June 23, 1977). And;

All Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Police Officers and their newly appointed Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Deputies Enjoys the Same Sovereign Immunity Protections as the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Nations themselves.

“The provision of the constitution of the United States that all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of that government, shall be the supreme law of the land, extends not only to treaties thereafter made, but also to those in existence when the constitution was ratified by the several legislatures.” Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 3 Dall. 199, 1 L.Ed. 568 (1796). And;

“A treaty, as a public law, is a part of the law of every case depending in the supreme court of the United States, and need not be spread on the record, but is obligatory on the court in rendering judgement on a writ of error.” Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816). And;

STATE LAWS DO NOT APPLY INSIDE AN INDIAN RESERVATION WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX INDIAN TRIBES PRIOR CONSENT IN WRITING BY CONTRACT!!!

DID YOU KNOW THAT IF THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA OR MORTON COUNTY OR THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA NEVER MADE FORMAL WRITTEN APPLICATION OR ASKED PERMISSION OF THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR TO BUILD A PUBLIC HIGHWAY THROUGH . . . “THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX INDIAN TRIBE RESERVATION” . . . THAT NONE OF THE ROADS RUNNING THROUGH THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE INDIAN RESERVATION ARE THE STATE’S PUBLIC HIGHWAYS AND IF THAT’S SO, THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX INDIAN TRIBE HAS FULL LEGAL RIGHTS TO EXCLUDE ALL NON-STANDING ROCKS OR ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE DAKOTA ACCESS LLP AND/OR ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS FROM THEIR USE OR FROM THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX INDIAN TRIBE RESERVATION ALTOGETHER FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH . . . “25 CFR Part 169 - RIGHTS - OF - WAY OVER INDIAN LANDS.”

In 1957 the Secretary of the Interior promulgated regulations pursuant to 25 U.S. Code § 311 - “Opening highways.” They appear in 25 C.F.R. Part 169, entitled “Rights-Of-Way Over Indian Lands,” which provides for application for a right-of-way, deposit of double estimated damages for a survey, the survey, making and filing of maps and field notes, appraisal of the right-of-way, payment and distribution of compensation for the right-of-way, and other technical procedures ordinarily followed in the construction of any public highway. The U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, Defendant-Appellee and/or the DAKOTA ACCESS LLP, Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee, has failed to make any ER 103 (2) Offers of Proof or submit any competent evidence in the record that any of the foregoing required federal procedures were complied with by the State of North Dakota or Morton County or the State of South Dakota. (Emphasis added).

In State v. Pink, 144 Wn.App. 945, 185 P.3d 634 (2008), the trial court held that the Quinault Nation granted an easement to the State of Washington to “build and maintain SR 109 over this portion of the Quinault Reservation.”

The State of Washington presented no evidence that the tribe ever ceded interest in the land to the State other than granting an easement, or otherwise consented to the application of RCW 37.12.021.

Likewise, neither the State of North Dakota or Morton County or the State of South Dakota has presented any competent evidence that the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Tribe ever ceded interest in the land to either the State of North Dakota or Morton County or to State of South Dakota other than granting an easement.

The grant of an easement for a public highway through a reservation does not alter the land’s status as “Indian Country” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151.

See, State v. Cooper, 130 Wn.2d 770, at 774, 928 P.2d 406 (1996).

Judge Foscue noted in his Letter Opinion, the jurisdictional issue in Somday v. Rhay, supra, did not involve an easement, but instead concerned a state highway for which a fee simple patent was granted in 1935, and that the land was therefore not tribal or allotted land as contemplated by RCW 37.13.020. Somday v. Rhay, supra, at 184.

As Judge Foscue noted, the Colville Tribe retained no interest in the land, whereas the Quinault retained ownership and granted only an easement to the state. An easement is an interest which one person has in the land of another. It is a nonpossessory interest in land that is in possession of another, whereas an estate in land is a possessory interest. Restatement of Property § 450, comments a, e, at 2902-05 (1944). Butler v. Craft Eng Constr. Co., 67 Wn.App. 684, 843 P.2d 1071 (1992). See also, Olympia v. Palzer, 107 Wn.2d 225, 728 P.2d 135 (1986).

Further, in State v. Schmuck, 121 Wn.2d 373, 850 P.2d 1332 (1993), the Washington State Supreme Court proclaimed that “Indian Country” is defined as all land within the limit of any Indian Reservation, “notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way. 121 Wn.2d at 390.

The Schmuck Court went on further to say that land within a reservation is subject to tribal and federal jurisdiction, including rights of way.

The grant of an easement for a public highway through a reservation does not alter the land’s status as “Indian Country” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151.

IT SHOULD BE OBVIOUS TO EVERYONE THAT BOTH ATTORNEYS . . . “PATTI A. GOLDMAN (DCBA #398565)” . . . “JAN E. HASSSELMAN (WSBA #29107)” . . . AND . . . “STEPHANIE TSOSIE (WSBA#49840)” . . . INTENTIONALLY DID NOT CITE OR PLEAD . . . “18 U.S.C. § 1151; 18 U.S.C. § 1153; 18 U.S.C. § 1154; 18 U.S.C. § 1161; 25 U.S.C. § 1321; 25 U.S.C. § 1322; 25 U.S.C. 1360 (b); 42 U.S.C. § 1437; 42 U.S.C. § 1437J; 25 U.S.C. § 323; 25 U.S.C. § 324; 25 U.S.C. § 325; 25 U.S.C. § 464; 25 U.S.C. § 474; 25 U.S.C. § 2201; 24 CFR 131.1; 24 CFR 805.218 (2); 24 CFR 805.425 (b); 25 U.S.C. § 311 AND 25 CFR Part 169 - RIGHTS - OF - WAY OVER INDIAN LANDS” . . . IN THEIR FRIVOLOUS INJUNCTION DESIGNED TO LOSE ON PURPOSE SO AS TO AVOID ANY QUESTION AS TO . . . WHO REALLY OWNS THE LAND SITUATED WITHIN . . . “INDIAN COUNTRY” . . . AS DEFINED BY . . . “18 U.S.C. § 1151.”

THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBAL POLICE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER ALL STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT TO REMOVE THEMSELVES FROM THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX INDIAN RESERVATION!

THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBAL POLICE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO FORCIBLY REMOVE ALL STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT FROM THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE RESERVATION!!!

THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBAL POLICE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ARREST ANY STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL FOR TRESPASSING ON THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX INDIAN TRIBE RESERVATION IF THEY REFUSE TO LEAVE!!!

Inherent tribal sovereignty is also the source of a tribal government’s power to exclude interlopers and trespassers from the reservation. Worcestor v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (“The Cherokee Nation * * * is a distinct community occupying its own territory * * * which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress”). “The basic policy of Worcester has remained.” Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959). Indian tribes generally retained by Treaty the power to exclude nonmembers from their reservations, along with the power to regulate their conduct on the reservation. As noted by the United States Supreme Court: “A tribes power to exclude nonmembers entirely or to condition their presence on the reservation is equally well established.” New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333, 76 L.Ed.2d 611, 103 S.Ct. 2378 (1983); Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256, (N.Dak. 1973); Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, at 1180 (9th Cir. (1975). The Supreme Court’s decisions in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 192-193 (1978), and Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), make this clear. In Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribes, 779 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1985), Plaintiff sued the White Mountain Apache Tribes, their . . . tribal court, . . . tribal council . . . and . . . various officials . . . in their individual capacities seeking damages alleged to have occurred after tribal officers forcefully removed Plaintiff from the reservation pursuant to a . . . tribal court order. The Hardin court stated:

“Sovereign immunity shields the tribe from any suit arising out of the proceeding. This tribal immunity extends to individual tribal officers acting in their representative capacity and within the scope of their authority. Because all of the individual defendants here were acting within the scope of their delegated authority, Hardin’s suit against them is also barred by the tribe’s sovereign immunity.” (Citations omitted). Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribes, 779 F.2d 476, 479-480 (9th Cir. 1985) (Emphasis added). And;

The Hardin court supra, clearly stated that . . . “Sovereign immunity shields the tribe from any suit arising out of the proceedings. This tribal immunity extends to individual tribal officers acting in their representative capacity and within the scope of their authority. Because all of the individual defendant’s here were acting within the scope of their delegated authority, Hardin’s suit against them is also barred by the tribe’s sovereign immunity.” Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribes, 779 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1985). In Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that “rights of way running through a reservation remain part of the reservation and within the territorial jurisdiction of the tribal police.” Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1180 (1975). The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1989) is instructive. The plaintiffs in the Evans matter were non-Indians who had been arrested by Blackfeet Tribal Police Officers for allegedly violating a tribal order. Evans, 869 F.2d at 1343-44. The Evans’ sued both the tribe and its officers. At the trial court, the defendant’s moved to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. Evans v. Littlebird, 656 F.Supp. 872, 873 (D. Mont. 1987). The district court agreed that the Evans’ claims were barred by sovereign immunity and, in so doing, rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that 25 U.S.C. § 450f(c) waived sovereign immunity of the Tribe. Littlebird, 656 F.Supp. at 876. In Bruette v.Knope, 554 F.Supp. 301 (E.D. Wis. 1983) Plaintiff sued multiple county and tribal officials, individually and in their official capacities, alleging various causes of action arising from a car chase, crash and subsequent arrest. The defendant’s included tribal police officers Snow and Herrara who were neither Indian or members of the tribe itself.

“The common law immunity from suit enjoyed by Indian tribes . . . extend to Snow and Herrara as tribal policemen . . . and effectively shields them in their official capacities from actions, either for injunctive or monetary relief. . . .” Citations omitted) Bruette v.Knope, 554 F.Supp. 301, at 304 (E.D. Wis. 1983). And;

Indian tribes are governments with sovereign power over defined territories which include non-Indians and non-Indian land. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, at 557 (1975). Tribal power is greater on Indian lands, where “the tribe has the rights of a landowner as well as the rights of a local government, dominion as well as sovereignty,” Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, at 145 n.12 (1912) (quoting Cohen, Federal Indian Law at 439 (U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 1958). Tribal jurisdiction, however, “does not derive solely from the Indian tribe’s power to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands. Instead, it derives from the tribe’s general authority as sovereign,” and extends “over all the lands of the reservation, whether owned by the tribe, by members thereof, or by outsiders . . .” Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 145 n.12, 102 S.Ct. 894, 906 n.12, 71 L.Ed.2d 21, 34 n.12 (1912). See also 18 Op. Atty. Gen. 440 (1886); 25 U.S.C. 13 (1970); Act of May 15, 1886, ch. 333, 24 Stat. 29, 43; 25 C.FR. 11.301 et seq. (1974).

DID YOU KNOW THAT ALL THE SO CALLED PUBLIC ROADS RUNNING THROUGH . . . “THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX INDIAN TRIBE RESERVATION” . . . MIGHT NOT REALLY BE . . . “THE STATE’S PUBLIC HIGHWAYS” . . . AND ARE IN FACT AND LAW . . . “INDIAN COUNTRY HIGHWAYS.”

THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBAL POLICE HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO BLOCK OFF ALL ENTRANCES TO THE RESERVATION AND SET UP THEIR OWN INDIAN TRIBAL RESERVATION BORDER PATROL PURSUANT TO . . . “25 CFR Part 169 - RIGHTS-OF-WAY OVER INDIAN LANDS” . . . IF THE STATE NEVER COMPENSATED THE TRIBE FOR ILLEGALLY TRESPASSING INTO . . . “18 U.S.C. § 1151 INDIAN COUNTRY” . . . AND BUILDING A HIGHWAY WITHOUT THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE’S PRIOR EXPRESS WRITTEN CONSENT!!!

IT DOES NOT MATTER IF THE STATE SPENT IT’S MONEY CONSTRUCTING ROAD THROUGH OUR RESERVATION, IF THEY DID IT WITHOUT OUR PRIOR CONSENT AND WITHOUT FOLLOWING THE FEDERAL REGULATIONS, WE INDIANS STILL OWN THE RIGHTS OF WAY AND HAVE MERELY GRANTED THEM AN EASEMENT WHICH WE HAVE LEGAL RIGHT TO SHUT OFF AT ANY TIME WE CHOOSE TO AND CAN SET UP OUR OWN INDIAN BORDER PATROL AT EACH AND EVERY ENTRANCE TO THE RESERVATION AND DECIDE WHO WE WANT TO LET IN OR LET OUT OF OUR RESERVATION JUST LIKE THE CANADIAN BORDER PATROL!

DID YOU KNOW THAT ALL THE ROADS RUNNING THROUGH THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX INDIAN TRIBE RESERVATION MIG HT STILL BE PRIVATE ROADS STILL OWNED BY THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX INDIAN TRIBE RESERVATION???

CFR › Title 25 › Chapter I › Subchapter H › Part 169

“25 CFR Part 169 - RIGHTS-OF-WAY OVER INDIAN LANDS

§ 169.1 — Definitions.
§ 169.2 — Purpose and scope of regulations.
§ 169.3 — Consent of landowners to grants of right-of-way.
§ 169.4 — Permission to survey.
§ 169.5 — Application for right-of-way.
§ 169.6 — Maps.
§ 169.7 — Field notes.
§ 169.8 — Public survey.
§ 169.9 — Connection with natural objects.
§ 169.10 — Township and section lines.
§ 169.11 — Affidavit and certificate.
§ 169.12 — Consideration for right-of-way grants.
§ 169.13 — Other damages.
§ 169.14 — Deposit and disbursement of consideration and damages.
§ 169.15 — Action on application.
§ 169.16 — Affidavit of completion.
§ 169.17 — Change of location.
§ 169.18 — Tenure of approved right-of-way grants.
§ 169.19 — Renewal of right-of-way grants.
§ 169.20 — Termination of right-of-way grants.
§ 169.21 — Condemnation actions involving individually owned lands.
§ 169.22 — Service lines.
§ 169.23 — Railroads.
§ 169.24 — Railroads in Oklahoma.
§ 169.25 — Oil and gas pipelines.
§ 169.26 — Telephone and telegraph lines; radio, television, and other communications facilities.
§ 169.27 — Power projects.
§ 169.28 — Public highways.

Authority:
5 U.S.C. 301; 62 Stat. 17 (25 U.S.C. 323-328), and other acts cited in the text.
Source:
33 FR 19803, Dec. 27, 1968, unless otherwise noted. Redesignated at 47 FR 13327, Mar. 30,
1982.” And;

https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/25/part-169

IT SHOULD BE OBVIOUS TO EVERYONE THAT THE THREE (3) INCOMPETENT OR CROOKED JEWISH ATTORNEYS . . . “PATTY A. GOLDMAN (DCBA #398565)” . . . “JAN E. HASSELMAN (WSBA #29107) . . . AND . . . “STEPHANIE TSOSIE (WSBA#49840)” . . . DID NOT CITE ANY OF THE GOOD TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY CASE LAW AND NOR DID THEY CITE ANY OF THE GOOD TREATY CASE LAW IN THEIR BULLSHIT INJUNCTION MOTION THAT I GAVE YOU FOR FREE IN MY NUMEROUS TREATY POSTS ON MY FACEBOOK PAGE IS PROOF THAT THEY INTENTIONALLY LOST THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE’S CASE ON PURPOSE!!!

READ REVELATION 2:9, REVELATION 3:9 AND JOHN 8:44!!!

“I know thy works and tribulation, and poverty (but thou art rich) and I know the blasphemy of them, which say they are Jews, and are not, but are the Synagogue of Satan.” Revelation 2:9

“Behold, I will make them of the Synagogue of Satan, which call themselves Jews, are not, but do lie: behold, I say, I will make them that they shall come and worship before thy feet, and shall know that I have loved thee.” Revelation 3:9

“Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do: he hath been a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, then speaketh of he of his own: for he is a liar, and the father thereof.” John 8:44

THOSE ARE THREE (3) REASONS WHY NO INDIAN TRIBE SHOULD EVER HIRE A JEWISH ATTORNEY!!!

THE TERM . . . “WHITE MAN SPEAKS WITH FORKED TONGUE” . . . WAS TALKING ABOUT . . . “JEWISH LAWYERS WHO ARE JOHN 8:44 EXPERT LIARS.”

THE TERM . . . “WHITE MAN SPEAKS WITH FORKED TONGUE” . . . WAS TALKING ABOUT THOSE . . . “WHO CALL THEMSELVES JEW, BUT WHO ARE NOT JEW AND LIE AND ARE FROM THE SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN” . . . AS DEFINED IN REVELATION 2:9 AND REVELATION 3:9” . . . AND . . . “JOHN 8:44.”

IT IS MY PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL OPINION AND BELIEF THAT ALL THREE (3) OF THE INCOMPETENT AND/OR CROOKED JEWISH ATTORNEYS EMPLOYED BY . . . “THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX INDIAN TRIBE” . . . “PATTY A. GOLDMAN (DCBA #398565)” . . . “JAN E. HASSELMAN (WSBA #29107) . . . AND . . . “STEPHANIE TSOSIE (WSBA#49840)” . . . ARE ENGAGED IN A 18 U.S.C. 371 CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY WITH THE DAKOTA ACCESS LLP AND THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS TO CREATE A FALSE LEGAL ARGUMENT AND KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY CAME UP WITH A SCHEME TO PREPARE AND FILE A FRIVOLOUS . . . “EMERGENCY MOTION FOR INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL” . . . REGARDING HISTORIC PROPERTIES AS DEFINED BY . . . “54 U.S.C. § 306101" . . . WHICH ONLY APPLIES TO . . . “WHITE MAN’S LAND” . . . THAT IS OWNED BY . . . “THE NATIONAL FOREST” . . . OR OTHER . . . “HISTORIC PROPERTIES” . . . LIKE . . . “MT. RUSHMORE” . . . “NIAGARA FALLS” . . . “THE STATUE OF LIBERTY” . . . “THE GRAND CANYON” . . . “YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK” . . . OR OTHER PROPERTIES OWNED BY . . . “THE NATIONAL FOREST” . . . AND DOES NOT APPLY TO . . . “INDIAN COUNTRY” . . . AS DEFINED BY . . . “18 U.S.C. § 1151; “THE TREATY OF FORT LARAMIE WITH SIOUX, ETC., 1851, Sept. 17, 1851. | 11 Stats., p. 749; 18 U.S.C. § 1153; 18 U.S.C. § 1154; 18 U.S.C. § 1161; 25 U.S.C. § 1321; 25 U.S.C. § 1322; 25 U.S.C. 1360 (b); 42 U.S.C. § 1437; 42 U.S.C. § 1437J; 25 U.S.C. § 323; 25 U.S.C. § 324; 25 U.S.C. § 325; 25 U.S.C. § 464; 25 U.S.C. § 474; 25 U.S.C. § 2201; 24 CFR 131.1; 24 CFR 805.218 (2); 24 CFR 805.425 (b); 25 U.S.C. § 311; 36 C.F.R. § 800.2 (c)(ii)(2)(i)(A)(B)(ii)(C)(D)(E)(F)(3) AND 25 CFR Part 169 - RIGHTS - OF - WAY OVER INDIAN LANDS.”

“However late, this objection has been made, or may be made in any cause, in an inferior or appellate court of the United States, it must be considered and decided before any court can move one further step in the cause: as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction. . . . appearance does not cure the defect of it’s judicial power.” Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 718, at 719, 12 Pet. 657 (1838). And;

FOR HELP BEATING ALL PHONY STATE LAW CRIMINAL CHARGES ISSUED WITHOUT JURISDICTION INSIDE 18 U.S.C. § 1151 INDIAN

https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/25/part-169